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PLAYING PEEKABOO WITH CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THE PCAOB AND ITS
PUBLIC/PRIVATE STATUS
Donna M. Nagy*
This Article is the first to consider the constitutional status of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB-pronounced by some as
"peekaboo"). Congress created the PCAOB in 2002 to regulate the account-
ing profession in response to scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other public
companies. The Article argues that, notwithstanding the PCAOB's congres-
sional designation as a nonprofit corporation in the private sector, its gov-
ernmental creation, governmental objectives, governmental powers, and
governmentally appointed board members render it a public (or state) actor
for purposes of constitutional law. The Article also analyzes the PCAOB
from a policy perspective and argues that the public/private PCAOB stands
in tension with democratic values such as accountability, transparency, and
legitimacy, and that inefficiencies result from its ambiguous status. It con-
cludes with a discussion of legislation pending in Congress that would estab-
lish a "Mutual Fund Oversight Board" and recommends that even if the
PCAOB's status remains unchanged, Congress should not create any other
public/private regulators modeled after the PCAOB.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (the PCAOB or the Board)' in direct response to the collapses
of Enron and WorldCom, and the bevy of other accounting and cor-
porate governance scandals capturing front page headlines in 2001
and 2002.2 As the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,3 its immedi-
ate mission was to restore public confidence in the securities markets
by ensuring the integrity of the accounting firms that audit financial
statements for publicly traded companies. 4 To achieve this end, Con-
gress vested the PCAOB with broad governmental powers and respon-
sibilities,5 including the authority to register accounting firms that
audit public companies;6 enact rules setting standards for auditing,
quality control, ethics, and independence; 7 inspect on a yearly basis
the nation's largest accounting firms and inspect other firms at least
once every three years;8 investigate accounting firms and their associ-
ated persons for possible violations of PCAOB rules or the federal se-
curities laws;9 and impose discipline for established violations through
a range of sanctions including censures, temporary suspensions, per-
1 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211-7219 (West Supp. 2004).
2 See infra Part I.B (discussing congressional hearings and legislative proposals
prompted by the collapse of Enron); see also William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley
and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 1033 (2003)
(noting that Congress was "frightened of negative elective consequences stemming
from the compounding of the Enron disaster by the WorldCom accounting scandal
(and bankruptcy) of the summer of 2002").
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
4 See ElliottJ. Weiss, Some Thoughts on an Agenda for the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 53 DuiK L.J. 491,492 (2003) (maintaining that "[t]he Board's mission
quite clearly is to develop regulations and implement regulatory procedures that will
bolster-and may even restore-the public's confidence in the integrity of public ac-
counting firms and the credibility of the final reports they audit and certify"). On the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's one-year anniversary, the Chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) expressed the view that "[t]he Board is absolutely vital to
our markets going forward." William H. Donaldson, Remarks to the National Press
Club (July 30, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch073003whd.
htm.
5 See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647,
648 (1986) (contending that "we do recognize certain powers as essentially govern-
mental: rulemaking, adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, licensing
and taxation").
6 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(c)(1).
7 Id. § 7211(c) (2).
8 Id. § 7214(b)(1)(A)-(B).
9 Id. § 7211(c) (4).
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manent bars, and substantial monetary fines.10 The PCAOB is now,
without question, the congressionally designated auditor for auditors.
In creating the PCAOB, Congress provided the Board with a
guaranteed source of funding,11 the means for subpoenaing docu-
ments, 12 official immunity from civil liability, 13 privileges from third-
party discovery, 14 and a comprehensive system of oversight by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission).
Congress was specific in charging the SEC with a number of responsi-
bilities: the SEC appoints the PCAOB's Chairperson and four other
members I 5 (who may be removed by the SEC only for good cause),16
the SEC approves the PCAOB's annual budget 17 ($103 million in
2004),18 and the SEC approves the PCAOB's rules prior to their adop-
tion. 19 Moreover, any disciplinary sanctions imposed by the PCAOB
are subject to SEC review.
20
Notwithstanding its governmental creation, its governmental
objectives, its governmental powers and privileges, and its governmen-
tally appointed board members, Congress established the PCAOB as a
private, not-for-profit corporation. Congress's determination to situ-
ate the PCAOB in the private sector could not have been clearer. In a
section entitled "status," the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that " [t] he
Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States
Government" 2 1 and that "[n]o member or person employed by, or
agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of
or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such service." 22
The PCAOB's public/private status renders its sardonic nickname
"peekaboo"2 3 more than a bit profound.
10 Id. § 7215(c) (4) (A)-(D).
11 Id. § 7219(d).
12 Id. § 7215(b) (2) (D).
13 Id. § 7215(b) (6).
14 Id. § 7215(b) (5).
15 Id. § 7211(e) (1), (4).
16 Id. § 7211(e) (6).
17 Id. § 7219(b).
18 See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
19 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(b) (2).
20 Id. § 7217(c) (2).
21 Id. § 7211(b).
22 Id.
23 See Judith Bums, Accounting Board Tackles Its Mission Amid Initial Laughs.
PCAOB, Known as Peekaboo to Some, Has Oversight of a Troubled Industry, WALL ST. J., Jan.
8, 2003, at C5 ("It is serious business. But the board's members have just discovered
that the body's name is also a cause for chuckles. That is because the board, known as
PCAOB, is called peekaboo by some.").
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This Article is the first to analyze the PCAOB's ambiguous status.
Indeed, in the two years since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
legal scholars have had remarkably little to say about whether, despite
Congress's characterization, the PCAOB should be regarded as an en-
tity of the federal government. 24 The media has been similarly silent
on this issue, with a notable exception in January 2003, when it was
reported that the Chairperson of the PCAOB was to be paid a salary of
$560,000 and its four other members were to be paid $452,000.25 Na-
tional newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and The New York
Times contrasted these salaries to the mere $142,500 paid to Harvey
Pitt, the then-SEC Chairman,26 and highlighted criticism by a number
of Senators, including Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), Judd Gregg (R-N.H.),
and Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), who described the PCAOB salaries as
"exorbitant" and "absurd."27 Senator Boxer went so far as to sponsor
legislation barring any federal salaries over the $400,000 paid to Presi-
dent Bush, a cap she intended to make applicable to the Board.
28
The hullabaloo concerning PCAOB salaries was a missed opportunity
for serious reflection on the public/private status of the Board.
24 A brief discussion of the PCAOB's public/private status can be found in
DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERI-
ALs 830-31 (2003), and in a seven page "white paper" prepared for the Federalist
Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, ERiKA C. BIRG, IS THE PUBLIC COMPANY Ac-
COUNTING OVERSIGHT BoARD CONSTITUTIONAL? (2003), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/Corpresp/ApptClauseFinal.pdf.
Several scholars have critiqued the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its impact on the ac-
counting profession. See, e.g., George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and
Public Accounting Before and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325 (2003); Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work),
35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 917 (2003); Stephen C. Gara & CraigJ. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: A New Ballgame for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. Ruv. 73 (2003); Jerry
W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking The Federal Securities
Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725 (2003); Perry E. Wallace, Accounting, Audit-
ing and Audit Committees After Enron, et al.: Governing Outside the Box Without Stepping Off
the Edge in the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 91 (2003). However, none thus far
have devoted significant attention to the PCAOB's nongovernmental status. A num-
ber of other scholars have focused on the PCAOB's responsibility for setting auditing
and ethical standards and its potential impact on the reporting, disclosure, and gov-
ernance practices of securities issuers. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 2; James D. Cox,
Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting
Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (2003); Weiss, supra note 4.
25 Stephen Labaton, Six Months Later, New Audit Board Holds First Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2003, at Al; David Rogers, Big Salaries for Oversight Panel Are Questioned on
Capitol Hill, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A4.
26 See Labaton, supra note 25.
27 See Rogers, supra note 25.
28 Id.
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Compensation aside, issues surrounding the PCAOB's public/pri-
vate status are tremendously important ones and beg for thoughtful
analysis. Indeed, Congress's creation of the PCAOB raises core consti-
tutional questions about whether its actions constitute "state action"
for purposes of the rights and protections secured by the U.S. Consti-
tution. Such doctrinal questions are sure to arise in litigation as soon
as the PCAOB begins to take disciplinary action against accounting
firms and their personnel. There are also important normative ques-
tions raised by Congress's decision to create the PCAOB as an ostensi-
bly private watchdog for the accounting industry. Chief among these
are whether the PCAOB stands in tension with democratic values such
as accountability, transparency, and legitimacy. The PCAOB's legisla-
tive history is replete with references to the benefits gained from the
Board's "strength" and "independence.'" 29 But democratic values will
be compromised if the PCAOB has the capacity to function too inde-
pendently from the will of Congress, the President, and the general
public.
Part I of this Article traces the history of the accounting profes-
sion's largely unsuccessful experience with self-regulation. It also ex-
amines the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with
particular focus on the competing proposals for a new oversight board
that would restore the public's confidence in the accounting
profession.
Part II highlights the PCAOB. It first analyzes the PCAOB's struc-
ture, powers, and responsibilities. It then compares the PCAOB to
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) in the securities industry such as
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD). It also compares the PCAOB to other pri-
vate corporations created by Congress, such as the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC).30 The comparisons reveal that, while
the PCAOB is by no means the only private sector entity relied on by
29 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002) ("The bill creates a strong indepen-
dent board to oversee the conduct of the auditors of public companies ...."); 148
CONG. REc. S6773 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("The bill ...
creates a new independent regulator for the accounting profession. The new body
will act as a strong, independent, full-time board with significant authority to regulate
auditors of public companies.").
30 The paucity of attention paid to the PCAOB's public/private status is some-
what predictable against a backdrop of constitutional and administrative law scholar-
ship that includes relatively few critiques of government corporations, whether public
or private. For a notable exception, see A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Govern-
ment Corporation, 1995 ILL. L. REv. 543, 547 (maintaining that "[a]lthough federal
corporations have been a part of the national life for 200 years, they remain
obscure").
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Congress to fulfill governmental objectives, its broad and sweeping au-
thority for rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication, when coupled
with its governmental creation and governmentally appointed board,
is indisputably unique.
Part III tackles the doctrinal issues raised by the PCAOB and ar-
gues that, notwithstanding its congressional designation, the PCAOB
is a public (or state) actor for purposes of the Constitution. Although
constitutional law scholars have described the Supreme Court's state
action doctrine as incoherent 31 and a "conceptual disaster area, '3 2 the
PCAOB permits a fairly straightforward application of precedent. The
key Supreme Court case is Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,
33
which involved a First Amendment challenge to an Amtrak official's
decision to remove a politically charged advertisement from a bill-
board in New York City's Penn Station. Like the PCAOB, Amtrak was
created by Congress as a private corporation in legislation declaring
that it "'will not be an agency or establishment of the United States
Government.' 34 And like the PCAOB, Amtrak was established to
serve governmental objectives with a board appointed entirely by gov-
There are, however, numerous critiques of so-called "private power" and the
growing state, federal, and international tendencies to look to private sources for the
provision of services typically performed by government-that is, privatization. See,
e.g., MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIvALs: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 4
(2002) (seeking "to identify the promise and dangers in the shifting roles of public
and private . . . in providing schooling, welfare, healthcare, and legal services"); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 547 (2000) (not-
ing that "[a] variety of nongovernmental actors, including corporations, public inter-
est organizations, private standard setting bodies, professional organizations, and
nonprofit groups, engage in 'public' decision making in myriad ways"); Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1369 (2003) (stating that
"[p]rivate entities provide a vast array of social services for the government; adminis-
ter core aspects of government programs; and perform tasks that appear quintessen-
tially governmental, such as promulgating standards or regulating third-party
activities"); infra notes 311-14 (citing additional books and articles). Recent law re-
view symposia have also featured the subject of privatization. See Annual Regulation of
Business Focus: Privatization, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 813 (2000); Single Subject Issue, Priva-
tization and Outsourcing, 30 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 551 (2001); Symposium, New Forms of Gov-
ernance: CedingPower to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Symposium, Public
Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1211 (2003); Symposium, Redefining
the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 FoRDHAM URB.
LJ. 1304 (2001).
31 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 505 (1985).
32 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
33 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
34 Id. at 391 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1964)).
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ernment officials. Writing for an almost unanimous Supreme Court,35
Justice Antonin Scalia held that it was for the Court-not Congress-
to decide whether Amtrak's officials were subject to the Constitution.
In making the determination that Amtrak was a public entity for
purposes of the Constitution, the Court found it "unnecessary to trav-
erse thf[e] difficult terrain" of traditional state action analysis, 36 which
questions whether actions by a private entity can be fairly attributed to
the state because of its "nexus," "symbiotic relationship," or "entwine-
ment" with the government. 37 Instead, the Court embraced the peti-
tioner's contention that, notwithstanding Congress's characterization,
Amtrak was the "government itself' for purposes of the Constitution.
In stark and unambiguous language, the Court concluded: "We hold
that where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special
law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for
itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of
that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for pur-
poses of the First Amendment."38 Under the precedent in Lebron, the
PCAOB must be considered a public entity-the "government it-
self"-for purposes of constitutional law.
But the conclusion that the PCAOB is the government for pur-
poses of the Constitution spawns a host of other constitutional issues,
implicating individual rights and liberties as well as structural protec-
tions secured by the Appointments Clause and the general doctrines
of separation of powers and nondelegation. The second and third
sections of Part III seek to frame these issues for future discussion and
analysis.
The fourth and final Part of this Article shifts from doctrine to
policy and argues that an entity established by federal law with a com-
bination of rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative power should
be part of the federal government for all purposes, not merely for
those which the Constitution has placed beyond Congress's purview.
Such a public/private regulator, even one subject to official federal
oversight, stands in great tension with democratic values such as ac-
countability, transparency, and legitimacy. To be sure, almost every
broad delegation by Congress raises concern about policymaking by
35 The lone dissenter, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, argued that considering
whether Amtrak is a government entity was "precluded because it was not presented
in the petition for certiorari," id. at 400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and that the con-
duct did not constitute state action under the traditional tests, id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
36 Id. at 378.
37 See infra Part III.A.1.
38 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
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unelected officials. But unlike most other congressionally created reg-
ulators, a public/private regulator generally is not subject to the politi-
cal and statutory checks that curb regulatory discretion and foster
rational and reflective decisionmaking. Moreover, broad delegations
to centaur-like entities39 make it alarmingly easy for Congress and the
President to claim credit for the entities' achievements while avoiding
the blame for their unpopular decisions or unwise policies. The result
is a serious lessening of Congress's and the President's own accounta-
bility to the public. Finally, although Congress often creates public/
private entities to further the goal of efficiency, a public/private regu-
lator may actually result in a regulatory program that costs more than
one administered by a regulator that is officially part of the federal
government.
The Article concludes with a discussion of legislation pending in
the Senate that would create an ostensibly private "Mutual Fund Over-
sight Board" in response to the current industry crisis. It argues that
even if the legal fiction surrounding the PCAOB is retained, Congress
should cease playing peekaboo with public/private regulators
modeled after the PCAOB.
I. THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. Accountants and Self-Regulation
The accounting profession's system of self-regulation owes its ori-
gin to congressional and SEC decisions made in the 1930s and reaf-
firmed in the 1970s to allow accountants to establish their own
standards of professional conduct and regulate their practices.40 The
39 Credit for this mythological term goes to Justice Scalia, who used it in oral
argument to describe Amtrak. See Oral Argument Transcript, Lebron v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (No. 93-1525), available at 1994 WL 759068.
40 In addition to self-regulation and the new PCAOB, accountants are subject to
regulation from two additional sources. One source is state regulation: the licensing
of certified public accountants (CPAs) is done at the state level and states may con-
duct a disciplinary proceeding and may suspend or revoke a license if a CPA is found
to have violated state regulations governing the conduct of CPAs. See Benston, supra
note 24, at 1345-46. The other source is direct regulation by the SEC. See infra notes
72-73 and accompanying text (discussing SEC rules regarding auditor indepen-
dence). Accountants who violate SEC rules, or any provisions in the federal securities
laws, may be subject to enforcement action. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 24, at 657-62
(outlining SEC civil remedies); id. at 833-35 (discussing possible penalties in criminal
actions brought by the Department of Justice). Moreover, under Rule 102(e) of its
Rules of Practice, the SEC has the power to censure or to prohibit from practicing
before the Commission any professional who lacks the "requisite qualifications to re-
present others," is "lacking in character or integrity," has "engaged in unethical or
20051
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ineffectiveness of this system was a constant theme in the congres-
sional hearings leading up to the PCAOB's creation. Dean Joel Selig-
man depicted it as a "positively Byzantine structure of accounting
disciplinary bodies which generally lack adequate and assured finan-
cial support, clear and undivided responsibility for discipline, and an
effective system of SEC oversight." 4' Other witnesses described it as "a
veritable alphabet soup of organizations provid[ing] governance" 42
and "a bewildering array of monitoring groups."43 The PCAOB re-
places most of this self-regulatory system with a new system of "inde-
pendent" regulation.
The analysis that follows examines the standard setting and over-
sight/disciplinary aspects of the accounting profession's self-regula-
tory system. It also discusses the SEC's role in this scheme.
1. Standard Setting
Although the federal securities laws authorize the SEC to regulate
the accounting methods to be used in preparing and auditing the fi-
nancial statements included in SEC reports,44 as a fledgling agency,
improper professional conduct," or has "willfully violated, or willfully aided and abet-
ted the violation of" the securities laws. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (i)-(iii) (2004). With
respect to accountants, "improper professional conduct" includes "intentional or
knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that results in a violation of applicable
professional standards" as well as a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct, or
repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, "that results in a violation of applicable
professional standards." Id. § 201.102(e)(iv). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act codified this
rule as Section 4C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-3 (West
Supp. 2004).
41 Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public
Companies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. 532 (2002) [hereinafter Accounting Reform Hearing] (testimony of Joel Selig-
man, Dean and Ethan A. H. Shepley Univ. Professor, Washington Univ. Sch. of Law).
42 Id. at 963 (prepared statement of Aulana Peters, Member, Public Oversight
Bd.) (bemoaning the "alphabet soup" of governance); Oversight Hearing on Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies Before the
Senate Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 723 (2002) [hereinafter
Oversight Hearing] (prepared statement of Shaun O'Malley, Chairman, 2000 Public
Oversight Bd. Panel on Audit Effectiveness). The "alphabet soup" metaphor surfaced
several times in congressional testimony. See, e.g., Accounting Reform Hearing, supra
note 41, at 245 (testimony and prepared statement of Lynn Turner, Chief Account-
ant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 1998-2001) (stating that "the multitude of organizations
often referred to in the press these days as 'alphabet soup' do not yield an efficient or
effective quality control process").
43 Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 376 (prepared statement of John
Biggs, Chairman, President, and CEO, TIAA-CREF).
44 Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000).
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the SEC was quick to delegate most of its standard-setting authority to
the private sector.45 Specifically, the SEC deferred to the accounting
industry's principal trade association, the American Institute of Ac-
countants (AIA), which later became known as the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) .46 The AICPA's initial stan-
dard-setting responsibilities included the formulation of both "gener-
ally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) 47 as well as "generally
accepted auditing standards" (GAAS) .48 As we shall see, the AICPA
(and thus the SEC) later looked to an independent body-the Finan-
45 See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATrHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 145
(3d ed. 2001); see also Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 4, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946). In its entirety, the Release
provided:
In cases where financial statements filed with this Commission pursuant to
its rules and regulations under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 are prepared in accordance with accounting principles for
which there is no substantial authoritative support, such financial statements will
be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate despite disclosures contained in
the certificate of the accountant or in footnotes to the statements provided
the matters involved are material. In cases where there is a difference of
opinion between the Commission and the registrant as to the proper princi-
ples of accounting to be followed, disclosure will be accepted in lieu of cor-
rection of the financial statements themselves only if the points involved are
such that there is substantial authoritative support for the practices followed by
the registrant and the position of the Commission has not previously been
expressed in rules, regulations, or other official releases of the Commission,
including the published opinions of its chief accountant.
Id. (emphasis added).
Commenting on the importance of this Release, Professor George Mundstock empha-
sizes that "[i]n two sentences, the SEC (i) gives the industry primary responsibility for
accounting principles and (ii) blesses the notion that there can be many acceptable
accountings for the same transaction." George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 813, 826 (2003).
46 Since 1887, AICPA and its predecessors have been the principal trade group
for the accounting profession. See Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, Summary
of AJCPA Operations, at http://www.aicpa.org/about/summary.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2005). The AICPA currently has over 128,000 public accounting members in the
United States. SeeAm. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA Membership Figures
and Breakdown, at http://www.aicpa.org/members/memstats.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2005).
47 The broad term "accounting principles" encompasses "those guidelines, rules
or procedures which enterprises use to prepare financial statements." HERWITZ &
BARRETT, supra note 45, at 144. Thus, GAAP "reflects a consensus of what the ac-
counting profession and financial community consider good accounting practices."
Id.
48 The broad term "auditing standards" encompasses the standards and proce-
dures that independent accountants must follow when they examine an enterprise's
financial statements for the purpose of expressing "an opinion regarding whether the
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cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)-to formulate GAAP; but
the AICPA retained responsibility for GAAS until Congress established
the PCAOB.
a. Accounting Principles
The AICPA's initial role in the formulation of formal accounting
principles was an important one. Its first efforts to develop such prin-
ciples occurred in 1939 when it organized a Committee on Account-
ing Procedure (CAP) and a Committee on Accounting Terminology
(CAT), whose accounting pronouncements took the form of Account-
ing Research Bulletins (ARBs).49 In response to SEC criticism about
the slow pace of their pronouncements, 50 as well as criticism by busi-
ness groups as to their closed processes, 51 the AICPA replaced CAP
and CAT in 1959 with the Accounting Principles Board (APB), whose
pronouncements took the form of APB Opinions.
52
In 1972, the AICPA disbanded the APB and designated the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the entity that would es-
tablish accounting principles governing the profession. The change
was made after an AICPA committee chaired by former SEC Commis-
sioner Francis M. Wheat recommended the establishment of an inde-
pendent standard-setting entity with broad-based public
participation. 53 The FASB was part of the newly created Financial Ac-
counting Foundation (FAF), a nonprofit organization that is responsi-
ble for "selecting the [seven] members of the FASB and its advisory
council, ensuring adequate funding of their activities, and exercising
general oversight with the exception of the FASB's resolution of tech-
nical issues. '5
4
financial statements fairly present, in all material respects, the enterprise's financial
position, results of operations and cash flows in conformity with GAAP." Id. at 180.
49 See id. at 152.
50 See Benston, supra note 24, at 1333.
51 See Mundstock, supra note 45, at 828-29.
52 See HERW1TZ & B/ARREjir, supra note 45, at 153. The APB's membership in-
cluded AICPA members, with representatives from each of the "Big Eight" accounting
firms, see infra note 69, as well as a few representatives from smaller firms and
academia. See HERWITZ & BARtatr-r, supra note 45, at 153.
53 Cheryl D. Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle
Black?, 82 NEB. L. Rrv. 365, 385 (2003).
54 See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB, at 2 (2003), available
at http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts.about-fasb-pdf. The nonprofit FAF has a Board
of Trustees composed of members from its eight constituent organizations: the Amer-
ican Accounting Association; the AICPA; the Association for Investment Management
and Research; Financial Executives International; the Government Finance Officers
Association; the Institute of Management Accountants; the National Association of
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From its inception, the FASB commanded more respect than any
of its standard-setting predecessors. Its heightened reputation was
due in part to its "large budget, professional staff, and a mandate to
reduce the scope of choice among alternative accounting practices."
55
But the SEC greatly contributed to the new organization's authority
and reputation when it issued a Release in 1973 expressing its "in-
tent[ion] to continue its policy of looking to the private sector for
leadership in establishing and improving accounting principles and
standards through the FASB. ''5 6 After reaffirming the 1938 Release
that first articulated its policy of private-sector delegation,
5 7 the SEC
stated unequivocally that the "principles, standards, and practices
promulgated by the FASB in its Statements and Interpretations will be
considered by the Commission as having substantial authoritative sup-
port, and those contrary to such FASB promulgations will be consid-
ered to have no such support."5 8 Scholars have since debated whether
the SEC abdicated an essential regulatory function by delegating the
formulation of accounting principles to the FASB
59 and, without suc-
cess, accounting firms have challenged the constitutionality of this
delegation. 60
Although its budget was substantially larger than its standard-set-
ting predecessors, until recently the FASB's funding was never very
State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers; and the Securities Industry Association.
Id. at 3.
55 Benston, supra note 24, at 1334.
56 Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260
(Jan. 7, 1974).
57 See supra note 45.
58 See Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. at 1260.
59 See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 153 (1979) (maintaining that "[t]he determination of what ac-
counting should mean is the SEC's most important job-too important to be left to
others"); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L.
REv. 763, 883 (1995) (arguing that "there is something to be said for Kripke's (and
many others') arguments that disclosure accounting should be governed by the SEC"
and emphasizing that " [t] he accounting profession is only one party in interest in the
debate about accounting standards, and accounting standards that are unduly respon-
sive to the interests of the accounting profession in the sale of accounting services,
rather than the interests of all the affected parties, are probably not socially benefi-
cial"). But see Cunningham, supra note 24, at 981 (observing that "[tlruly sweeping
reform would abolish the FASB" but that "[g]ivi.ng the SEC sole direct power could
further politicize the standard-setting process").
60 SeeArthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,720 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 3, 1976); see also infra notes 456-59 and accompanying text (discussing the so-
called private nondelegation doctrine).
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secure. The FASB received its funding from the FAF, which derived
more than two-thirds of its monies from subscriptions and sales of
FASB publications and about one-third from voluntary contribu-
tions. 61 This funding mechanism drew sharp criticism from congres-
sional witnesses during the Enron hearings, who testified that it
caused FASB to be "less than optimally independent or objective" be-
cause "it constantly place [d] FASB and FAF in the role of a hat-in-
hand supplicant soliciting the industry for charity."62
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act responds to this criticism by providing
the FASB with the same source of guaranteed funding it accorded to
the PCAOB: public companies are required to pay "annual account-
61 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-601T, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADDRESSING SELECTED REGULATORY OVERSIGHT, AUDITING, COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING ISSUES 17 (2002) (testimony of David
Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office). In 2001, "FASB re-
ceived net contributions of $5,113,000 and subscription and publication sales of
$14,818,000; its direct costs of sales was $1,586,000." See Framework for Enhancing
the Quality of Financial Information Through Improvement of the Auditing Process,
Securities Act Release No. 8109, Exchange Act Release No. 46,120, 67 Fed. Reg.
44,964, 44,979 n.92 (July 5, 2002).
62 The Financial Accounting Standards Board Act: Hearing Before the House Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Energy & Commerce Comm., 107th
Cong. 52 (2002) [hereinafter FASB Act Hearing] (prepared statement of John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Univ. Law Sch.); see also The Corpo-
rate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002: Hearing on
HR. 3763 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 496 (2002) (statement of
Damon A. Silvers, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, AFL-CIO) (stating that "[a]nyone familiar
with the political pressures brought to bear on FASB around accounting for executive
stock options in the mid-1990's, not to mention the decade long paralysis on SPE
[Special Purpose Entities] accounting knows that FASB is too open to pressures from
issuers and those beholden to issuers"); Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at
205 (testimony of Michael Sutton, Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
1995-1998) ("Take control of the money away from those who want to manipulate
the system [and] . . . have a truly independent governance process. If you do that, I
think we would have a chance of getting better and more timely answers from the
FASB."); The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 37 (2002) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Former
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) ("The fact that the board is funded by the very
firms for whom they set standards, who often come back to them and say, 'If you are
going to set this standard, we are going to cut off your funding.' That is wrong. We
have got to change their funding."). But see FASB Act Hearing, supra at 32 (statement
of Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.) (stating "[i]n my
five years as Chairman of the FASB, no contribution to the FAF, or threat of withhold-
ing a contribution, if any occurred, had any impact, in any way, on any of the deci-
sions of the Board" but acknowledging that "a secure and adequate non-discretionary
funding source for the FAF that might serve to strengthen the appearance of inde-
pendence of the FASB").
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ing support fees" to fund both boards' operations. 63 Congress further
strengthened the FASB by confirming its authority to establish GAAP,
provided the FASB satisfies new criteria designed to separate it from
the accounting profession. 64
b. Auditing Standards
Although the SEC from time to time encouraged the formation
of an "independent" FASB-like entity to promulgate auditing stan-
dards, that responsibility fell initially to the AICPA and remained with
it for decades. The AICPA's first formal auditing standards were is-
sued in 1939 by a newly created Committee on Auditing Procedure
(CAC), which promulgated the broad auditing standards that con-
tinue to form the core of GAAS.65 Over time, the CAC was reorga-
nized and became the Auditing Standards Board (ASB).66 The ASB is
primarily responsible for interpreting GAAS, and its interpretations
are published in the AICPA's Statements on Auditing Standards
(SAS). 67 For a brief time in 2001, the ASB was overseen by the Public
63 See infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
64 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(b) (1) (West Supp. 2004) (as amended by Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108(a), 116 Stat. 745, 768):
[T]he Commission may recognize as "generally accepted" for purposes of
the securities laws any accounting principles established by a standard set-
ting body... that-(i) is organized as a private entity; (ii) has ... a board of
trustees (or equivalent body) serving in the public interest, the majority of
whom are not, concurrent with their term of service on such board, and
have not been during the 2-year period preceding such service, associated
persons of any registered public accounting firm; (iii) is funded as provided
in section 7219 of this title; (iv) has adopted procedures to ensure prompt
consideration, by majority vote of its members, of changes to accounting
principles necessary to reflect emerging accounting issues and changing bus-
iness practices; and (v) considers, in adopting accounting principles, the
need to keep standards current in order to reflect changes in the business
environment, the extent to which international convergence on high quality
accounting standards is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
for the protection of investors.
Id. The Senate Report makes clear that the standard-setting body referred to above is
the FASB. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 13 (2002) (stating that "[t]he bill seeks to for-
malize the SEC's reliance on the FASB"). For a discussion of the new criteria for
standard-setting bodies, see infta note 262.
65 See Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, The Enron Crisis: The AICPA, The
Profession & The Public Interest: A Brief History of Self-Regulation (2002), at.
66 The name of the CAC was changed in 1972 to the Auditing Standard Executive
Committee (AudSEC), "in recognition of its role as the AICPA's senior technical com-
mittee charged with interpreting generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS)." Id.
The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) was formed in 1978 as AudSEC's successor. Id.
67 Id.
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Oversight Board (POB), which was independent from, but funded by,
the AICPA.
68
The self-interest endemic to the ASB's structure drew particularly
harsh criticism during the Enron congressional hearings. Indeed, the
fifteen members who volunteer their time to sit on the ASB are
predominantly practicing accountants, many of whom are partners
with what are now the Big Four accounting firms.69 As Lynn Turner,
former Chief Accountant at the SEC, testified:
They actually draft the standards.
One of the problems with that part of the system today is, when they
go through that drafting process, since it is all being done by the
firms themselves, in fact, their legal counsels get involved in editing
those very standards themselves, those standards tend to be written
to protect the accounting firms in case they get in trouble on an
audit, sometimes probably which is deserved, and quite frankly,
sometimes which is not deserved....
It is not drafted with the public interest in mind .... As long as you
leave that standards setting process in the hands of the firms and of
the firm's legal counsel, you are going to get standards written to
protect them in court, as opposed to standards written to ensure
that they do audits that will protect the public."
70
Most witnesses believed that the SEC's role as the ASB's ultimate
"overseer" did little to mitigate the standard-setting conflicts. 71 An ar-
68 See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
69 Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 217 (testimony and prepared state-
ment of Lynn Turner, Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n). For many years,
eight national firms dominated the accounting industry. But in 1989, with the merg-
ers of Ernst & Whitney and Arthur Young into Ernst & Young and Touche Ross and
Deloitte Haskins & Sells into Deloitte & Touche, the "Big Eight" was reduced to six
members. When Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers Lybrand in 1998, the "Big
Six" became the "Big Five." After Arthur Andersen's Enron-related demise in 2002,
the "Big Five" dwindled to what is now the "Big Four" (also referred to sometimes as
the "Final Four"): PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst &
Young LLP, and KPMG LLP.
70 Id. at 217 (testimony and prepared statement of Lynn Turner, Chief Account-
ant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (quoting Sandy Burton, former Chief Accountant).
71 See S. RP. No. 107-205, at 5-6 (2002); see also The Enron Collapse: Impact on
Investors and Financial Markets: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Mkts.,
Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. and the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of
the House Comm. on Fin. Serus., 107th Cong. 95 (2001) (statement of Robert Herdman,
Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n). Herdman described the SEC's monitoring
role as follows: "[T]he SEC staff attends many of the ASB's public meetings, reviews
exposure drafts of proposed auditing standards and selected comment letters re-
sponding to those exposure drafts, and periodically meets with representatives of the
ASB to discuss current and future projects and other matters of mutual concern." Id.
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guable exception might be the requirements for auditor indepen-
dence because, only a few years before, the SEC had enhanced its own
rules in that area. 72 Yet even these requirements drew much criticism
in congressional hearings. 73 Congress eventually interceded in Title
II of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which amends the Exchange Act to make
it unlawful for any accounting firm to provide contemporaneously
with an audit for a public company any one of eight types of non-audit
services.
74
In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, it is an open question as to
whether the AICPA will play a significant role in standard setting for
auditors. To be sure, Congress had the AICPA in mind when it au-
thorized the PCAOB to "cooperate on an ongoing basis" with profes-
sional and advisory groups 75 and to "adopt as its rules... any portion
of any statement of auditing standards... by [a] professional group[ ]
72 In the late 1990s, the SEC, at the urging of its Chairman, Arthur Levitt, sought
to increase the independence of auditors by restricting an accounting firm's ability to
provide both audit services and consulting services to the same client. Although the
SEC's initial proposals would have resulted in substantial change, these proposals
were scaled back substantially under heavy pressure from members of Congress (who
were being lobbied strongly by the Big Five accounting firms). See Michael Schroeder,
SEC May Back Down on Key Consulting Issue, WALL ST.J., Oct. 25, 2000, at C1 (reporting
that both the House and the Senate had drafted provisions to bills that would undo
any SEC rules prohibiting auditors from providing consulting services to their audit
clients). The SEC's final rules, Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence
Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 7919, Exchange Act Release No. 43,602, 65
Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,013 (Dec. 5, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240 (2004)),
bore a faint resemblance to Chairman Levitt's original plan for reform. See ARTHUR
LEvrrr, TAKE ON THE STREET 132-33 (2002) (describing the initiatives in the 1990s to
increase auditor independence and stating that "[n]ever before had the SEC faced
such a threat" to its own independence).
73 See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 17-18 (maintaining that " ' the AICPA and the SEC
have failed to update their independence standards in a timely fashion and that past
updates have not adequately protected the public's interest"') (quoting a statement
by Comptroller General David Walker).
74 Exchange Act, § 10A(g)(1)-(8), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l (g) (1)-(8) (West Supp.
2004); see also S. REP. No. 107-205, at 18 (stating that "[t]he approach adopted by the
bill reflects the Committee's belief that the issue of auditor independence is so funda-
mental to the problems currently being experienced in our financial markets that
statutory standards are needed to assure the independence of the auditor from the
audit client"). As we shall see, Congress vested the PCAOB with significant power to
both add to and subtract from this list of prohibited non-audit services. See infra notes
193-96 and accompanying text. The similarities between Title II's requirements and
the restrictions on auditors that were initially proposed by the SEC in the late 1990s,
see supra note 72, have been noted by many. See, e.g., NAGY ET AL., supra note 24, at
832.
75 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(c) (1).
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of accountants" that is determined to be in the public interest.76 But
Congress clearly put the PCAOB in the driver's seat with respect to the
formulation of auditing standards, 77 and regarding professional group
standards, stated explicitly that the PCAOB "shall retain full authority
to modify, supplement, revise, or subsequently amend, modify, or re-
peal, in whole or in part, any portion of any statement" included in
such standards. 78 At a public meeting in April 2003, the PCAOB an-
nounced that it would be developing its own standards for the audits
of public companies and that the AICPA's existing standards would be
applicable only in the interim.
79
2. Oversight and Discipline
Unlike standard setting, which was clearly on the minds of SEC
officials and members of Congress in the 1930s, significant concerns
about the accounting profession's oversight and discipline (or its lack
thereof) did not arise until the 197 0s, when investors lost staggering
sums of money due to financial scandals and subsequent bankruptcies
at companies including Penn Central Railway, Equity Funding, and
Continental Vending.80  In addition, congressional hearings
prompted by the Watergate break-in and its subsequent cover-up re-
vealed undisclosed slush funds, bank accounts, and other devices used
76 Id. § 7213(a)(3)(A)(i).
77 See Cunningham, supra note 24, at 919 (noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
stripped the AICPA of its power to make authoritative decisions).
78 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a)(3)(A)(ii).
79 See Audit Standards: PCAOB to Adopt own Audit Standards, Agrees to Existing Rules
as Interim Step, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 671, 671-72 (2003) (reporting PCAOB
member Kayla Gillan's statements that she was "'reluctantly supporting' the adoption
of interim standards and she 'would have loved to have new [PCAOB] standards' ...
[by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's deadline], but she understood that was not possible");
see also Oversight of the Public Company Accounting Board: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 6
(2004) [hereinafter PCAOB Hearing] (statement of William F. McDonough, Chair-
man, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. Chairman), available at http://financialser-
vices.house.gov/media/pdf/108-98.pdf (emphasizing that the PCAOB intends to
review the "interim standards and would determine, standard by standard, whether
they should be modified, repealed, or made permanent").
80 See Lynn Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, Shifting Paradigms in Self-Regulation:
Address at the 27th Anniversary Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 27, 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch340.htm; see also Accounting Reform Hear-
ing, supra note 41, at 896 (testimony and prepared statement of Charles Bowsher,
Chairman, Public Oversight Bd. and former Comptroller General of the United
States) (noting that after its enactment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
"Congress did not look really again at the accounting profession until the 1970's").
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by major corporations to hide illegal bribes and kickbacks. 81 These
revelations prompted the cry, "Where were the auditors?"
82
With Congress's attention now focused on the accounting profes-
sion, the relative merits of federal regulation over self-regulation were
examined and debated. Although a self-regulatory system was the one
ultimately favored, members of Congress concluded that "the SEC's
reliance on the private accounting profession alone . . . ha[d] been
insufficient to protect public investors and accomplish the objectives
of the Federal securities laws,"83 and that reforms were "needed to
restore public confidence in the accuracy and reliability of financial
and other information reported by publicly-owned corporations."
84
In 1977, in response to congressional demands, "and as an alter-
native to federal legislation, the... [AICPA], in consultation with the
SEC," created a new self-regulatory framework with peer review at its
center.85 Specifically, the AICPA established the SEC Practice Section
(SECPS) and the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC).86 The
SECPS handled the peer review of auditing firms while the QCIC in-
vestigated allegations of audit failure.8 7 AICPA member firms per-
forming audits for public companies were required to join the SECPS,
meet its standards, and submit to its periodic peer reviews. 88 The
AICPA also established the Public Oversight Board (POB) in the same
1977 Council Resolution that created the SECPS. 89 This resolution
required the POB to
81 Turner, supra note 80.
82 Id.
83 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON FEDERAL REGULA-
TION AND REGULATORY REFORM 38 (Subcomm. Print 1976) (also known as the "Moss
Report").
84 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING, AND MGMT. OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., REPORT ON THE ACCOUNTING ES-
TABLISHMENT: A STAFF STUDY 20 (Subcomm. Print 1977).
85 See Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 940 (testimony and prepared
statement of Charles Bowsher, Chairman, Public Oversight Bd. and former Comptrol-
ler General of the United States).
86 See Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through
Improvement of the Auditing Process, Securities Act Release No. 8109, Exchange Act
Release No. 46,120, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,964, 45,010 app. A (July 5, 2002); see also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-411, THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: STATUS OF
PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY
SYSTEM 7 (2002).
87 Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through Im-
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(a) Monitor and evaluate [the regulatory and sanction] activities of
the Peer Review and [SECPS] Executive Committees to assure their
effectiveness, (b) Determine that the Peer Review Committee is as-
certaining that firms are taking appropriate action as a result of
peer reviews, (c) Conduct continuing oversight of all other activities
of the Section. 90
The POB's story is, by now, a familiar one. Although its system of
peer review resulted in some improvement, the POB's funding mecha-
nism and lack of sanctioning authority ultimately doomed its ability to
meet its objectives. As the SEC recounted:
While intended to be autonomous (the POB could set its own
budget, establish its own operating procedures, and appoint its own
members, chairperson, and staff), the POB relied for its funding on
voluntary dues paid by AICPA firms that audited public companies
and belonged to [the] SECPS. In addition, the POB lacked the abil-
ity to organize and implement its own quality control reviews. And,
the POB was not given any authority to sanction auditors for defi-
ciencies or incompetence noted during quality control reviews. 91
Peer review, the two-decade-old cornerstone of the self-regulatory
system, drew particularly harsh criticism, 92 eventually prompting the
SEC in 1999 to remove its "endorsement" of the process from its An-
nual Reports to Congress. 93 The bubbling tension grew to a boil the
following year after the AICPA cut off the POB's funding when it ac-
90 Id. (quoting DIv. FOR CPA Fiims, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SECPS REFERENCE
MANuAL, § 100.23).
91 Id. at 44,970.
92 See, e.g., Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 76 (prepared statement of
Harold M. Williams, Former Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) ("To my knowledge,
there has never been a negative review of a major firm.... Particularly as the Big 8
has become only the Big 5, peer review, in its present form becomes too incestuous.");
id. at 1116 (prepared statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n)
("[I]t appears that the current system of firm-on-firm peer reviews, overseen by [the
POB] .. .has not produced a credible result."); id. at 1035 (prepared statement of
Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman, Consumer Fed'n of Am. and former U.S. Sena-
tor) ("The POB ... is notable for having never sanctioned a major accounting firm in
its 25 years of existence, even when peer reviews have uncovered serious short com-
ings in a firm's audit procedures."); id. at 533 (testimony ofJoel Seligman, Dean and
Ethan A. H. Shepley Univ. Professor, Washington Univ. Sch. of Law) ("Peer review
has been to some degree unfairly maligned. But even at its best, it involves competi-
tors reviewing competitors. The temptation to go easy on the firm you review lest it
be too critical of you is an unavoidable one.").
93 Id. at 247 (testimony and prepared statement of Lynn Turner, Chief Account-
ant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 1998-2001); see also Framework for Enhancing the Quality
of Financial Information Through Improvement of the Auditing Process, 67 Fed. Reg.
at 44,968.
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ceded to the SEC's request to examine the Big Five accounting firms'
compliance with the then-applicable standards for auditor indepen-
dence. 94 Although the POB and the SEC agreed to organizational
changes in 2001, 9 5 the structural weaknesses remained. In January
2002, the members of the POB voted unanimously to disband after
the SEC announced its intention to create an auditor oversight body
with more independence from the accounting profession.
96
B. The Enron Scandal and Congress's Response
Despite the concerns raised in the 1980s and 1990s about the ac-
counting profession's system of self-regulation, change was very slow
to occur. Impediments came from a variety of sources, including an
SEC that lacked the budget to avail itself more fully of its own regula-
tory authority97 and elected officials who were mindful that the Big
For many years, we had stated in our Annual Report that the peer review and
QCIC processes resulted in accounting firms "focusing on and achieving the
important goal of maintaining and improving effective quality control sys-
tems." Because of our growing concerns, however, we intentionally did not
include that statement in our 1999, 2000, and 2001 Annual Reports.
Id.
94 See Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 941 (testimony and prepared
statement of Charles Bowsher, Chairman, Public Oversight Bd. and former Comptrol-
ler General of the United States) (stating that "[t] he decision of the SECPS to deny
funding to the POB was a serious blow to the notion of independent oversight of the
accounting profession").
95 Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through Im-
provement of the Auditing Process, 67 Fed. Reg. at 44,971. Among other changes,
the new charter provided for POB oversight of the Accounting Standards Board. Id.
96 Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 941 (testimony and prepared state-
ment of Charles Bowsher, Chairman, Public Oversight Bd. and former Comptroller
General of the United States) (contending that the "precipitating event" of the POB's
decision to disband was a plan "worked out in private talks between the SEC and the
AICPA and the Big 5 accounting firms with no input from the POB, which had repeat-
edly been assured that it would be consulted" and that "[t] he new proposal effectively
rendered the POB a 'lame duck'"). The SEC proposal provided for the creation of
one or more Public Accountability Boards (PABs). Framework for Enhancing the
Quality of Financial Information Through Improvement of the Auditing Process, 67
Fed. Reg. at 44,971. Members of a PAB were to be drawn from the accounting profes-
sion as well as the public, though the public members were to have predominated. Id.
And PABs were to be overseen by the SEC. Id. The SEC's proposal for PABs, of
course, was preempted by Congress's decision to establish the PCAOB.
97 See, e.g., Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 18 (testimony of Richard C.
Breeden, Former Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
Attrition among the staff of the SEC is the friend of everyone who hopes to
commit an undetected fraud .... The SEC also does not have enough re-
sources in the accounting area in particular. For many years we did not have
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Five accounting firms and other major campaign contributors were
staunchly opposed to increased government regulation (such as in the
area of auditor independence).98 But Congress and the SEC were
propelled into action by the Enron debacle at the end of 2001. The
growing number of accounting and corporate governance scandals
had sounded an alarm, 99 which was made all the more deafening by
the staggering sums of money lost by shareholders, employees, and
retirees of the companies involved.' 00 As one corporate law scholar
observed, after Enron, "Congress possessed that rare political and in-
stitutional capacity to address deep causes and systemic dysfunc-
tion." 10 1 Indeed, within a six-month period, the scandal-driven
momentum resulted in dozens of congressional hearings, more than
thirty proposed bills, and landmark legislation passed by a virtually
unanimous Congress and signed into law by the President.
1. Congressional Hearings
In the period of time between January and April 2002, commit-
tees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives held hear-
enough staff to look at both IPOs and 34 Act filings. That is not good
enough.
Id.
98 See supra note 72. For discussions on the powerful force of the accounting
lobby, see Bratton, supra note 2, at 1033 (contending that "[tihe accounting profes-
sion has become famously aggressive at protecting its own interests and those of its
clients in the corridors of power in Washington"); Cox, supra note 24, at 316 (noting
that "the industry spent $41 million on lobbying activities between 1997 and 2001"
and that of the "248 Senate and House members who sat on congressional commit-
tees involved in the numerous investigations prompted by the financial scandals of
2002, 212 of them had received contributions from one or more [of] the Big Five
accounting firms"); see also LEVrr, supra note 72, app. (publishing letters received
from members of Congress regarding the SEC's proposed auditor independence
rules).
99 In the winter of 2002, a list of significant accounting and corporate governance
scandals would have included Adelphia Communications Corp., Qwest Communica-
tions, Rite Aid Corp., Global Crossing, Tyco International, and Xerox Corp. But in
June 2002, a new company was added to the top of the list: WorldCom, whose fraud
was initially estimated at $3.8 billion, but was later revealed to be more than eleven
billion dollars. See Robert Frank et al., Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at
BI; see also infra note 147 and accompanying text (contending that the WorldCom
scandal fueled the momentum for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
100 Cunningham, supra note 24, at 979 (stating that Congress and the President
"knew that constituents wanted action, eyeing [Enron and WorldCom] after the value
of their investment funds-built for dreams concerning first-home purchases, educat-
ing children, enjoying retirement, and taking trips around the world-shrank from
Dow 12,000 to Dow 8,000 (and less)").
101 Id. at 917.
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ings on the accounting and investor protection issues raised by Enron
and the notorious scandals at other public companies. In the Senate,
the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, chaired by
Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), held ten days of hearings involving a
total of thirty-six witnesses.10 2 A total of nineteen witnesses testified in
hearings held by the House Committee on Financial Services, chaired
by Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio). 1° 3 To be sure, much of
the congressional testimony related to issues of corporate governance,
insider abuses, completeness of disclosure in SEC filings, conflicts of
interest among securities analysts, and the inadequacy of the re-
sources available to the SEC. 10 4 But issues concerning standards and
oversight for accountants and auditors predominated.
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, virtually all of
those testifying shared the view that the accounting profession's sys-
tem of self-regulation was in need of a serious overhaul.
10 5 Most wit-
nesses supported the creation of a new, independent entity to provide
more effective auditor oversight.'0 6 And most agreed that the new
entity should not be dependent for funding on the accounting profes-
sion.10 7 But opinions diverged as to whether this newly created entity
should be private or public. Some witnesses urged the establishment
of a private sector entity modeled after SROs in the securities industry
such as NYSE or the NASD. s08 It was argued that a private, indepen-
dent entity with the SEC as its overseer would allow Congress to attain
102 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2-4 (2002) (listing hearings and names of witnesses).
103 H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 19 (2002). Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, at least nine other congressional committees held hearings in response to
the Enron scandal. SeeJOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OxLEY DESKBOOK § 2:4.3,
app. K (2004) (listing committees and dates of hearings).
104 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2.
105 See supra notes 42, 61-62, 69-71 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No.
107-205, at 5-7.
106 See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 5.
107 Id. at 13.
108 See Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 583 (prepared statement of
John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Univ.) ("Legislation is
necessary to create a body that would have at least the same powers, duties and obliga-
tions as the NASD."); id. at 532 (testimony of Joel Seligman, Dean and Ethan A. H.
Shepley Univ. Professor, Washington Univ. Sch. of Law) (" [I] t is time for a new audit-
ing self-regulatory organization to be created [with] .. .clear and undivided responsi-
bility for discipline, and an effective system of SEC oversight."); id. at 194 (testimony
of Michael Sutton, Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 1995-1998) ("In my
view, those goals can be best accomplished through an independent statutory regula-
tory organization operating in the private sector under the oversight of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.").
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"the best of both worlds."'10 9 Other witnesses expressed concern with
an NYSE/NASD model, with one witness warning that private sector
companies with governmental powers constituted the "worst of both
worlds rather than the best." 1 0
David Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States, pro-
vided the most extensive analysis on the choice between creating a
new entity in the private or public sector. In his April 9, 2002, testi-
mony to the House Committee on Financial Services, Comptroller
Walker recommended that Congress "create an independent statutory
federal government body to oversee financial audits of public compa-
nies."11 1 He also advised that "the new body would have independent
decisionmaking authority from the SEC,"' 12 that it "should be given
appropriate flexibility... to provide compensation that is competitive
to attract highly competent board members and supporting staff,"' 1 3
and that "members of the board should be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the U.S. Senate." 1 4 The Comptroller provided a
109 Id. at 529 (prepared statement of Robert R. Glauber, Chairman and CEO,
Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers)
It is my judgment that if properly designed, a new private sector regulator
can make a major contribution by tapping industry resources and insights
not available to the Government. To get the best of both worlds, however,
these advantages should be matched with tough SEC oversight under the
watchful eye of Congress.
Id.
110 Id. at 1027-28 (testimony of Sarah Teslik, Executive Director, Council of Insti-
tutional Investors).
They are not accountable to anyone. We don't elect them. They do not
disclose anything. Do you know what Dick Grasso makes? We know what
you make. We do not know what CEOs make.... And our ability to either
police them, oversee them, or even give them input, tends to be less than the
government entities that we deal with .... By and large, we get better re-
sponses, more quickly in the sunshine, with better regulation from govern-
ment bodies.
Id. Teslik's critique foreshadowed the NYSE's surprising announcement that its
Chairman and CEO, Richard Grasso, "will collect $139.5 million in deferred retire-
ment benefits and a pay package of at least $2.4 million this year." Kate Kelly, NYSE
Chief Will Collect $139.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at Cl.
111 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 61, at 5.
112 Id. at 7.
113 Id.
114 Id. Comptroller Walker further suggested that candidates for board member-
ship "could be identified through a nominating committee that could include the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Chairman of the SEC, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, and the Comptroller General of the United States." Id.
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more nuanced opinion to the Senate Banking Committee, 115 and ad-
vised that there were "several alternative structures" that the Congress
could choose from in establishing the new body, including creating:
"(1) a new unit within the SEC, (2) an independent government en-
tity within the SEC, (3) an independent government agency outside
the SEC, or (4) a non-governmental private-sector entity overseen by
the SEC."1 16 Although he recognized that all four alternatives had
various pros and cons, he believed that alternatives one and four had
a lesser likelihood of success. He specifically noted that "under alter-
natives one and four, the new body would have less direct accountabil-
ity to the Congress and the public than a body with board members
who are PASs [President appointed confirmed by the Senate] .- 117 He
also expressed concern that alternatives one and four would increase
the SEC's responsibility as well as its workload. 118
Of the remaining alternatives, Comptroller Walker favored num-
ber two:
[W]e favor alternative two as having a greater likelihood of success
because the new body would be housed within the SEC and, there-
fore, could receive administrative support from the SEC, including
human resources, payroll, and other administrative support. More
importantly, this alternative should better facilitate communication
and provide for maximum coordination with the SEC, while also
allowing the new body the independence to design its own policies
and procedures as it deemed appropriate. In addition, alternative
two would not require Congress to create a separate federal entity.
Alternative two would also facilitate a consolidation of the new en-
tity under the SEC in future years if such a consolidation was
deemed to be both desirable and appropriate. Therefore, we be-
115 Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General, Gen. Accounting Office,
to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (May 3, 2002), reprinted in U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-02-41 1, THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM app. 6 (2002), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02411.pdf.
116 Id. at 5, reprinted in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-411, THE ACCOUNT-
ING PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO EN-
HANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM app. 6, at 79 (2002), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d0241 1.pdf.
117 Id., reprinted in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-411, THE ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO EN-
HANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM app. 6, at 79 (2002), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d0241 1.pdf.
118 Id., reprinted in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-411, THE ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO EN-
HANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM app. 6, at 79 (2002), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d0241 1.pdf.
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lieve that alternative two has the greatest likelihood of success in
terms of potential effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of the
new body. 119
But with that said, Comptroller Walker reiterated the view that "each
of the alternative structures has merit and can potentially work if
properly designed and implemented." 120
Several witnesses agreed with the assessment that change to the
status quo was necessary, but disagreed with the recommendation that
Congress create a new regulatory body (whether public or private). A
number of witnesses, including former SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden, 12 1 advocated direct regulation of the accounting profession
by the SEC, provided it was infused with additional funding. 122
Others suggested that the POB's structure could be improved to cor-
rect its past weaknesses.'
23
119 Id. at 6, reprinted in U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-411, THE AccouNT-
INC PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO EN-
HANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM app. 6, at 80 (2002), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d02411 .pdf.
120 Id., reprinted in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-411, THE ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO EN-
HANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYsTEM app. 6, at 80 (2002), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d0241 I.pdf.
121 Accounting Reform Hearing, supra note 41, at 37 (testimony of Richard C.
Breeden, Former Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
We do not need to go and invent another [body]. We need to invigorate the
SEC and make sure it has the tools to do the job. Let's not reinvent the
wheel. Downstream from the SEC, private sector groups can be helpful.
And I do not mean to exclude that. But let's [not] lose sight. The primary
enforcer of the law needs to be the Commission.
Id.
122 Id. at 745 (prepared statement of Robert E. Litan, Vice President and Director,
Econ. Studies Program, The Brookings Inst.) ("I urge [Congress] at least to consider
whether the SEC itself should be performing the oversight of auditors directly, al-
though .. .it might make sense to establish a slimmed-down [entity] to set auditing
standards."); id. at 208 (testimony of Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, 1992-1995) ("I wouldn't have this board.... [G]ive the SEC pay
parity, increase their budgets so that they can do more and better jobs. But do not
create another body that is going to compete with them."); id. at 745 (statement of
Arthur R. Wyatt, CPA).
I would be inclined to provide increased funding to the SEC and have it
assume the principal role in overseeing the effectiveness of the financial re-
porting process. Creation of a new agency to undertake this responsibility
seems unnecessary in view of the record established by the SEC over the past
65 years.
Id.
123 Oversight Hearing, supra note 42, at 724 (prepared statement of Shaun
O'Malley, Chairman, 2000 Public Oversight Bd. Panel on Audit Effectiveness) (rec-
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2. Legislative Proposals and Congressional Debates
Both sides of the aisle on both sides of the Capitol generated a
flurry of proposals in response to the scandals as well as the concerns
raised by hearing witnesses. Many of these proposals constituted com-
prehensive legislation that provided for, among other things, the es-
tablishment of a new entity (or entities) that would increase oversight
for accounting firms that audit public companies.
Four proposals are particularly important to an understanding of
the PCAOB. The first was a bill (H.R. 3763) sponsored by Representa-
tive Michael Oxley (R-Ohio), titled "The Corporate and Auditing Ac-
countability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act" (CAARTA).1
24
This bill, which passed the House of Representatives in April 2003 by a
vote of 334 to 90,125 required the SEC to establish criteria for "public
regulation organizations," but the bill itself did not actually create
such an entity. 126 CAARTA's critics favored an alternative bill (H.R.
3818) sponsored by Representative John LaFalce (D-N.Y.), that re-
quired the SEC to establish a "Public Accounting Regulatory
Board."' 27 The third proposal took the form of a draft bill dissemi-
nated by Senator Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.), 128 with input from Senator
Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), that required the SEC to establish a "Profes-
sional Standards Board." 129 The last of these proposals was a bill (S.
2004) co-sponsored by Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) andJon
Corzine (D-N.J.) requiring the SEC to create an "Independent Public
Accounting Board.' 30 The Dodd-Corzine proposal was the one most
reflected in the PCAOB.
13 1
A side-by-side comparison of the oversight boards proposed in
these four bills, along with a close reading of the legislative record,
reveals that the choice between situating the board in the private sec-
tor or the public sector was not a particularly partisan one. Indeed,
ommending that the new entity resemble the expanded POB endorsed in 2000 by the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness, stating "I believe that a strengthened POB would have
served the interests this Committee seeks to protect").
124 Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act,
H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
125 See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
126 H.R. 3763 § 2(b).
127 Comprehensive Investor Protection Act, H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. § 4(b) (2002).
128 At the time, Senator Enzi was the only member of Congress with the credential
of a CPA. 148 CONG. REc. S6330 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
129 Investor Protection and Corporate Responsibility Act, Draft Bill, 107th Cong.
(2002), available at http://enzi.senate.gov/account.htm.
130 Investor Confidence in Public Accounting Act, S. 2004, 107th Cong. § 101 (a)
(2002).
131 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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like the PCAOB established by Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, both
the Dodd-Corzine bill and the Enzi-Gramm alternative opted for pri-
vate status. 132 In contrast, both Representative Oxley's CAARTA and
Representative LaFalce's alternative were silent as to the board's sta-
tus, with neither bill specifically characterizing the entity as private or
public. However, both House bills provided for application of the
Freedom of Information Act, 133 and the LaFalce bill provided that the
Board would be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.'34 The
LaFalce bill also authorized the SEC to empower the Board, or one or
more officers of the Board, to subpoena witnesses for documents and
testimony. I 35 To say the least, these provisions would have been ex-
ceedingly odd as applied to a Board that Was situated in the private
sector. Although it is not possible to know what was in the minds of
the House members that voted for (or against) these bills, there is
evidence that some Representatives viewed the CAARTA as authoriz-
ing the establishment of a private board, 3 6 whereas others viewed that
132 See S. 2004 § 101 (b) (providing that the Board "shall not, for any purpose, be
an agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government, and no officer, employee,
member of the Board, or other person associated with the Board shall be, for any
purpose, an officer or employee of the Federal Government"); Investor Protection
and Corporate Responsibility Act, supra note 129, § 101 (b) (same). Although Senator
Enzi's draft bill contemplated a private sector board overseen by the SEC, the draft
provided that disciplinary sanctions imposed by the board may be appealed to the
SEC, "to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, or to the appropriate
Federal district court in the State in which the firm or associated person is domiciled."
Id. § 202(b) (6) (A).
133 Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act,
H.R. 3673, 107th Cong. § 2(d) (2) (D); Comprehensive Investor Protection Act, H.R.
3818, 107th Cong. § 4(g) (5) (D) (2002).
134 H.R. 3818 § 4(c)(8).
135 Id. §4(g)(2)(D)(ii).
136 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H1546 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Rogers). Representative Rogers rose in support of the Oxley bill, noting that it was
"an important piece of legislation that does not create a new Federal bureaucracy
funded by taxpayers; rather, it requires a new private sector oversight body to review
the accounting firms that audit financial statements." Id. Representative Rogers then
asked Representative Oxley for clarification on that very issue:
Mr. Rogers: [I]t is my understanding that this bill does not create a new
Federal bureaucracy to oversee the accounting profession but, rather, cre-
ates a private sector regulator to do that job.
Mr. Oxley: .. . [Tihat is correct. We are giving the SEC the tools to oversee
this new PRO, but it is going to be funded by the private sector.
Id. But Representative Oxley's response to Representative Rogers begs the question.
It is certainly possible for Congress to create a public entity that is funded entirely by
the private sector. See infra notes 295, 303, 498 and accompanying text (discussing the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve).
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very same bill as authorizing a board that was public.
1 3 7
Although the legislative record does not reflect much congres-
sional consideration of the choice between situating an oversight
board in the private or public sector, it does evidence an awareness
that the board that eventually became the PCAOB was "a strange kind
of entity [in that we] want it to be private, but we want it to have
governmental powers." 138 It also evidences a striking awareness as to
the PCAOB's audacious power. Indeed, in the course of a Senate de-
bate, Senator Gramm candidly acknowledged:
Anybody who thinks this board is just going to slap around a few
accountants does not understand this bill. This board is going to
have massive power, unchecked power, by design. I would have to
say the board that Senator Enzi and I set up in our bill has massive
unchecked power as well. I mean, that is the nature of what we are
trying to do here. I am not criticizing Senator Sarbanes. I am just
reminding people that there are two edges of this sword. We are
setting up a board with massive power that is going to make deci-
sions that affect all accountants and everybody they work for, which
directly or indirectly is every breathing person in the country. They
are going to have massive unchecked powers.
139
3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Few could have predicted the factors that metastasized the four
proposals discussed above into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Over the
137 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. H1556 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Shows). Representative Shows rose in support of the Oxley bill, stating:
I support CAARTA's creation of a public regulatory organization (PRO)....
The American public and the accounting profession will be better served by
this independent governmental body that is given the authority to sanction and
discipline those accountants who violate codes of ethics, standards of inde-
pendence and competency, or securities laws.
Id. (emphasis added). Representative Shows specifically referenced Comptroller Gen-
eral David Walker's testimony favoring an "'independent statutory federal government
body,"' see supra note 111 and accompanying text, and expressed support for both
Walker's conclusion as well as the "means and degree by which CAARTA creates a
public regulatory board to address [his] concerns." 148 CONG. REc. H1557 (daily ed.
Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Shows).
138 148 CONG. REC. S6337 (daily ed.July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). The
PCAOB's "strangeness" appears to have troubled Senator Gramm. See S. REP. No.
107-205, at 67 (2002) (stating that "before this legislation becomes law, the concerns
of constitutional experts with regard to the appointment, regulatory powers, and tax-
ing authority of this new supervisory board will need to be resolved"). Senator
Gramm eventually supported the final legislation, which contained an oversight
board that was virtually identical to the board that triggered this statement. See infra
notes 148, 154 and accompanying text.
139 148 CONG. REc. S6334 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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strong objections of many House Democrats who viewed the CAARTA
as delegating too much decisionmaking to the SEC 140 and nothing
more than a "press release,"1 41 the House passed Representative
Oxley's bill (H.R. 3763) on April 25, 2002, by a vote of 334 to 90.142 A
substitute bill introduced by Representative LaFalce, which closely re-
sembled his earlier bill (H.R. 3818), had been defeated by a vote of
219 to 202.143 The CAARTA, with the support of President Bush and
the SEC, was then referred to the Senate Banking Committee. But
the Chairman of that Committee, Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), was
busy preparing a bill of his own (S. 2673). 144
Although pundits gave Senate Bill 2673 little chance of success, 145
their predictions soon proved incorrect. Senator Sarbanes's bill
140 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H1545 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement by Rep.
Kanjorski) (lamenting that much of CAARTA's "language is simply too vague to en-
sure that essential standards for effective oversight will be met, giving the SEC near-
total flexibility in establishing guidelines for the new oversight body" and that "Con-
gress should not shirk its responsibility by delegating these urgent problems to the
SEC"); id. at H1541 (statement by Rep. Slaughter) (stating that CAARTA "simply side-
steps the problem" and "does not provide for a strong, independent regulator for the
auditing industry, but simply punts Congress' job to the Securities and Exchange
Commission"); see also H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 47 (2002) (presenting minority views
and stating that "[i] n spite of the critical role that auditors play in the financial report-
ing system for publicly traded companies under our securities laws, oversight of the
industry has been left entirely to the industry itself, with little input from either the
SEC or the public").
141 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. H1545 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement by Rep.
LaFalce) ("The bill before us is cosmetic. The bill before us is a press release.").
142 Id. at H1592.
143 Id. at H1588-89. By a vote of 381 to 39, id. at H1573, the House also voted
down a substitute bill (H.R. 3795) sponsored by Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-
Ohio), that would have established within the SEC a "Federal Bureau of Audits" (the
FBA). See Investor, Shareholder, and Employee Protection Act, H.R. 3795, 107th
Cong. § 3(a) (2002). The FBA would consist of a Director, Deputy Director, and In-
spector General and would have the authority to "hold hearings, sign and issue sub-
poenas, administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence at any place in the
United States it may designate." H.R. 3795 § 3(g). The criticism directed to the bill
was particularly pointed. See, e.g., 148 CONG. Ric. H1572 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Kelly) (noting that the FBA was modeled after the FBI, and that
one could see "auditors storming into companies with their calculators drawn, de-
manding individuals to freeze and drop their pencils"); id. at H1573 (statement of
Rep. Oxley) (describing the bill as "essentially the neutron bomb").
144 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002).
145 See, e.g., Alan Murray, Gramm, Chertoff Sends Wrong Signals in Accounting Mess,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2002, at A4.
[Senator Sarbanes] has spent the past few weeks belatedly getting his fellow
Democrats in line behind a bill to increase oversight of the accounting in-
dustry. And he is holding talks with his GOP counterpart, Sen. Gramm. But
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passed the Senate Banking Committee on June 18, 2002, by a vote of
seventeen to four,146 but even then, its chances in the full Senate were
uncertain. The fate changed for Senate Bill 2673 on June 25, 2002,
after WorldCom's shocking revelation that it had overstated its earn-
ings by more than $3.8 billion during the past five quarters, primarily
because it had improperly accounted for its operating costs. 14 7 Sena-
tor Sarbanes introduced Senate Bill 2673 to the full Senate that very
same day and it passed ninety-seven to zero less than three weeks
later. 1 4
8
Title I of Senate Bill 2673 established a "Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board" in the private sector, and the Senate Bank-
ing Committee Report accompanying that bill specifically notes the
significant roles played by Senators Dodd, Corzine, and Enzi in the
PCAOB's design and structure. 149 But in addition to its obvious name
change, the oversight board in Senate Bill 2673 had a curious feature
not included in either of the earlier Senate proposals, nor in any of
the House bills sponsored by Representatives Oxley or LaFalce: the
PCAOB was to be a body corporate-specifically, a nonprofit corpora-
tion chartered by Congress under the laws of the District of
Columbia.150
The pace with which Senate Bill 2673 passed through the Senate
became even more frenetic in the fifteen days leading up to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's enactment. After the Senate's unanimous vote
on July 15, 2002, the House and the Senate formed a Conference
Committee to reconcile the stark differences between Senator
there is little sign of progress .... Unless he can find some Republican sup-
port, Mr. Sarbanes stands no chance of getting his bill through the narrowly
divided Senate this year.
Id.
146 S. REP. No 107-205, at 1 (2002); see Michael Schroeder & Tom Hamburger,
Accounting Reform Gets Big Lift as Senate Panel Backs New Board, WALL ST. J., June 19,
2002, at Al (describing the contents of the bill and discussing public reaction to the
Banking Committee's passage of it).
147 See Frank et al., supra note 99 (noting that when the entire fraud unraveled,
WorldCom's restatement grew to a staggering eleven billion dollars).
148 148 CONG. REc. S6779 (daily ed. July 15, 2002). One commentator has re-
marked that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "might be more appropriately referred to as the
Enron/WorldCom Response Act, as the Enron demise triggered the initiative, but it
took the WorldCom collapse to bring it to fruition." See HARoLD S. BLOOMENTHAL,
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 21 (2004).
149 S. REp. No 107-205, at 4 (2002) (stating that "Title I reflects significant portions
of S. 2004, authored by Senators Dodd and Corzine, as well as the terms of an amend-
ment offered at the Committee's June 18 mark-up by Senator Enzi, which was
adopted by voice vote").
150 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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Sarbanes's bill (S. 2673) and Representative Oxley's bill (H.R.
3763).151 The conference committee used Senate Bill 2673 as its
framework, but rather than soften that bill to reflect more of House
Bill 3763, "most changes made by the conference committee strength-
ened the prescriptions of S. 2673 or added new prescriptions.' 152 The
Committee approved the final conference bill on July 24, 2002, titling
it "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002."153 The following day, both
houses of Congress voted on it without change, producing an over-
whelming margin of victory: 423 to 3 in the House and ninety-nine to
zero in the Senate. 154 On July 30, 2002, President George W. Bush
signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law, declaring that it contained
some of "the most far-reaching reforms of American business prac-
tices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."
1 55
II. THE PCAOB
Securities law scholars have put forth varying views as to whether
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act actually constituted the "sweeping reform"
that was depicted by Congress and the President. 156 But few would
151 At this time, House Bill 3763 was accompanied by a companion bill (H.R.
5118) that enhanced the earlier bill's criminal penalties. See BOSTELMAN, supra note
103, § 2:6.1[B], at 2-30. For procedural reasons, the Senate renumbered Senator
Sarbanes's bill to House Bill 3763 and Representative Oxley's language was replaced
in toto by the language of Senate Bill 2673 as it passed the Senate. See id. § 2:6.2, at 2-
31 n.106.
152 BOSTELMAN, supra note 103, at 2-31. None of the work of the Conference Com-
mittee amounted to significant change in Title I of Senate Bill 2673. See H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 107-610 (2002). Although this revised bill is termed a "report," the entire
document consists of the final conference bill. Thus, since the Conference Commit-
tee did not produce any legislation report of its own, the Senate Report that describes
Title I constitutes the most authoritative source of legislative intent for the PCAOB.
See BOSTELMA, supra note 103, at 2-32.
153 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-610, at 1 (2002).
154 Richard B. Schmitt et al., Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Eases Path for Investor
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at Al.
155 Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2002, at Al.
156 SeeJoel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After
Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 516 (2002).
[W]hen this Act is combined with other changes involving more vigilant
boards and audit committees, an expanded SEC with an activist enforcement
program, greater private litigation, and much voluntary restraint, for the
foreseeable future there will be a material diminution of the type of account-
ing scandal that typified our recent past.
Id. Compare Cunningham, supra note 24, at 917 (observing that the President, Con-
gress, the SEC, and other "participants and observers" of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act often
[VOL. 8o:3l OO6
PLAYING PEEKABOO WITH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
dispute that the PCAOB constitutes a radical change to the account-
ing profession's former system of self-regulation. The analysis that fol-
lows tracks the nine sections in Title I of the Act and highlights some
of the PCAOB's activities in its first eighteen months of operation. It
then compares the PCAOB to SROs in the securities industry as well as
to other ostensibly private corporations created by Congress.
A. The PCAOB's Structure, Powers, and Responsibilities
1. Establishment and Administrative Provisions
Section 101 of Title I establishes the PCAOB and delineates the
Board's principal responsibilities. Its first two provisions are impor-
tant enough to be set out in full:
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF BOARD.-There is established the Pub-
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board, to oversee the audit of
public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related
matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public
interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and held by
and for, public investors. The Board shall be a body corporate, op-
erate as a nonprofit corporation, and have succession until dis-
solved by an Act of Congress.'
57
(b) STATUS.-The Board shall not be an agency or establishment
of the United States Government, and, except as otherwise provided
in this Act, shall be subject to, and have all the powers conferred
upon a nonprofit corporation by, the District of Columbia Non-
profit Corporation Act. No member or person employed by, or
agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or employee
of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such
service.
158
Although both provisions evidence Congress's decision to situate
the PCAOB as a nonprofit corporation in the private sector, the itali-
cized portions also reflect the PCAOB's inherently governmental mis-
sion. The PCAOB's mission is further reflected in section 101's third
provision, which sets out the PCAOB's four principal responsibilities:
registration, standard setting, inspection, and discipline.1 59
refer to it as "sweeping reform," but questioning whether it is "more sweep than re-
form"), with Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States
Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that the scope of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is "sweeping and dramatic").
157 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(a) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
158 Id. § 7211(b).
159 Id. § 7211(c) (1)-(4). Congress elaborates on these responsibilities in sections
102, 103, 104, and 105 of Title I. See infra notes 172-241 and accompanying text.
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There are two additional provisions in section 101 that seem anti-
thetical to the Board's nongovernmental status. One specifies that
PCAOB members are to be governmentally appointed: "the Commis-
sion, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
appoint the chairperson and other initial members of the Board."
1 60
Subsequent vacancies on the PCAOB "shall be filled in the same man-
ner."1 61 The other provision empowers the PCAOB to fund its opera-
tions by "allocat[ing], assess[ing], and collect[ing] accounting
support fees" from public companies.
162
The balance of section 101 rounds out the Board's principal fea-
tures. It establishes that the Board is to be composed of five full-time
members163 who shall serve staggered, once-renewable, five-year
terms;' 64 it mandates that two Board members (but only two) shall be
or have been CPAs;165 it provides that Board members may be re-
160 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e) (4) (A). The Commission was required to make initial
appointments to the PCAOB by October 30, 2002. Id. The PCAOB's five founding
members were William H. Webster (Chair), Daniel L. Goelzer, Kayla J. Gillan, Willis
D. Gradison, Jr., and Charles D. Niemeier. News Release, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Commission Announces Founding Members of Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (Oct. 25, 2002). Less than three weeks into his term, Wil-
liam Webster resigned amid a storm of controversy concerning his service as head of
the audit committee at U.S. Technologies, a company that had been accused of ac-
counting fraud. See Michael Schroeder, Webster Makes It Official and Quits Accounting
Board, WALL ST.J., Nov. 13, 2002, at A3. SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt had tendered his
own resignation the previous week after it was revealed that Webster had informed
him of the audit committee issues and Chairman Pitt had failed to share that informa-
tion with his fellow commissioners. David S. Hilzenrath & Mike Allen, Embattled Pitt
Resigns as SEC Chief; Latest Controversy Cost Him White House Support, WASH. POST, Nov.
6, 2002, at A2. PCAOB member Charles Niemeier served as Acting Chair until the
SEC appointed the current Chair, William F. McDonough. See News Release, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, SEC Unanimously Approves William J. McDonough
as Chairman of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (May 21, 2003).
161 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e) (4) (B).
162 Id. § 7211(f)(5).
163 Id. § 7211(e)(1). Board members are to be
appointed from among prominent individuals of integrity and reputation
who have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors and the
public, and an understanding of the responsibilities for and nature of the
financial disclosures required of issuers under the securities laws and the
obligations of accountants with respect to the preparation and issuance of
audit reports with respect to such disclosures.
Id.
164 Id. § 7211(e)(5).
165 Id. § 7211 (e) (2). If one of the CPAs is the Board's chairperson, "he or she may
not have been a practicing certified public accountant for at least 5 years prior to his
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moved by the SEC upon a showing of "good cause;"' 66 it vests the
Board with a number of powers,' 67 including the power (and obliga-
tion) to make rules governing its operations; 68 and it requires the
Board to submit an annual report to the SEC, which shall transmit a
copy to the Senate Banking Committee and the House Committee on
Financial Services. 169 Section 101 also set an April 25, 2003, deadline
for the SEC's determination that the Board was fully operational.
1 70
The SEC and the PCAOB met that deadline right at the wire.
17 1
2. Registration
Section 102 of Title I makes it unlawful for any person who is not
associated with a "registered public accounting firm" to prepare or
issue, or participate in the preparation or issuance of, any audit report
for any public company. 172 Accounting firms based in the United
States were to be registered by October 22, 2003-180 days after the
SEC declared the PCAOB operational. 173 Foreign accounting firms
involved with the audits of public companies trading in U.S. markets
were also required to register, though they were accorded an addi-
or her appointment to the Board." Id. Although Senator Enzi voted in favor of the
Act both in the Senate Banking Committee and in the full Senate, he repeatedly em-
phasized that "[a] uditing standards are complicated and detailed and the setting of
them requires the knowledge and expertise of individuals who understand and work
in the field of accounting" and questioned whether it made sense to "allow a Board,
of which the majority must be non-accountants, to establish the standards under
which accountants operate." S. REP. No 107-205, at 68 (2002) (separate statement of
Sen. Enzi).
166 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e) (6).
167 Id. § 7211 (f). Its powers include the power to sue and be sued in its corporate
name, id. § 7211 (f)(1), to lease or purchase property, id. § 7211 (f)(3), and to appoint
employees and to fix their salaries "at a level that is comparable to private sector self-
regulatory, accounting, technical, supervisory, or other staff or management posi-
tions," id. § 7211(f)(4).
168 Id. § 7 211(g). The PCAOB has promulgated many operations rules pursuant
to this congressional mandate, including a Code of Ethics and Rules for Investigations
and Adjudications. See Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Rules of the Board, at
http:www.pcaobus.org/Rules oftheBoard/index.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).
169 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (h). The PCAOB filed with the SEC its first Annual Report
(for the year 2003) in June 2004. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., 2003 ANN.
REP. (2004), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/AboutUs/AnnualReports/200 4 .
pdf.
170 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(d).
171 See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OvERsiGHT BD., supra note 169, at 7.
172 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(a).
173 Id.
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tional nine months. 1 74 As of June 22, 2004, the PCAOB had regis-
tered 1003 U.S. and non-U.S. public accounting firms and it continues
to receive applications from both foreign and domestic firms. 17 5
Congress was specific in delineating the baseline information re-
quired in a public accounting firm's application for registration, 176 a
list that can be added to by subsequent PCAOB or SEC rulemaking. 177
Registered firms are also obligated to update that information in an
annual report to be filed with the PCAOB.178 To cover the costs of
the registration and annual review process, the Board is required to
assess and collect both a registration fee and an annual fee from each
registered public accounting firm. 179 The Board is also required to
act on a firm's completed application within forty-five days after sub-
mission.180 Such action includes either the approval or denial of a
firm's registration request. 8 1 Application denials are to be treated as
a PCAOB disciplinary action and thus are reviewable by the SEC.1 82
Section 102 also included a "consent" provision that was likely
drawn from a draft bill authored by Senator Enzi. 183 Specifically, ap-
plications for registration are required to include a "consent executed
by the public accounting firm to cooperation in and compliance with
any request for testimony or the production of documents made by
the Board in the furtherance of its authority and responsibilities"
under the Act. 184 Registration is further conditioned on the firm's
agreement "to secure and enforce similar consents from each of the
associated persons of the public accounting firm as a condition of
their continued employment by or other association with such
174 See PCAOB Hearing, supra note 79, at 6 (statement of William F. McDonough,
Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.).
175 Id. (statement of William F. McDonough, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd.).
176 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(b)(2).
177 Id. § 7212(b)(2)(H).
178 Id. § 7212(d).
179 Id. §7212(f). More than ninety percent of the firms that registered paid a fee
of $500 or less. Each of the Big Four accounting firms, see supra note 69, paid a
registration fee of $390,000. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 169,
at 7.
180 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(c)(1).
181 Id.
182 Id. § 7212(c) (2). As of its 2003 Annual Report, the PCAOB had yet to deny an
application for registration. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSiGrr BD., supra note 169,
at 7.
183 See Investor Protection and Corporate Responsibility Act, Draft Bill, 107th
Cong. § 201(c) (2) (A) (2002).
184 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(b)(3)(A).
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firm." 8 5 As we shall see, failures to cooperate may result in discipli-
nary actions against the registered firm or its associated persons.
186
3. Rulemaking
As discussed previously, section 103 of Title I places the PCAOB
in the AICPA's prior role as the primary standard-setter for audi-
tors. 187 Specifically, Congress requires the PCAOB to promulgate
rules establishing the auditing and related attestation standards, qual-
ity control standards, and ethics standards that are to be used by regis-
tered firms in the preparation and issuance of audit reports for public
companies.' 88 As with the baseline information elicited on applica-
tions for registration,' 89 Congress delineated certain requirements
that must be incorporated into the PCAOB's auditing standards.190
The rulemaking procedures adopted by the PCAOB are designed
to ensure that all of its rules will be subject to substantial review before
they become final. Proposed rules are issued by the PCAOB at open
meetings and are posted on the PCAOB's website with a time period
specified for public comments. In response to these comments, the
PCAOB issues the final rules that are filed with the SEC. 191 As dis-
cussed below, PCAOB rules must be approved by the SEC before they
become effective, and the SEC's process for review includes an addi-
tional period for public notice and comment.
192
The full extent of the PCAOB's rulemaking power cannot be ap-
preciated without reference to Title II of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
185 Id.
186 See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
188 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a) (1). As noted previously, the PCAOB has adopted the
AICPA's standards as interim standards, but plans to review all of these standards to
determine whether they should be repealed, modified, or made permanent. See supra
note 79. Section 103 also gives the PCAOB authority to convene expert advisory
groups to make recommendations concerning the content of its standards. 15
U.S.C.A. § 7213(a)(4).
189 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
190 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a) (2). These include a requirement that auditors prepare
.audit work papers" and retain those papers for at least seven years, id.
§ 7213(a) (2) (A) (i), that audit reports be reviewed and approved by a second or "con-
curring" partner, id. § 7213(a) (2) (A) (ii), and that the auditor "describe in each audit
report the scope of the auditor's testing of the internal control structure and proce-
dures of the issuer," id. § 7213(a) (2) (A) (iii).
191 See Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Typical Rulemaking Process, at
www.pcaobus.org/rulemaking-process.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2005) (presenting a
chart of the rulemaking process).
192 See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text (discussing section 107's review
procedures for PCAOB rulemaking).
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which amends the Exchange Act to make it unlawful for a registered
firm to perform any of eight types of nonaudit services contemporane-
ously with the audit of a public company. 93 But Congress's list also
includes a ninth prohibition: "any other service that the Board deter-
mines, by regulation, is impermissible. 1 94 And the PCAOB's power is
even further increased through its broad authority to grant exemp-
tions. Specifically:
The Board may, on a case by case basis, exempt any person, issuer,
public accounting firm, or transaction from the prohibition on the
provision of services under [Exchange Act section 10A(g)] to the
extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and is consistent with the protection of investors.195
Exemptions granted by the PCAOB under this provision are subject to
SEC review.1
96
A recent statement by the SEC's Chief Accountant forecasted an
expanded role for the PCAOB on auditor independence issues, where
the PCAOB would become "the primary standard-setter and the pri-
mary source of advice and guidance on these issues."19 7 He noted, in
particular, that "[a]s the PCAOB engages more staff with expertise in
these areas, I expect that a great number of the independence inter-
pretive issues that currently are handled by my office appropriately
will migrate to the PCAOB." 198
4. Periodic Inspections
Section 104 of Title I elaborates on the responsibility that, at least
in its initial years, will likely consume the lion's share of the PCAOB's
attention: the periodic inspection of registered accounting firms to
assess the degree of compliance "with this Act, the rules of the Board,
the rules of the Commission, or professional standards, in connection
with its performance of audits, issuance of audit reports, and related
matters involving issuers."199 Registered public accounting firms that
regularly provide audit reports for more than 100 public companies
193 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g)(1)-(8) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000)).
194 Id. § 78j-1 (g) (9); see Bratton, supra note 2, at 1033 (contending that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act delegates to the PCAOB the most important matters concerning
professional standards).
195 15 U.S.C.A. § 7231.
196 Id.
197 Jonathan Weil, Accounting Board Should Expand Its Authority, SEC Official Says,
WALL ST. J., July 15, 2004, at C3 (quoting statements by Donald T. Nicolaisen, SEC
Chief Accountant).
198 Id.
199 15 U.S.C.A. § 7214(a).
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must be inspected annually;200 other firms must be inspected at least
once every three years.
201
Congress provided a general framework for PCAOB inspections:
The PCAOB is required to
(1) inspect and review selected audit and review engagements ...
performed at various offices and by various associated persons of
the firm ... ; (2) evaluate the sufficiency of the quality control sys-
tem of the firm, and the manner of documentation (of that
firm) ... ; and (3) perform such other testing of the audit, supervi-
sory, and quality control procedures of the firm as are necessary or
appropriate. 20
2
It must also share with the firm under inspection a draft report and
provide an opportunity for the firm to comment.20 3 The PCAOB
must prepare a final report of its findings and must transmit that re-
port, along with any letter of comment from the firm, to the SEC and
appropriate state regulatory authorities. 20 4 In addition, the PCAOB
must make the nonproprietary sections of this report public, except
that portions of the report dealing with criticisms of or potential de-
fects in the firm's quality control systems shall not be made public if
those criticisms or defects are addressed satisfactorily by the firm
within the year following the inspection report.20 5 A registered ac-
counting firm may seek interim SEC review of the PCAOB's report.
20 6
The PCAOB's regular inspection cycle began in May 2004 and its
process for inspecting the eight largest U.S. firms and a great number
of small U.S. firms is currently underway.20 7 In 2003, the PCAOB
200 Id. § 7214(b) (1) (A). Eight such firms were registered with the PCAOB as of
December 31, 2003: the "Big Four," see supra note 69; Grant Thornton LLP; BDO
Seidman LLP; Crowe, Chizek and Company LLC; and McGladrey & Pullen, LLP. See
PCAOB Hearing, supra note 79, at 6-7 (statement of William F. McDonough, Chair-
man, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.).
201 15 U.S.C.A. § 7214(b)(1)(B). The PCAOB may, however, adjust that inspec-
tion schedule through rulemaking if it finds that "different inspection schedules are
consistent with the purposes of this Act, the public interest, and the protection of
investors." Id. § 7214(b) (2).
202 Id. § 7214(d)(1)-(3).
203 Id. § 7214(f).
204 Id. § 7 2 1 4 (g)(1).
205 Id. § 7214(g) (2); see infra note 209 and accompanying text (criticizing the con-
fidentiality provision).
206 U.S.C.A. § 7214(h). Any SEC decision with respect to an interim review will
not be treated as a "final agency action" and is thus not reviewable under Exchange
Act § 25(a)(1) or section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id.
§ 7214(h) (2).
207 See PCAOB Hearing, supra note 79, at 45 (statement of William F. McDonough,
Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.).
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launched a special inspection program with "limited procedures" in-
spections of the Big Four firms.20 8 The PCAOB's August 2004 report
on these firms identified "'significant audit and accounting issues that
were missed by the firms,' though none of those problems caused ma-
jor shareholder losses and almost none of them affected earnings."20 9
5. Investigations and Disciplinary Proceedings
Section 105 grants the PCAOB broad authority to conduct investi-
gations and impose discipline. Specifically, the PCAOB is authorized
to investigate any act, practice, or failure to act, by any registered firm,
or its associated persons
that may violate any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, the
provisions of the securities laws relating to the preparation and issu-
ance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of account-
ants with respect thereto, including the rules of the Commission
issued under this Act, or professional standards, regardless of how
the act, practice, or omission is brought to the attention of the
Board.
2 10
Congress instructed the PCAOB to develop by rule "fair procedures"
for its investigatory and disciplinary functions. 21 1
Pursuant to its investigatory rules, the PCAOB may require the
testimony or the production of documents (including audit papers)
from any registered firm or associated person, and it may take discipli-
nary action for failure to cooperate with an investigation. 2 12 The
PCAOB may also request the testimony or the production of docu-
208 Id. at 6 (statement of William F. McDonough, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd.).
209 Jonathan Weil, Big Four Get Mixed Marks from U.S. Panel, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27,
2004, at C1 (quoting the public portion of the reports). The confidential sections of
the reports include critiques of the firms' disciplinary policies, risk-management prac-
tices, partner compensation structures, as well as the "tone at the top" set by the firms'
top executives. See id; supra note 205 and accompanying text. The article reported
that "[w] hen Congress created the board, it acceded to pressure by the Big Four firms
to include a provision in the law under which the board only would disclose the exis-
tence of deficiencies in a firm's quality controls if the firm hadn't fixed them within a
year." Weil, supra. It also reported statements by Lynn Tuner, the SEC's Chief Ac-
countant from 1998 to 2001, that "'[u]nfortunately, we don't know how many more
infractions were not made public as a result of Congress allowing those to remain
behind closed doors"' and that "'Congress needs to quickly bring that out into the
sunshine.'" Id.
210 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(b)(1).
211 Id. § 7215(a); see infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text (noting that, to a
great extent, the PCAOB has modeled itself after the SEC).
212 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(b) (2) (A)-(B).
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ments from any other person (including a firm's audit clients).213 If
such testimony or documents cannot be obtained on a voluntary basis,
the PCAOB may request the SEC to issue a subpoena.
21 4
Congress also took steps to protect the PCAOB and its officials
from a litigious public by granting the type of privileges and immuni-
ties typically accorded to regulatory agencies. Often termed a "law
enforcement privilege" when extended to a federal agency, Congress
provided that
[A]ll documents and information prepared or received by or specif-
ically for the Board, and deliberations of the Board and its employ-
ees and agents, shall be confidential and privileged as an evidentiary
matter (and not subject to civil discovery or other legal process) in
any Federal or State court or administrative agency.
215
Yet, unlike federal agencies which generally must produce materials
when an investigation is no longer pending, PCAOB materials are to
remain exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) or otherwise. 216 With respect to immunity, Congress spec-
ified that "[a] ny employee of the Board engaged in carrying out an
investigation under this Act shall be immune from any civil liability
arising out of such investigation in the same manner and to the same
extent as an employee of the Federal Government in similar
circumstances. "217
Congress was clear that the PCAOB's disciplinary rules must pro-
vide registered firms and associated persons with adequate notice and
the opportunity to be heard.218 But unlike SEC enforcement pro-
ceedings, which are public unless the SEC finds good cause to pro-
ceed confidentially, 219 PCAOB hearings shall not be public "unless
otherwise ordered by the Board for good cause shown, with the con-
213 Id. § 7215(b) (2) (C).
214 Id. § 7215(b)(2)(D). The rules of the Board may
provide for procedures to seek issuance by the Commission, in a manner
established by the Commission, of a subpoena to require the testimony of,
and production of any document in the possession of, any person, including
any client of a registered public accounting firm, that the Board considers
relevant or material to an investigation under this section.
Id.
215 Id. § 7215(b) (5) (A).
216 Id.
217 Id. § 7215(b)(6).
218 Id. § 7215(c)(1). The PCAOB is also required to keep a record of the proceed-
ings. Id.
219 17 C.F.R. § 201.102 (2003).
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sent of the parties to such hearing."220 The PCAOB may refer any
investigation to the SEC or to other federal regulators, and on the
SEC's direction, to other specified administrative or regulatory
authorities. 22'
If the PCAOB finds a violation based on all the facts and circum-
stances, 222 it may impose an array of sanctions,223 including cen-
sure;2 2 4 required additional professional education or training;
225
temporary suspension;2 26 permanent revocation (or in the case of an
individual, a bar from association with a registered firm);227 tempo-
rary or permanent limitation on the activities, functions, or operations
of such firm or person;228 and a civil monetary penalty for each such
violation not to exceed $100,000 for individuals and two million dol-
lars for firms.2 29 If the violation involves intentional or knowing con-
duct, or repeated instances of negligent conduct, then the maximum
penalty rises to $750,000 for individuals and fifteen million dollars for
firms. 230 Unlike the SEC, whose monetary fines generally revert to the
220 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(c) (2). Commentators have speculated that confidential
hearings may "encourage well-healed [sic] and litigious defendants to delay repeat-
edly the resolution of proceedings to keep them from becoming public." Thomas 0.
Gorman & HeatherJ. Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in Corporateville? The Obligations of
Directors, Officers, Accountants and Lauyers After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 56 ADMIN.
L. REV. 135, 178 (2004).
221 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(b) (4) (B). These other authorities include the Attorney
General of the United States, state attorneys general, and appropriate state regulatory
authorities. Id. § 7215(b) (4) (B) (iii).
222 Any sanction imposed by the PCAOB must be supported by a statement setting
forth the act, practice, or failure to act that constitutes the violation; the specific provi-
sion of the Act, the securities laws, the PCAOB's rules, or professional standards
which have been violated; and a justification for the specific sanction(s) imposed. Id.
§ 7215(c) (3).
223 The PCAOB may also sanction registered accounting firms and their supervi-
sory personnel for a failure to reasonably supervise a partner or employee of that
firm. See id. § 7215(c) (6). To impose such sanctions, the PCAOB must make findings
similar to those that the SEC must make in broker-dealer proceedings initiated pursu-
ant to Exchange Act § 15(b) (4) (E). 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (E) (2000).
224 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(c) (4) (E).
225 Id. § 7215(c) (4) (F).
226 Id. § 7215(c) (4) (A) (providing for temporary suspension for firms); id.
§ 7215(c) (4) (B) (providing for temporary suspension for associated persons).
227 Id. § 7215(c)(4)(A) (providing for permanent revocation for firms); id.
§ 7215(c) (4) (B) (providing for a bar from association with a registered firm for
individuals).
228 Id. § 7215(c) (4) (C).
229 Id. § 7215(c) (4) (D) (i).
230 Id. § 7215(c) (4) (D) (ii).
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U.S. Treasury,2 3 1 fines imposed by the PCAOB are to be used to fund
a merit scholarship program for students pursuing undergraduate or
graduate degrees in accounting.
232
Sanctions imposed by the PCAOB are subject to SEC review,
233
and any application for review shall operate as a stay of any such disci-
plinary action. 23 4 PCAOB sanctions must be reported to the SEC, ap-
propriate state or foreign regulatory authorities, and the public
("once any stay on the imposition of such sanction has been
lifted") .235
Pursuant to section 105, the PCAOB has adopted comprehensive
rules of investigations and adjudications. 23 6 The PCAOB drew these
rules from a variety of sources, including the APA and the SEC's Rules
of Fair Practice.2 37 Although the rules make clear in a number of
places that the PCAOB is situated in the private sector,238 the PCAOB
appears to have modeled itself on the SEC.239 For example, the
PCAOB's procedures permit parties under investigation to file a
Wells-like submission outlining reasons why an enforcement action
231 Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, all civil monetary fines collected by the SEC
were directed to the U.S. Treasury. But the Act now provides that in actions where
disgorgement is ordered, the SEC may add the amount of the civil penalty to a dis-
gorgement fund "for the benefit of the victims of such violation." The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784-85 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7246).
232 15 U.S.C.A. § 7219(c) (2).
233 See infra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
234 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(e).
235 Id. § 7215(d).
236 See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE No. 2003-015,
RULES ON INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS (2003), available at http://www.
pcaobus.org/rules/Release2003-015.pdf. Because PCAOB investigations and discipli-
nary proceedings are nonpublic, it is difficult to tell whether such investigations or
proceedings are underway. None were referenced in the PCAOB's Annual Report,
referred to (even in general terms) in recent testimony to Congress, or reported in
major newspapers.
237 See Mary M. Sjoquist, The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: One Year
Later, INSIGHTS, Nov. 2003, at 4, 7 (stating that "the PCAOB drew from the rules of the
Commission and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and rules
governing civil procedures and fair hearings procedures adopted from the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), federal rules of evidence, and the Federal District Court
of Southern New York").
238 See, e.g., PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 236, app. 2 at A2-19
n.1 (noting that the "requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act are not bind-
ing on the Board").
239 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 148, at 1138 (stating that "[a]ttorneys who have
appeared as counsel in SEC administrative proceedings will feel comfortable with the
Board's rules of practice").
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should not be brought against them.240 Moreover, unlike the NYSE
and the NASD, the PCAOB does not intend to regard good-faith invo-
cations of a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a
sanctionable failure to cooperate.
241
6. Foreign Public Accounting Firms
Section 106 provides that accounting firms organized under the
laws of countries other than the United States that issue audit reports
for companies subject to U.S. securities laws are covered by the Act to
the same extent as U.S. accounting firms. 24 2 However, both the
PCAOB and the SEC may grant exemptions, where appropriate. 243
The PCAOB is currently developing a framework for how its inspec-
tion and investigatory programs should operate in relation to non-
U.S. registered firms. 244 "[T]o the greatest extent possible," the
PCAOB seeks to cooperate with international regulators. 245
7. SEC Oversight
Section 107 establishes a system of SEC oversight for the PCAOB
that parallels the recordkeeping, rulemaking, and disciplinary review
240 PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., BYLAWS AND RULES OF THE PUBLIC COM-
PANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BoARD R. 5109(d), at 63 (2004), available at http://
www.pcaobus.org/Rules of the_Board/Documents/Rules_of the_Board/all.pdf.
241 PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OvERsIGHT BD., supra note 236, app. 2 at A2-33.
[W]e do not intend to invade the province of any legitimately asserted privi-
lege that would, under prevailing law, be treated as a valid basis for declining
to provide documents or information in response to a Commission sub-
poena, including valid assertions of the privilege against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. Invoking their status as "private organizations," the NYSE and the NASD have
refused to recognize a Fifth Amendment privilege, and courts have consistently up-
held their right to do so. See infra note 345.
242 15 U.S.C.A. § 7216(a) (1) (West Supp. 2004).
243 Id. § 7216(c).
The Commission, and the Board, subject to the approval of the Commission,
may, by rule, regulation, or order, and as the Commission (or Board) deter-
mines necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, either unconditionally or upon specified terms and conditions ex-
empt any foreign public accounting firm, or any class of such firms, from any
provision of this Act or the rules of the Board or the Commission issued
under this Act.
Id.
244 See PCAOB Hearing, supra note 79, at 51-52 (statement of William F. McDon-
ough, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.).
245 Id. at 51 (statement of William F. McDonough, Chairman, Pub. Co. Account-
ing Oversight Bd.).
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procedures currently in place for the NASD and other SROs. Indeed,
Congress stated specifically that Exchange Act section 17 (a) (1), which
mandates recordkeeping and SEC access to records, 246 and Exchange
Act section 17(b) (1), which provides for examinations by the SEC,
247
shall apply to the PCAOB "as fully as if the Board were a 'registered
securities association' for purposes" of those provisions.
2 48
The PCAOB's rulemaking is governed by Exchange Act Section
19(b), 249 which requires SROs to file with the SEC proposed rules or
proposed changes to rules for SEC review and approval, and which
specifies that no SRO rule shall become effective absent such ap-
proval. 250 Section 19(b) also obligates the SEC to provide the public
with notice of proposed SRO rules and the opportunity to
comment.2
51
With respect to the SEC's review of disciplinary actions taken by
the PCAOB, the governing procedures are once again those applica-
ble to SROs by virtue of Exchange Act section 19(d) (2) and (e) (1).252
Pursuant to these sections, which apply to the PCAOB "as fully as if
the Board were an [SRO]," final disciplinary sanctions are reviewable
by the SEC on its own motion or upon timely application by any ag-
grieved person.253 The SEC's review must include notice and the op-
portunity to be heard.254 After such hearing, the SEC must issue an
order affirming, modifying, remanding, or setting aside the sanction
imposed by the SRO.25 5 Although Exchange Act section 19(e) does
not permit the SEC to increase the sanctions imposed by an SRO, the
SEC may enhance a PCAOB sanction if the SEC's review finds it to be
inadequate or otherwise not appropriate to the finding based on
which the sanction was imposed. 256 While Title I does not explicitly
specify, final SEC orders on PCAOB disciplinary proceedings are re-
246 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1) (2000).
247 Id. § 78q(b) (1).
248 15 U.S.C.A § 7217(a).
249 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b).
250 Id. § 78s(b) (1). Section 107 of Title I also explicitly states that "[no rule of
the Board shall become effective without prior approval of the Commission in accor-
dance with this section, other than as provided in [section 103(a) (3) (B)] with respect
to initial or transitional standards." 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(b) (2).
251 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1).
252 Id. § 78s(d) (2), (e)(1).
253 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(c) (2); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2). In most cases, applications by
aggrieved persons must be filed with the SEC no later than thirty days after the per-
son's receipt of notice. See id.
254 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1).
255 Id.
256 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(c)(3).
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viewable by a federal circuit court of appeals pursuant to Exchange
Act section 25 (a) (1).257
Section 107 also provides for censure and other sanctions to the
PCAOB itself. The SEC, by rule, may relieve the PCAOB of any re-
sponsibility to enforce compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
securities laws, the PCAOB's rules, or professional standards. 258 Pro-
vided good cause is shown, the SEC may also issue an order censuring
or limiting the activities of the PCAOB. 259 Board members may be




As discussed previously, 261 section 108 amends section 19(a) of
the Securities Act to explicitly allow the SEC to recognize "generally
accepted" accounting principles established by a private entity, pro-
vided the entity is funded according to section 109 (discussed immedi-
ately below) and has adopted certain procedures designed to distance
it from the accounting profession. 262 The Senate Banking Committee
257 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1).
A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pursuant to
this chapter may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of busi-
ness, or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in such court, within
sixty days after the entry of the order, a written petition requesting that the
order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.
Id.
258 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(d)(1).
259 Id. § 7217(d)(2). Censure or limitations on activities are conditioned on a
showing that the PCAOB
(A) has violated or is unable to comply with any provision of this Act, the
rules of the Board, or the securities laws; or (B) without reasonable justifica-
tion or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or
rule, or any professional standard by a registered public accounting firm or
an associated person thereof.
Id.
260 Id. § 7217(d) (3). Censure or removal are conditioned on a showing that the
PCAOB member
(A) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, or
the securities laws; (B) has willfully abused the authority of that member; or
(C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compli-
ance with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by any
Id. registered public accounting firm or any associated person 
thereof.
261 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
262 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(b)(1). Section 19(a)'s new requirement of majority voting
caused the FASB to change a rule that had formerly required a supermajority (five of
seven) vote. See Cunningham, supra note 24, at 964.
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Report makes clear that the FASB was the private entity referenced in
section 108.263
9. Funding
Title I's final section, section 109, is responsive to the suggestions
in congressional testimony that both the PCAOB and the FASB should
be provided with a guaranteed source of funding to protect their inde-
pendence.2 64 To achieve this end, Congress required their primary
source of funding to come from "accounting support fees" paid by
public companies. 265 Section 109 directs both the PCAOB and the
FASB to allocate these fees in accordance with a formula based on
their respective budgets and a company's market capitalization. 266
The PCAOB's budget is subject to SEC approval267 and the SEC must
approve the fees assessed on public companies by both the PCAOB
and the FASB.
2 68
The PCAOB's budget reveals much about the scope of its opera-
tions and its impact on both registered accounting firms and public
companies. For 2004, the SEC (itself with a 2004 budget of $811.5
million) approved a PCAOB budget of $103 million and a total ac-
counting support fee of $101 million (approximately two million dol-
lars of the PCAOB budget will come from the accounting firm
registration fees collected in 2003).269 Personnel costs account for
more than half of the budget:270 the PCAOB has hired a staff of more
than 200 auditors, analysts, and attorneys, and expects to have close to
300 employees by the end of 2004.271 In addition to its main office in
263 See supra note 64. In response to testimony by several congressional witnesses
that the U.S. system of accounting is "overly-detailed," see S. REP. No 107-205, at 13
(2002), section 108 also requires the SEC to conduct a study on the adoption by the
U.S. financial reporting system of a principles-based accounting system. 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 7218(d) (1).
264 See supra notes 62, 91-94 and accompanying text.
265 15 U.S.C.A. § 7219(c) (1).
266 Id. § 7 219(g).
267 Id. § 7219(b).
268 Id. § 7219(d)(1) (applying to the PCAOB); id. § 7219(e) (1) (applying to the
FASB).
269 PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.pcaobus.org/about-us/budgetpresentations/2004.pdf; see also
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: PCAOB Official Says Fee Collection 'Running
Smoothly'for 2004 Invoices, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1592, 1592-93 (Aug. 30,
2004) (discussing the collection process and the amount of fees collected).
270 PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 269.
271 PCAOB Hearing, supra note 79, at 37 (statement of William F. McDonough,
Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.).
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Washington, D.C., the PCAOB has offices in New York, Atlanta, Dallas,
and San Francisco, and intends to open offices in Chicago and South-
ern California in the near future.
272
B. Comparisons to SROs and Federal Government Corporations
Before turning to an analysis of the PCAOB's constitutional status
(Part III) and the normative implications of Congress's decision to
establish the PCAOB as a "private" entity (Part IV), this section com-
pares the PCAOB to SROs in the securities industry and to other os-
tensibly private corporations created by Congress for public purposes.
The comparison is useful for a host of reasons, including that it vali-
dates Part I's observation that the PCAOB is a "strange kind of en-
tity."273 Indeed, the PCAOB's structure, powers, and responsibilities
place it far apart from any of the other "strange entities" that Congress
may have been involved with in the past.
1. SROs in the Securities Industry
As discussed above, in the months preceding the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress heard much testimony about the securi-
ties industry's relatively successful experience with self-regulation and
the great benefits that could be gained if the accounting industry were
regulated by an accounting analog to the NYSE or the NASD. 274 But
if Congress aimed to model the PCAOB after the NYSE or the NASD,
then it shot very far off its mark. This is so despite the stark similari-
ties between their rulemaking, investigative, and disciplinary functions
and the system of SEC oversight to which they are all subject.
2 75
The PCAOB's establishment by Congress is the threshold feature
that sets it apart from both the NYSE and the NASD. Congress did
not create either of those SROs. Instead, both organizations were
formed at the initiative of securities brokers and firms long before
Congress enveloped them in a regulatory scheme. This distinction is
an important one because, as we shall see in Part III of this Article, the
272 Id. (statement of William F. McDonough, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd.).
273 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (quoting the statement of Senator
Phil Gramm).
274 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. Much of the testimony reflects
an underlying assumption that the NASD and the NYSE are comfortably situated in
the private sector, notwithstanding their "quasi-governmental" powers and responsi-
bilities. But, as we shall see, courts have, on occasion, concluded that the NYSE and
NASD were state actors for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
See infra note 345.
275 See supra notes 246-57 and accompanying text.
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fact that an ostensibly private entity owes its creation to Congress is a
key factor in determining whether the Constitution will apply to its
actions.2
76
As the older of the two SROs, the NYSE's history is particularly
rich, dating back to 1792, when, according to the lore, twenty-four
brokers signed an agreement under a buttonwood tree located at
what is now 68 Wall Street.277 The NYSE took its self-regulatory re-
sponsibilities seriously, and its President in 1934 went so far as to ar-
gue in congressional testimony that the creation of the SEC was not
necessary. 278 Congress plainly rejected that argument, but the Ex-
change Act, and particularly its 1975 amendments, 279 evidence an un-
deniable respect for the NYSE's self-regulatory authority.
Although it is often said that the NASD was "created" by Congress
in 1938 as part of the Maloney Act, a more nuanced view of history
reveals that the NASD owes its origins to a trade group founded in
1912 by several investment banks, the Investment Bankers Association
of America (IBAA).280 That trade group created an Investment Bank-
ers Code Committee in 1933, which reorganized itself three years later
276 See infra Part III.A.2.a.
277 See N.Y. Stock Exch., Firsts and Records, at http://www.nyse.com/about/
1022221392987.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2005). The Buttonwood Agreement stated:
We the Subscribers, Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stock, do
hereby solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each other, that we will
not buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind of Public
Stock at a less rate than one-quarter per cent. Commission on the Specie
value, and that we will give a preference to each other in our Negotiations.
Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 663 (1975) (quoting the Buttonwood
Agreement).
278 RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 421 (1990) (quoting NYSE President
Richard Whitney's statement to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee that
"[y]ou gentleman are making a great mistake" and that "[t]he Exchange is a perfect
institution"); see Richard W. Painter, The Dubious History and Psychology of Clubs as
Self Regulatory Organizations (2004) (unpublished manuscript, American Academy
of Arts and Sciences).
279 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Congress amended the Exchange Act in
1975 to clarify the scope of the self-regulatory responsibilities of the stock exchanges
and the NASD and to clarify and enhance the SEC's oversight role. See NAGY ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 723-44. Self-regulation has been described by William 0. Douglas, a
former SEC chairman and Supreme Court Justice, as "letting the exchanges take the
leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the
shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but
with the hope it would never have to be used." WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND
FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940).
280 Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 23-24 (2001).
20051 1023
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
as the Investment Bankers Conference. 28 1 As Professor Paul Mahoney
recounts:
The conference and the SEC worked with Congress to craft an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizing the
formation of a self-regulatory organization for securities dealers....
The amendment, known as the Maloney Act, was enacted in 1938.
The Investment Bankers Conference then reorganized itself into
the NASD.
2 8 2
At first blush, another SRO, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board (MSRB), may appear to be the stronger analogy to the PCAOB
because it shares the feature of congressional creation-it was estab-
lished by Congress in 1975 to develop rules for securities firms and
banks that are involved in underwriting, trading, and selling munici-
pal securities.2 8 3 But, as its name implies, the MSRB's congressionally
designed responsibilities extend only to rulemaking.2 84 Accordingly,
with neither investigative nor disciplinary authority, the MSRB pos-
sesses only a fraction of the regulatory might that is shared by the
NASD, the NYSE, and the PCAOB.
285
In addition to their very different origins, there are at least three
other important distinctions setting the NYSE and the NASD apart
from the PCAOB. The first concerns the manner by which their
board members are appointed. In the case of the PCAOB, the ap-
281 Dean Joel Seligman recounts the rocky start of the Investment Bankers Confer-
ence as a "nationwide voluntary organization to police the over-the-counter markets."
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 184-85 (3d ed. 2003).
282 Mahoney, supra note 280, at 23-24. Of the post-Enron legislative proposals
discussed above, only Representative Oxley's CAARTA would have allowed for the
creation of an oversight board by the accounting industry itself. Although many
House Democrats criticized the bill for its vagueness, see supra notes 140-41, the dis-
cretion that it accorded the SEC in fact paralleled much of the Maloney Act. Thus,
had CAARTA been enacted into law, an NASD-like analogue for the accounting pro-
fession could well have resulted.
283 Exchange Act § 15B, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (2000).
284 The examination and enforcement of MSRB rules falls upon the SEC and
NASD for securities firms and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, and the Comptroller of the Currency for banks. 15 U.S.C. §§ 780-
4(c) (7)(A), 78c(a) (34) (2000); see also Mark Thoman & Amy B. Serper, New Disclosure
Requirements for Municipal Securities, 27 REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 111, 112-14
(discussing the history of SEC regulation of municipal securities) (1994).
285 For reasons discussed in Part III.A.2.b, infra, the MSRB's congressional crea-
tion and rulemaking mission may well be enough to render it the "government itself"
for purposes of constitutional law. See Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (maintaining that the MSRB's assertion that it is a purely private organization is
"questionable" in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lebron); see also infra note
392 (explaining further the D.C. Circuit's assertion).
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pointment power lies with the government, in that the SEC appoints
the five board members after consultation with the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury. 286 The govern-
ment also dictates that two-but only two-of the PCAOB's five mem-
bers must be CPAs. In contrast, the government plays no formal role
in the appointment of board members for either the NYSE 28 7 or the
NASD,288 and the government does not specify who may or may not
serve. Few would dispute that the government's power to appoint the
directors of an entity results in greater government control.
There are also important differences in the way that these three
organizations are funded. As we have seen, the PCAOB's private sec-
tor funding stems from a congressional mandate that obligates public
companies to pay an "accounting support fee" to fund the board's
operations.2 89 In contrast, the NYSE and NASD are funded primarily
by their member firms and listed companies. 290 To be sure, such
membership fees are not truly voluntary in that securities firms are
essentially compelled to belong to these organizations.2 91 But the
NYSE's and the NASD's mechanisms for member-firm funding pre-
existed any congressional dictate for membership.
292
A final distinction between these three organizations concerns
their power to obtain documents and testimony in the course of inves-
286 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
287 Members of the NYSE Board of Directors are elected by the Exchange's mem-
bership. They are required to be "independent of management of the Exchange, the
members, and issuers of securities listed on the Exchange." CONSTITUTION OF THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE art. IV, § 2 (2003), available at http://rules.nyse.com/
NYSE/Constitution.
288 Members of the NASD Board of Governors also are elected by its members. In
addition to five prescribed executive positions, the remaining twelve to twenty-two
governors must include representatives (or affiliates) of an issuer of investment com-
pany shares, an insurance company, a national retail firm, and a regional retail or
independent financial planning member firm. BY-LAWs OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. art. VII, § 4(a), available at http://www.nasd.com
(last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
289 See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
290 N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2004); NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC.
DEALERs, INC., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2004).
291 See Exchange Act § 15(b) (8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (2000) (making it unlaw-
ful for any broker-dealer registered with the SEC to effect any transaction "unless such
broker or dealer is a member of a securities association registered pursuant to section
78o-3 of this title or effects transactions in securities solely on a national securities
exchange of which it is a member"). The NASD is the only securities association
registered pursuant to Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1.
292 In addition, in contrast to the budget and fees of the NYSE and NASD, the
PCAOB's budget and its "accounting support fee" must be reviewed and approved by
the SEC. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
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tigations and disciplinary proceedings. Although all three organiza-
tions require cooperation with respect to the firms and associated
persons subject to their jurisdiction, only the PCAOB has a congressio-
nally designed avenue for compelling the production of documents
and testimony from third parties. Namely, only the PCAOB has the
statutory power to seek SEC issuance of a subpoena.293 The PCAOB
can therefore cast a much wider investigatory net over non-regulated
members of the public.
2. Corporations Created by the Federal Government
In contrast to the many references made to the NYSE and NASD
in the hearings and debates leading up to Sarbanes-Oxley, the legisla-
tive record does not reflect much discussion of congressionally cre-
ated private corporations that could serve as a model for the PCAOB.
The absence of analogy is hardly surprising: although Congress has
created literally dozens of corporations since the era of the New
Deal,29 4 almost all of those that serve a regulatory function are entities
of the federal government.
295
293 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
294 See Froomkin, supra note 30, at 546.
295 For example, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation was established to help
improve economic stability of agriculture by promoting and implementing a system of
sound crop insurance, 7 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2000); 7 C.F.R. pts. 400-457 (2003), the
Commodity Credit Corporation was founded to stabilize and support farm income
and price through loans and other programs for commodity distributors and export-
ers, 15 U.S.C. § 714 (2000); 7 C.F.R. pts. 1400-1482 (2003), the Export-Import Bank
is authorized to issue loans, guarantees, insurance, and credits to encourage and sup-
port U.S. exports, 12 U.S.C. § 635(a) (2000); 12 C.F.R. pts. 400-413 (2003), and the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (a federal government corporation in the De-
partment of Labor) was established to encourage voluntary private pension plans and
to insure for the timely and uninterrupted payment of benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)
(2000); 29 C.F.R. pts. 4000-4907 (2003). All of these corporations are entities of the
federal government. See also infra notes 296-304 and accompanying text (discussing
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
Though not a corporation, the Federal Reserve System was founded by Congress
in 1913 through the Federal Reserve Act to provide the nation with a safer, more
flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system. The Board of Governors
acts as a federal governmental agency in conjunction with the twelve regional Reserve
Banks to supervise and regulate "certain financial institutions and activities; [to pro-
vide] banking services to depository institutions and to the federal government; and
[to ensure] that consumers receive adequate information and fair treatment in their
business with the banking system." BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Svs., THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 1-4 (1994); see also 12 U.S.C.
§§ 241-252 (codifying the composition, powers, and responsibilities of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. pts. 201-281 (2003) (codifiying
the rules pertaining to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is one of the
many public corporations that shares numerous similarities with the
PCAOB (though with more than 5200 employees, its size is certainly
larger).296 Both the FDIC and the PCAOB were created by Congress
in response to a major financial crisis,297 both were charged with the
mission of restoring and preserving public confidence, 298 both have
regulatory authority over an important private industry,299 both have
five-person boards with members appointed by the government,
300
and both are funded from sources other than congressional
appropriation.
3 0 1
But the FDIC differs from the PCAOB in at least two important
ways. First, the FDIC was established as an independent agency of the
federal government.30 2 Second, the FDIC serves a commercial func-
tion thatjustifies its corporate form. Namely, in addition to its regula-
tory responsibilities, the FDIC also functions to sell deposit insurance
coverage to banks and thrift institutions.30 3 Thus, unlike the PCAOB,
the FDIC fits squarely within the general rationale for creating a fed-
eral government corporation: "to permit the development of a facility
or service with revenue producing potential."
304
296 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West Supp. 2004); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Who
Is the FDIC?, at (last updated July 28, 2003) (providing a general overview of the
FDIC's purposes and organization).
297 Congress created the FDIC in 1933 in response to the thousands of bank fail-
ures that occurred in the Great Depression. See ALFRED M. POLLARD ET AL., BANKING
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (1988); see also FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476
U.S. 426, 432 (1986) (recounting the genesis of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
298 See POLLARD ET AL., supra note 297, at 52; see also Philadelphia Gear, 476 U.S. at
433 (citing 77 CONG. REc. 3837, 3838, 3840 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall)).
299 See POLLARD ET AL., supra note 297, at 52.
300 See 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a) (1) (the FDIC's five-member board consists of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and
three other members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate);
supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (describing the PCAOB Board).
301 See infra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing the FDIC); supra notes
264-66 and accompanying text (discussing PCAOB).
302 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(1); see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2003 ANN. REP. 3
(2004) (stating, in its mission statement, that the FDIC is "an independent agency
created by the Congress").
303 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a), 1814, 1815.
304 See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 104TH CONG., MANAGING THE
PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, at XIII (Comm. Print 1995)
(Ronald C. Moe, primary contributor). With an eye to their revenue producing po-
tential, Congress has also created a number of privately owned corporations to serve
the purpose of loaning money for housing, agriculture, and education. These are
often referred to as "government sponsored enterprises" (GSEs), defined to include a
"privately owned, federally chartered financial institution with nationwide scope and
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While the PCAOB shares many similarities with the FDIC and
other public corporations, its similarities with the other ostensibly pri-
vate corporations created by Congress are few. To be sure, the
PCAOB's statutory disclaimer of "not an agency or establishment of
the United States Government" can be found in other statutes creat-
ing private corporations.3 0 5 Some of these, including the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation (LSC) ,306 the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB) ,307 the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),308
limited lending powers that benefits from an implicit federal guarantee to enhance its
ability to borrow money." Ronald C. Moe & Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored
Enterprises as Federal Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public Account-
ability, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 321, 321 (1989). GSEs include the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Company (Freddie Mac), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fan-
nie Mae), the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), the Federal Agricul-
tural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac), and the Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLB). Id. A comparison of the PCAOB to these GSEs is, therefore, inapposite.
305 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4411 (a) (2000) (establishing the National Endowment for
Democracy, a District of Columbia corporation); 36 U.S.C. § 151,301(b) (2000) (es-
tablishing the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, a Maryland corporation); id.
§ 151,701(b) (establishing the National Film Preservation Foundation, a federally
chartered corporation); id. § 152,401 (b) (establishing the National Recording Preser-
vation Foundation, a federally chartered corporation); see also infra notes 306-08 (dis-
cussing additional corporations).
306 The LSC, a private, nonprofit corporation established by Congress in 1974,
provides civil legal assistance to those who would otherwise be unable to afford it. 42
U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000). Its eleven-member board of directors is appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. § 2996c(a). See generally CharlesJ. Cooper
& Michael A. Carvin, The Price of "Political Independence": The Unconstitutional Status of
the Legal Services Corporation, 4 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 13, 13-38 (1994) (providing a histori-
cal background of the LSC and arguing the LSC Act violates the separation of powers
doctrine).
307 The CPB, a private, nonprofit corporation established by Congress in 1967,
encourages and supports public radio and television. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2000). In
2003, the Corporation allocated $240 million of congressionally appropriated funds
for public television and radio station community service grants. CoRP. FOR PUB.
BROAD., 2003 ANN. REP. 4 (2004). Its nine-member board is appointed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c) (1). See generally ChrisJohnson,
Federal Support of Public Broadcasting: Not Quite What LBJ Had in Mind, 8 COMM. LAW
CONSPECTUS 135, 135-48 (2000) (reviewing the history and purposes of the Public
Broadcasting Act and examining the role of political parties in public broadcasting).
308 The SIPC, a private, nonprofit corporation established by Congress in 1970,
protects investors with assets in the hands of bankrupt or otherwise illiquid brokerage
firms. SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., 2003 ANN. REP. 4 (2004). The SIPC was created to
restore investor confidence after a wave of broker-dealer failures in the 1960s. Id.
The Corporation is funded by its members, who are registered brokers and dealers of
securities. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ccc (West Supp. 2004). Its seven-member board consists
of one member appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury from among employees of
the Treasury, another member appointed by the Federal Reserve from among em-
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and Amtrak30 9 also share the PCAOB's feature of governmentally ap-
pointed directors-a feature that has often prompted political scien-
tists to label their private status as "legal fictions. '3 1 0 And the LSC,
CPB, and SIPC also perform limited regulatory functions. But re-
search has not revealed a single "private" government corporation-
or for that matter any congressionally created entity in the private sec-
tor-that shares the scope of the rulemaking, investigative, and adju-
dicative authority that Congress has delegated to the PCAOB. The
constitutional significance of this conclusion shall be explored in the
following Part.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PCAOB
Congress's decision to establish the PCAOB as a nonprofit corpo-
ration in the private sector comports with national-and even interna-
tional-trends toward the "privatization" of government.311 Although
ployees of the Federal Reserve, and five members appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate (two public members and three from the securities indus-
try). Id. § 78ccc(c) (2). See generally Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The
Securities Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1071 (1999) (reviewing the history and purposes of the SIPC and sug-
gesting improvements to the SIPC scheme).
309 The Supreme Court addressed Congress's designation of Amtrak as a private
corporation in Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378-80 (1995). The
decision is discussed extensively in Part III.A.2, infra.
310 See Thomas H. Stanton & Ronald C. Moe, Government Corporations and Govern-
ment-Sponsored Enterprises, in THE TooLS OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Lester M. Salamon ed.,
2002) (quoting a 1981 study of the National Academy of Public Administration Re-
port on Government, declaring it a "'misleading fiction' for government corporations
such as Amtrak, the Legal Services Corporation or the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation to be deemed by statute to be private corporations that were not agen-
cies or instrumentalities of the United States").
311 The term privatization is often used to describe "the range of efforts by govern-
ments to move public functions into private hands and to use market-style competi-
tion." Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1230 (2003). "Privatization can include using publicly funded
vouchers to permit eligible recipients to purchase goods or services in the private
market, government contracts with private providers, and using private entities to set
public standards." Id. at 1230 n.4. Other terms describing essentially the same phe-
nomenon include "government by proxy," see, e.g., John J. Dilulio, Jr., Government by
Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1271, 1271 (2002) (discussing the rise of
'third-party government" or increased governmental reliance on authorized proxies);
.private ordering," see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REv 319,
319 (2002) (discussing the sharing of regulatory authority with private actors); and
.contracting out," see, e.g., Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twen-
tieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52
ADMIN. L. REv. 859, 861 (2000) (noting that the terms "privatization," "reinvention,"
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the scholarly literature reflects much disagreement as to the trend's
normative consequences, 12 there is a growing consensus that ex-
panded privatization has served to blur the distinction between the
spheres of public and private.313 The blurriness has prompted Profes-
sor Jody Freeman and others to argue that there is "no purely private
realm and no purely public one ... [only] the set of negotiated rela-
tionships between the public and the private. ' 314 The Supreme
Court, however, has yet to come to grips with this more pragmatic
and "contracting out" describe the same effort "to reform and reduce 'Big
Government"').
312 The legal and political science literature on privatization is voluminous, and
there is substantial dispute as to whether the advantages of privatization are out-
weighed by its disadvantages. See supra note 30 (citing recent books and articles as
well as symposia in the Harvard Law Review, UCLA Law Review, Administrative Law Re-
view, and Fordham Urban Law Journal); see also THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (collecting various perspectives on the question of
whether courts should extend certain public law values into the deregulated, private
environment). For extensive commentary on the privatization trend in countries
outside the United States, see SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?: SOVEREIGN-Y IN AN
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION passim (1996); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE:
THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996); Symposium, The Decline of
the Nation State and Its Effect on Constitutional and International Economic Law, 18 CAR-
DOZO L. REv. 903 (1996). Advocates of expanded privatization generally emphasize
that it substantially reduces regulatory costs and the costs of providing goods and
services because the private sector is more efficient and less bureaucratic than govern-
ment. Critics argue that expanded privatization escapes the many checks, constitu-
tional and otherwise, that are placed on public actors in regulating entities,
administering programs, and distributing resources. See generally Jody Freeman, Ex-
tending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1291-314
(2003) (reviewing ideological and pragmatic arguments for and against expanded
privatization).
313 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 551-56; see also Matthew Diller, Form and Sub-
stance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1739, 1756 (2002) (not-
ing that "[t]he restructuring of intergovernmental relationships based on corporate
models suggests that privatization can be internalized" and that "[s]uch internaliza-
tion further blurs the distinctions between the public and private sectors"); CliffordJ.
Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing and Military Force in Liberal
States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 880 (2004) (arguing that "the boundaries between public
and private uses of force have become increasingly blurred").
314 Freeman, supra note 30, at 548 (drawing from scholarship in critical legal stud-
ies and public choice theory); see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the
Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 520 (2003) (observing that
"prominent scholars and practitioners in nearly every field seem to have joined the
negotiated governance crusade, either criticizing existing United States legal struc-
tures as overly formal and legalistic and urging a more negotiated approach, or ap-
plauding new U.S. legal developments as embracing the negotiated governance
ideal").
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analysis of public/private power. 315 Instead, modern constitutional
law continues a longstanding allegiance to two related notions: that
the categories of public and private are distinct, and that only public
or "state" actors can be subject to constitutional restraint. Hence,
while scholars may view the so-called state action requirement as
anachronistic, 316 it remains the doctrine under which all constitu-
tional claims are judged.
In view of this constitutional reality, this Part first contends that
the PCAOB is not only a "state actor" but a public entity (the "govern-
ment itself") under prevailing Supreme Court precedent. It then ex-
plores some of the constitutional restraints to which the PCAOB will
be subject. The final section discusses the PCAOB in light of the
Court's so-called nondelegation doctrine, another area of constitu-
tional jurisprudence that is difficult to reconcile with expanded
privatization.
A. The State Action Doctrine as Applied to the PCAOB
Although the judiciary has yet to grapple with its full implications,
the privatization phenomenon has generated much constitutional liti-
gation, with the Supreme Court delving into diverse arenas, including
interscholastic athletics, 317 worker's compensation, 318 railway trans-
portation,3 19 prisons, 320 nursing homes,
32 1 and electrical utilities.3 22
Because the Constitution generally does not apply to "merely private
315 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 576 (maintaining that "[t]he Court remains
strongly committed to the public/private distinction on which the [state action] doc-
trine depends"); Metzger, supra note 30, at 1400 (observing that the Court "strictly
compartmentalizes society into public and private spheres, and does not acknowledge
any substantial blurring between the two").
316 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 30, at 579 (contending that the "state action doc-
trine demands that we demarcate the public from the private, a task that proves ever
more difficult and unrealistic in the face of public/private interdependence"); Metz-
ger, supra note 30, at 1371 (arguing that "constitutional law's current approach to
privatization is fundamentally inadequate in an era of increasingly privatized govern-
ment" and that "[m]uch of this inadequacy results from current doctrine's failure to
appreciate how privatization can delegate government power to private hands").
317 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288
(2001). The Court has also analyzed intercollegiate basketball. See Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
318 See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
319 See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
320 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
321 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
322 SeeJackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,"3 23 the Court has
attempted to "plot a line between state action . . . and private con-
duct. '324 In addition to its basis in the text of the Constitution,325 this
state action requirement is said to further a number of policy objec-
tives, including "preserv[ing] an area of individual freedom by limit-
ing the reach of federal law" 326 and "avoid [ing] imposing on the State
.. responsibility for conduct for which [it] cannot fairly be
blamed."32
7
In "traditional" state action cases, the Court's line-plotting in-
volves a determination as to whether a private entity's conduct can be
fairly attributed to the government for constitutional purposes. Only
infrequently has the Court been confronted with a claim that an os-
tensibly private entity is the "government itself." Constitutional litiga-
tion involving the PCAOB will therefore present an untraditional-
but not unprecedented-state action scenario.
1. Traditional State Action Analysis
As the Supreme Court has recognized: "In the typical case raising
a state-action issue, a private party has taken the decisive step that
caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the question is whether the State
was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct as state ac-
tion." 328 In other words, traditional state action analysis requires a
323 Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 50 (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1002). The Thirteenth
Amendment stands as a notable exception to the state action doctrine because its
prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude extends to both private and public
actors. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 (1988).
324 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001).
325 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases empha-
sized the language in the Fourteenth Amendment that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
326 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
327 Id. As Professor Ronald Krotoszynski has explained, the state action doctrine is
essentially "a device that permits the federal courts to balance the interests of private
individuals and entities in being free from constitutional regulation against the pub-
lic's countervailing interest in ensuring that the government and its agents do not
disregard constitutional constraints." Ronaldi. Krotoszynski, Back to the Briarpatch: An
Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 302, 347 (1995).
328 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) (holding
that a state university's adoption of, and adherence to, rules and enforcement pro-
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court to determine whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus be-
tween the State and the challenged action."32 9 The nexus inquiry is
"necessarily fact-bound,"330 and for many years, the Court found a pri-
vate entity's acts to constitute state action only in one of three circum-
stances: (1) when the challenged activity resulted from the
government's exercise of "coercive power" or "significant encourage-
ment, either overt or covert";3 3 1 (2) when the private entity performed
a traditional governmental function; 33 2 or (3) when the challenged
activity resulted from a "symbiotic" interdependence between the gov-
ernment and the private entity. 333 This intensely fact-based inquiry
triggered claims by constitutional scholars that the Court's traditional
state action doctrine is "incoheren[ t],'' 4 a "conceptual disaster
area"33 5 and a "dark thicket of constitutional law."'3 36 Even the Court
has acknowledged that its "cases deciding when private action might
be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency.
'" 3 37
ceedings of a private organization did not render the private organization a state
actor).
329 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (holding that a
private insurer who withheld payment was not a state actor despite being subject to
extensive government regulations).
330 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (holding that a corporate creditor who acted jointly with
a state official in seizing a debtor's property amounted to a state actor for § 1983
purposes).
331 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 1004 (1982) (finding no State coercion by "[m]ere
approval of or acquiescence in" adjustments of Medicaid disbursements pursuant to a
private nursing home's decision to transfer patient's level of care to a lower level).
332 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (holding that a private physician's mis-
treatment of an inmate constituted state action because the physician had contracted
with the state prison to provide medical services to inmates).
333 See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
542-47 (1987) (holding that the authorities and resources conferred upon the U.S.
Olympic Committee (USOC) by the Amateur Sports Act did not create a symbiotic
relationship between the USOC and the government); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 843 (1982) (holding that "[nit symbiotic relationship such as existed in
Burton exists here"); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1972) (find-
ing that the state's issuance of a liquor license to a private club that excluded minori-
ties did not amount to a symbiotic relationship); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961) (finding a symbiotic relationship between a racially seg-
regated restaurant and a state agency from which the restaurant leased public space).
334 Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 505.
335 Black, supra note 32, at 95.
336 Krotoszynski, supra note 327, at 303.
337 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (quoting Ed-
monson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
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The Court's most recent state action decision, Brentwood Academy
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n,338 provides its critics with ad-
ditional fodder. The case presented a traditional state action scena-
rio: the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was a private
organization overseeing athletic events for nearly all of the state's pub-
lic and private secondary schools and the question presented was
whether the association would violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in enforcing a rule that restricted the manner in which
its member schools could recruit student athletes. But rather than
considering the three tests for state action identified above, a sharply
divided Supreme Court chose instead to focus on the association's
overall "entwinement" with the government. 339 Over the four dissent-
ers' strong objection, the majority held that "entwinement to the de-
gree shown here" supports the conclusion that the association "ought
to be charged with a public character and judged by constitutional
standards."340 As constitutional scholars have observed, Brentwood's
reasoning is strikingly different from the reasoning in American Manu-
facturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,3 41 where only two terms
before the Court insisted upon the state's involvement in "the specific
conduct of which the plaintiff complains"342 and not in the mere
background and workings of the private insurance companies. 343
Convoluted though it may be, traditional state action analysis
would have been necessary had Congress enacted CAARTA instead of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and had a "public regulatory organization"
been recognized by the SEC pursuant to CAARTA's criteria.344 In-
338 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
339 Id. at 291, 296-305.
340 Id. at 302. The dissenters strongly chastised the majority's failure to apply the
traditional tests of state action. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Scalia and Kennedy, J.J., dissenting) ("We have never found state action based upon
mere 'entwinement' . . . . The majority's holding . . . not only extends state-action
doctrine beyond its permissible limits but also encroaches upon the realm of individ-
ual freedom that the doctrine was meant to protect.").
341 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
342 Id. at 51 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
343 See Metzger, supra note 30, at 1414 (noting that "Sullivan is in many ways the
apogee of a formalistic state action inquiry" whereas the Brentwood majority's ap-
proach was "flexible, pragmatic, and situation specific").
344 See supra notes 124-26, 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing the
CAARTA as well as concerns by its critics that the legislation left too much of the
design of the public regulatory organization in the hands of the SEC and the account-
ing industry). Because the CAARTA did not explicitly situate the "public regulatory
organizations" that were contemplated in either the public sector or the private sec-
tor, there would have been substantial confusion as to their status. See supra notes
136-37 (contrasting diametrically opposed views from two representatives supporting
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deed, a "public regulatory organization" that was recognized by the
SEC would closely resemble securities industry SROs like the NASD
and the NYSE, and courts employ traditional state action analysis
when SRO conduct is subject to constitutional challenge. 345 But Con-
gress's creation of the PCAOB as an ostensibly private entity shifts the
PCAOB from the traditional State action paradigm to a narrower one
that focuses on whether an entity is the "government itself."
the legislation). Assuming that a public regulatory organization regarded itself as a
private entity and the SEC concurred, there would have been no easy answer to the
question of whether its actions nonetheless would be deemed to be "state action" for
purposes of the Constitution. It is quite likely that courts would analogize the organi-
zation to the NYSE or NASD and perform a state action analysis with a similarly scat-
tershot approach. See infra note 345.
345 Not surprisingly, in the context of constitutional challenges to conduct by se-
curities industry SROs, traditional state action analysis has produced results that are
difficult to reconcile. Compare Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., 452
F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that "[t]he intimate involvement of the Ex-
change with the [Commission] brings it within the purview of the Fifth Amendment
controls over governmental due process"), and Villiani v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 348 F.
Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (stating that "[i]t is now beyond dispute that the
Fifth Amendment due process requirements as to federal action apply to the discipli-
nary hearings conducted by the Exchange"), affd sub nom. Sloan v. N.Y. Stock Exch.,
Inc., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973), with Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1183 (4th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting defendant's constitutional challenge under the Double Jeopardy Clause in
part because "[w] hile the NASD is a closely regulated corporation, it is not a govern-
mental agency, but rather a private corporation organized under the laws of Dela-
ware"), and United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that
the NYSE's status as a private institution insulates it from the defendant's claim that
he was denied the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination). The
caselaw on SRO state action is even more difficult to reconcile when viewed alongside
the related issue of immunity. See, e.g., D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93,
105 (2d Cir. 2001)
The NYSE, as a SRO, stands in the shoes of the SEC in interpreting the
securities laws for its members and in monitoring compliance with those
laws. It follows that the NYSE should be entitled to the same immunity en-
joyed by the SEC when it is performing functions delegated to it under the
SEC's broad oversight authority.
Id. For articles taking the position that constitutional protections should apply to
SRO disciplinary actions, see William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment's Public/
Private Distinction Among Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace-Revisited, 23 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727 (2004); Richard L. Stone & Michael Perino, Not Just a
Private Club: Self Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 453.
2005] 1035
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
2. The PCAOB as a Public Entity
a. The Lebron Decision
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,346 Justice Scalia and
seven other Justices ruled that Amtrak was a public entity (the "Gov-
ernment itself') for constitutional purposes, notwithstanding Con-
gress's statutory declaration that Amtrak was a corporation under the
District of Columbia's Business Corporation Act and that it "'will not
be an agency or establishment of the United States Government.' ,,347
The opinion emphasized that "government, state or federal," cannot
"evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by
simply resorting to the corporate form."
3 48
The case arose when Michael Lebron sought to display a provoca-
tive advertisement on the 1000 square foot billboard (known as "the
Spectacular") overhanging the main entryway of Amtrak's Penn-
sylvania Station in New York City.3 49 Amtrak's vice president refused
to display Lebron's work, invoking Amtrak's policy "that it will not
allow political advertising on the [S]pectacular advertising sign.13 5 0
Lebron sued in federal court on the grounds that his First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights had been violated, and after expedited dis-
covery the district judge granted Lebron's request for an injunction
and ordered Amtrak to display his advertisement. The district judge
concluded that "based on examination of the federal government's
deep and controlling entwinement in Amtrak's structure and opera-
tions, . . . when Amtrak undertakes to control the content of speech
on its billboards, its conduct must be deemed governmental rather
than private."' 35 1 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, maintaining that, in creating Amtrak, Con-
gress specifically determined that it would not be a government en-
tity. 352 The panel further reasoned that the federal government was
346 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
347 Id. at 391 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108
Stat. 1379 (1994)).
348 Id. at 397.
349 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 811 F. Supp. 993, 994-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1993), rev'd, 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 U.S. 374 (1995). The ad scrutinized
the Coors family's right-wing affiliations by portraying "convivial drinkers of Coors
beer, juxtaposed with a Nicaraguan village scene in which peasants are menaced by a
can of Coors that hurtles towards them, leaving behind a trail of fire, as if it were a
missile," and stating that "Coors is 'The Silver Bullet that aims The Far Right's politi-
cal agenda at the heart of America."' Id. at 995.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 997.
352 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 1993).
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not so involved with Amtrak as to render Amtrak's Vice President's
decision a federal action. 353 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
reversed, and remanded.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion recognized at the outset that it
"may be unnecessary to traverse [the] difficult terrain" of traditional
state action jurisprudence "since Lebron's first argument is that Am-
trak is not a private entity but Government itself."3 54 That argument
prompted the Court to "place Amtrak within its proper context in the
long history of corporations created and participated in by the United
States for the achievement of governmental objectives." 355 The Court
noted that World War I begat the first large-scale use of government
controlled corporations, and that the Great Depression brought about
the next major group "which proved to be more enduring. '35 6 For
the most part, these corporations were designated as government
agencies and were located within existing governmental structures. 35 7
But beginning with the Communications Satellite Corporation (Com-
sat) in 1962, Congress "turned to sponsoring corporations that it spe-
cifically designated not to be agencies or establishments of the United
States Government. '" 358 Amtrak, established by Congress in 1970, was
one of those corporations with an authorizing statute declaring that it
"'will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Govern-
ment. - 3 59 But operated with federal funds, and controlled by a board
with a majority of presidentially appointed directors,3 60 Amtrak was
353 Id. at 392.
354 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995).
355 Id. at 386.
356 Id. at 388 (citing examples including the FDIC, the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority).
357 Id. at 390. In response to the growing trend of government corporations, Con-
gress passed the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 (GCCA), ch. 557, 59
Stat. 597 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 9101-9109 (2000)), which re-
quired the dissolution or liquidation of both wholly- and partially-owned government
corporations unless Congress chose to reincorporate them. New government corpo-
rations could only be created pursuant to congressional approval and would be au-
dited by the Comptroller General. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 389-90.
358 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390. The Court seemed to regard Comsat as a truly private
corporation because, while it was established by Congress to serve governmental
objectives, it was capitalized entirely with private funds, and its board was to be con-
trolled by its private shareholders (with only three out of fifteen directors appointed
by the President). Id. at 390-91.
359 Id. at 391 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108
Stat. 1379 (1994)).
360 The Court provided a description of the appointment process that existed at
that time. Six of Amtrak's nine board members were appointed directly by the Presi-
dent: the Secretary of Transportation was an ex officio member; three members were
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expected to "avert the threatened extinction of passenger trains" in
the United States.
36 1
The Court then turned to Amtrak's contention that "whatever its
relationship with the Federal Government," Congress's disclaimer of
agency status "prevents it from being considered a Government en-
tity." 3 6 2 With respect to statutes and other matters in Congress's con-
trol, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, and government procurement laws, the Court con-
ceded that Congress's "private" disclaimer would be dispositive.
3 63
Constitutional matters, however, are not within Congress's control
and therefore "it is not for Congress to make the final determination"
as to constitutional status. 364 The Court then stated:
If Amtrak is, by its very nature, what the Constitution regards as the
Government, congressional pronouncement that it is not such can
no more relieve it of its First Amendment restrictions than a similar
pronouncement could exempt the Federal Bureau of Investigation
from the Fourth Amendment. The Constitution constrains govern-
mental action "by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that
action may be taken." And under whatever congressional label.
365
Drawing on language from an earlier decision involving the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, the Court also emphasized that Con-
gress's choosing to call an entity "'a corporation does not alter its
characteristics so as to make it something other than what it actually
is.' "366
Ultimately, the Court had little trouble concluding that Amtrak is
what this Article terms a "public/private entity": public for purposes of
the Constitution and private for those purposes over which Congress
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, one chosen from a list submit-
ted by the Railway Labor Executives Association, one selected from the governors of
states, and one picked as a business representative with an interest in rail transporta-
tion; two more members were appointed independently of the Senate, from a list
provided by various commuter rail authorities. Two additional members were chosen
by Amtrak's preferred stock-holders; however, because the United States government
held all of Amtrak's preferred stock, the Secretary of Transportation chose these
members. The final member was the board's president, who was elected by the other
eight members. Id. at 385.
361 Id. at 383.
362 Id. at 392.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 392-93 (quoting Ex pate Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880)).
366 Id. at 393 (quoting Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 536, 539
(1946)).
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has control.367 The Court first highlighted past practices and under-
standings of government-created and -controlled corporations as be-
ing part of the federal government and drew particular attention to
their policymaking functions. 368 It then stated that "reason itself' sup-
ports the conclusion that such corporations "are (for many purposes
at least) part of the Government itself."3 69 Indeed, if converting to
the corporate form allowed the government to evade its most solemn
constitutional obligations, then Plessy v. Ferguson370 could have been
resurrected through Louisiana's operation of segregated trains
through a state-owned Amtrak.371 Turning to Amtrak's particular
characteristics, the Court emphasized that Amtrak "[was] established
and organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing fed-
eral governmental objectives, under the direction and control of fed-
eral governmental appointees"372 and that it was markedly similar to
"so-called independent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Com-
munications Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, which are run by Presidential appointees with fixed terms."
373
All of this prompted the Court to hold that "where, as here, the Gov-
ernment creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of
governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to
appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corpora-
tion is part of the Government for purposes of the First
Amendment."3
74
367 Id. at 394.
368 Id. at 394-96. In so doing, the Court distinguished Amtrak from its prior deci-
sion in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), where the Court
held that the Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail) was not a federal entity, id. at 152,
despite the federal government's power to appoint eight of fifteen of its directors, id.
at 165 (Douglas, J., dissenting). According to the Court, Conrail was not part of the
government because the government's voting control was designed to shift to the
private shareholders when Conrail's federal financial obligations fell below half of its
total indebtedness and because "'[t] he responsibilities of the federal directors are not
different from those of other directors-to operate Conrail at a profit for the benefit
of shareholders'-which contrasts with the public-interest 'goals' set forth in Amtrak's
charter." Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399 (quoting Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
at 152). The Court concluded that "Amtrak is worlds apart from Conrail" because the
federal government "exerts its control not as a creditor but as a policymaker." Id.
369 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397.
370 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
371 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397.
372 Id. at 398.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 400. It is interesting to speculate about whether Amtrak's denial of ad-
vertising space to Lebron would have constituted state action under traditional state
action analysis. Not surprisingly, constitutional scholars offer differing conclusions.
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As constitutional scholars have recognized, the Lebron decision
ushered in a new preliminary step in state action analysis. 375 Indeed,
rather than merely assume that an entity's "private" label is control-
ling, courts must first consider whether the entity could actually be
the government itself. And if a court finds that the entity is the gov-
ernment, all of that entity's actions shall be deemed state action for
purposes of constitutional law.
3 76
b. Lebron's Application to the PCAOB
In the wake of Lebron, lower courts have differed as to whether
the Court's holding demands application of a three-prong test or per-
mits a more flexible analysis for determining whether a purportedly
private corporation will be deemed a public entity for constitutional
purposes. While the latter interpretation seems truer to Lebron's rea-
soning,37 7 the PCAOB easily qualifies as the "government itself' under
either alternative.
Courts interpreting Lebron to require the application of a three-
prong test have articulated that test as follows:
"[O]nly if (1) the government created the corporate entity by spe-
cial law, (2) the government created the entity to further govern-
mental objectives, and (3) the government retains permanent
authority to appoint a majority of the directors of the corporation
will the corporation be deemed a government entity for the pur-
pose of the state action requirement."
378
Compare Froomkin, supra note 30, at 570-71 (maintaining that "Lebron was actually an
easier case than the Court made it seem" and that Amtrak's nexus with the federal
government was sufficient to find state action), with Krotoszynski, supra note 327, at
324 (contending that "[u]nder the Court's traditional contacts analysis tests, Amtrak
probably would not qualify as a state actor"). Justice O'Connor's dissent supports
Professor Krotoszynski's position. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 413 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (finding that Amtrak was not a state actor because "nothing in this case suggests
that the Government controlled, coerced, or even influenced Amtrak's decision,
made pursuant to corporate policy and private business judgment, to disapprove the
advertisement proposed by Lebron").
375 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1536-37 (4th ed. 2001);
Krotoszynski, supra note 327, at 308.
376 See Krotoszynski, supra note 327, at 314.
377 See id. at 345 (noting Lebron's "totality of the circumstances" approach and em-
phasizing that "[n]o one factor or set of factors was dispositive by itself"); see also id. at
327 n.130 (observing that the Lebron majority "did not specify the precise degree of
control necessary for its holding to apply").
378 Horvath v. Westport Library Ass'n, 362 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations omitted)).
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Although courts have applied the "majority of directors" prong with
varying degrees of rigor,379 there appears to be a general requirement
that all three prongs must be met for purportedly private entities to be
considered a part of the government.
380
379 Compare Horvath, 362 F.3d at 153 (noting that although appointees by the town
constituted exactly half (and therefore not a majority) of the library's board, the third
element of the Lebron test was satisfied because town funding of more than ninety
percent of the library's budget demonstrated the requisite government control), with
Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2000) (expressing
the belief that "Lebron means what it says" and holding that although the state of
Connecticut created Yale University by special law for the governmental objective of
higher education, Yale is not a state entity when state officials constitute only two of its
nineteen trustees), and Hall v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "[b]ecause the government has not retained permanent authority to
appoint the majority of the Red Cross governing board, the Red Cross is not a govern-
ment actor under the Lebron structural analysis of government chartered
corporations").
380 This "three-prong test" of Lebron has an interesting lineage. The test appears
to have originated in American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1409-11 (9th Cir. 1996). Having determined that "Freddie Mac is
a corporation chartered by Congress," the court maintained that, under Lebron, the
"two relevant criteria for judging Freddie Mac's status as a federal entity for Fifth
Amendment purposes are the extent to which its objectives are governmental and the
extent to which the government directs and controls the corporation's pursuit of
those objectives." Id. at 1406. The court concluded that despite its governmental
objective of encouraging home ownership, Freddie Mac was not a federal entity for
constitutional purposes because its more than sixty million shares were publicly
traded and fewer than one-third of its directors were appointed by the government.
Id. at 1407-09. A few months later, another panel of the Ninth Circuit cited American
Bankers Mortgage Corp. when applying the following "government entity" test: "[A] cor-
poration created by special law is part of the government for the purposes of the First
Amendment (1) when the corporation is created for the furtherance of governmental
objectives and (2) when government retains for itself permanent authority to appoint
the majority of directors of the corporation." Hall, 86 F.3d at 921-22. A number of
courts then recognized "government creation" as the first of three elements for the
test and required that "all three Lebron prongs need to be met for private corporations
to be considered governmental actors." Abu-Jamal v. Nat'l Pub. Radio, No. CIV.A. 96-
0594, 1997 WL 527349, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1997) (finding that despite its receipt
of federal funding, NPR is not an entity of the federal government because no direc-
tor of NPR is "selected, appointed or confirmed by any branch of the federal govern-
ment"), affd, 159 F.3d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); see also
Barrios-Velazquez v. Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 84
F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that a financial service association is not an
entity of Puerto Rico because the government does not retain the power to appoint
any of the association's directors); Remy v. Howard Univ., 55 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29-30
(D.D.C. 1999) (stating that a university "eludes the third Lebron criterion" because the
government does not appoint university trustees).
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Little analysis is needed to see that the PCAOB satisfies all three
prongs of this test. The PCAOB was created by Congress in Title I of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which also authorized the SEC to appoint
each of the PCAOB's five initial members and all of its subsequent
members.38 Moreover, the objectives furthered by the PCAOB are
even more quintessentially governmental than those presented in
prior challenges, including Lebron itself. Although important govern-
mental objectives are undoubtedly served through the operation of
railways,3 8 2 lending institutions for home mortgages, 38 3 humanitarian
relief organizations in war and peacetime, 3 4 universities,3 8 5 and li-
braries, 38 6 those objectives are also met routinely by private sector en-
tities. In contrast, the PCAOB's statutory mission of "protect[ing] the
interests of investors and further[ing] the public interest" in the prep-
aration of reliable audit reports3 8 7 and its rulemaking, enforcement,
and adjudicative powers have a longstanding tradition of being an ex-
clusive province of government. 38 8 The PCAOB therefore passes the
"three-prong test" with flying colors.
Viewing this test as too formalistic, other courts have interpreted
Lebron to permit a more flexible analysis in determining whether a
purportedly private entity will be deemed the government for consti-
tutional purposes.38 9 Under this contextual approach, an entity's gov-
381 See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
382 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995); see also Laverty
v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 13 P.3d 725, 732 (Alaska 2000) (finding state action because the
"statutory basis and management structure of the Alaska Railroad Corporation paral-
lels that of Amtrak as described by the Supreme Court").
383 Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d at 1407.
384 Hall, 86 F.3d at 921.
385 Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2000).
386 Horvath v. Westport Library Ass'n, 362 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2004).
387 See supra text accompanying note 157 (quoting text from Title I of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act).
388 See supra note 5 (identifying powers that are well recognized as
"governmental").
389 See, e.g., Sotack v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 471, 479
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that an association of insurers is considered a state entity for
constitutional purposes);Jersawitz v. People TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1338 (N.D. Ga.
1999) (holding that People TV is an agency of the city for constitutional purposes);
Becker v. Gallaudet Univ., 66 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that de-
spite its congressional creation and governmental objectives, Gallaudet University is
not an entity of the federal government for constitutional purposes); Wilkinson v.
Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 45 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that LSC is an entity
of the federal government for constitutional purposes); Clark v. County of Placer, 923
F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that nonprofit fair association is an
entity of the county for constitutional purposes). The Wilkinson court's finding that
the LSC is a federal entity for purposes of the Constitution is particularly significant
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ernmental creation and governmental objectives remain as threshold
requirements. However, the analysis views a board with a majority of
governmental appointees not as a requirement, but rather as one of
several indicia of government control over policymaking. 390 Other in-
dicia of control include government funding, 391 government approval
of rules or policies,392 and governmental supervision.3 9 3 Thus, regard-
less of its board membership, an entity created by the government for
a governmental objective may be considered the "government itself' if
the government's capacity for control is substantial.
The conclusion that the PCAOB is part of the federal govern-
ment for constitutional purposes inevitably flows from this more flexi-
ble analysis. Indeed, the PCAOB's governmentally appointed board is
but one of several factors that make it subject to substantial govern-
mental control, at least as a formal matter. The SEC not only appoints
its five board members, but it must also approve all of the PCAOB's
rules as well as the PCAOB's budget and annual accounting support
fee. 39 4 In addition, the SEC has the power to review PCAOB discipli-
nary proceedings and, provided cause is shown, to censure the Board
because like the PCAOB, the LSC was created by Congress pursuant to a statute speci-
fying that it "shall not be considered a department, agency or instrumentality of the
federal government." Wilkinson, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996d(e) (1) (2000)).
390 See, e.g., Sotack, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (finding that because the "Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania controls almost every aspect of [its] operations," the Penn-
sylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (PPCIGA) is a
governmental entity even though "the members of the Board are typically not ap-
pointed by the government"); Becker, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 21 n.6 (stating that the "focus
of Lebron and its progeny is on congressional direction and control, and although the
composition of the Board of Trustees is one indicator of the extent of federal control,
it should not be the sole factor"); Clark, 923 F. Supp. at 1283-85 (finding that the
county retained "ultimate control" over the Association's operations, even though the
members of the Association's board of directors are elected by its members).
391 Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 552-53 (2d Cir.
2001) (concluding in dicta that a state-created and state-funded agricultural coopera-
tive was a state actor even though only two of its ten board members were appointed
by the government).
392 In Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit stated that
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's assertion that it was a private entity was
"questionable" in light of the Lebron decision. The court made this statement despite
the fact that the government no longer plays a role in appointing MSRB members;
vacant seats are filled through a nomination committee composed of private individu-
als, with current Board members ultimately electing the committee's nominees. 15
U.S.C. § 78o-4(b) (1) (2000).
393 See Sotack, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (stating that the Commissioner of Insurance
"has virtually limitless authority to supervise and regulate the PPCIGA at all times").
394 See supra notes 249-51, 267-68 and accompanying text.
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or its members, limit their activities, or remove members from the
Board.395 Thus, Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enables the SEC to
wield substantial control over the PCAOB's policymaking. Regardless
of whether a court would apply the three-prong test or a more flexible
alternative, the PCAOB is a public entity-the government itself-for
purposes of constitutional law.
B. Constitutional Restraints on the PCAOB
The application of the Court's decision in Lebron to the PCAOB
has tremendous significance: when actions by the PCAOB are chal-
lenged in court (as they inevitably will be), judges must hold the
PCAOB to the Constitution in the same way and manner as any other
entity of the federal government. Although one can hardly predict
the full range of constitutional issues that will arise in PCAOB litiga-
tion, it is possible to create a roadmap that highlights some principal
constitutional restraints, drawn in part from litigated cases involving
the SEC or other federal agencies. After providing that general
roadmap, this section then focuses on two questions that are likely to
be threshold issues in evaluating the constitutionality of any action by
the PCAOB: whether the provision for the appointment of the
PCAOB's five members complies with the Appointments Clause in Ar-
ticle II of the Constitution and whether congressional limitations on
presidential control of PCAOB officials can be reconciled with the
general doctrine of separation of powers. The goal throughout this
section is not to resolve the constitutional issues, but rather to frame
them for future discussion and analysis.
1. A General Roadmap for the PCAOB
The Constitution operates to restrain the PCAOB's actions in at
least four respects. First, as the "government itself," the PCAOB must
afford its employees constitutional rights and liberties to which they
would not be entitled were they working for a truly private em-
ployer.3 96 Thus, for example, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause may protect PCAOB employees from being disciplined or ter-
minated without the opportunity for a hearing,397 the First Amend-
395 See supra notes 252-57, 259-60 and accompanying text.
396 Cf Krotoszynski, supra note 327, at 310 n.44 (noting that "[c]onsistent with
Lebron, because the government cannot cease to be the government, it may not avail
itself of the same freedom of conduct that private entities enjoy in their employment
decisions").
397 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (holding that a professor at
a state college had a due process entitlement to a hearing on his claim that he was
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ment guarantee of freedom of speech may protect their ability to
criticize elected officials (including the President),398 and the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures may
afford PCAOB employees a zone of limited privacy in the workplace
(prohibiting, for instance, mandatory random drug testing). 099 Of
course, constitutional restraints set only a floor and the PCAOB could
adopt policies and procedures that are even more employee-sensitive
than those constitutionally required. But then the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause may require the PCAOB to comply with the poli-
cies and procedures it announces.
400
Second, as the "government itself," the PCAOB must conduct in-
spections and investigations of accounting firms and their associated
persons in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution. Thus,
for example, an accountant with a reasonable fear of criminal prose-
cution may be able to exercise a Fifth Amendment right not to testify
in a PCAOB investigation, and the PCAOB may not be able to subject
her to discipline solely for her failure to cooperate. 40 1 The Constitu-
terminated for exercising his First Amendment right to criticize the college adminis-
tration's policies).
398 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (holding that a clerical em-
ployee in a county constable's office was improperly discharged for remarking, after
hearing of an attempt on the life of President Reagan: "If they go for him again, I
hope they get him").
399 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678-79 (1989)
(upholding suspicionless urinalysis testing for United States Customs Service employ-
ees who seek transfer or promotion to certain positions directly involved in drug in-
terdiction or required to carry firearms, but questioning the reasonableness of such
testing for other positions); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches conducted by the government, even when the government acts in its capacity
as an employer).
400 See United States ex reL Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954)
(holding that public agencies must adhere to voluntarily adopted, binding policies
that limit their discretion); Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 62
(D.D.C. 1998) (finding that despite statutory language designating it as a "private,
nonprofit corporation," the LSC is a government actor that is required to conform
with the Due Process Clause and the Accardi doctrine in terminating its employees).
401 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974) (stating that "[i]t has long
been established, of course, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal
papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony"); cf. SEC v. Dunlap, 253 F.3d
768, 774 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]o the extent that the Injunction Order and
the Contempt Order require Dunlap to produce his personal records, or to create
and produce a sworn accounting regarding his personal financial transactions and
assets, those orders implicate his Fifth Amendment protections . . . [and] should be
modified as necessary"). See generally Seymour Glanzer et al., The Use of the Fifth Amend-
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tion, however, would not preclude the PCAOB (or other fact finders)
from drawing a negative inference from that failure to testify, except
in the context of a criminal prosecution. 40 2 The Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination may also affect the enforceability
of the "consents" to cooperation that accountants are required to sign
as a condition of their employment with a registered accounting
firm.40 3 Accounting firms and their associated persons may also be
able to challenge other actions that could occur in the course of
PCAOB investigations, such as unreasonable searches or seizures of
property40 4 or unreasonable interferences with a firm's or individual's
choice of counsel. 40 5 The caselaw, however, is clear that accounting
ment in SEC Investigations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895, 899-913 (1984) (discussing the
scope of the Fifth Amendment in SEC investigations).
As noted previously, the PCAOB has announced its intention to honor good-faith
invocations of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege, although it has
done so in a comment to a Rule rather than in a rule itself. See supra note 241. But
PCAOB officials have emphasized that this is a voluntary measure that distinguishes
the PCAOB from the NASD and other SROs. See Mary M. Sjoquist & Marilyn H. Wei-
mer, The PCAOB Takes on Enforcement, 7 WALL STREET LAW. 1, Mar. 2004, at 1, 3-7,
available at http://www.realcoporatelawyer.com/wsl/wsl0304.html.
402 Cf SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[p]arties are
free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw
adverse inferences from their failure of proof"). See generally Marvin G. Pickholz &
AllisonJ. Unger, Use and Misuse of the "Adverse Inference" in SEC Civil Enforcement Actions,
24 SEC. REc. L.J. 38, 44-53 (1996) (examining the problems raised by the use of the
adverse inference in SEC civil enforcement actions).
403 Cf Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977) (stating that the
Fifth Amendment is violated when "refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege
leads automatically and without more to imposition of sanctions"). As noted previ-
ously, an accounting firm's registration is conditioned on its agreement to secure and
enforce written consents from each employee as a condition of his or her employ-
ment. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. Presumably, this means that
accounting firms are required to terminate the employment of an accountant or
other employee who refuses to cooperate in a PCAOB investigation.
404 See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 69 (1992) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment's standard of "reasonableness" applies to any seizure by the government
in any context); cf Colello v. SEC, 908 F. Supp. 738, 752-55 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (ruling
that an asset freeze by Swiss authorities at the request of the Department of Justice
and the SEC violated the Fourth Amendment in that a treaty allowed seizure based on
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause), affid, 139 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1998);
OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (stating that if the
SEC "knew or should have known at the time of the seizure's occurrence" that the
informant was conducting a private party search, then the SEC violated Fourth
Amendment rights).
405 Cf SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Since any statement made by Csapo during the course of his questioning
may later be referred to the Department of Justice for future consideration
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firms and their associated persons, firms, and individuals will not have
a constitutional right to be notified if they become "targets" of a
PCAOB investigation.
40 6
Third, the PCAOB's disciplinary proceedings must be conducted
in accordance with due process and other constitutional require-
ments, and sanctions imposed by the PCAOB must not violate the
Constitution. In the context of adjudications, constitutional due pro-
cess generally requires four safeguards: (1) adequate notice of issues
presented, (2) an opportunity to present facts and arguments either
in writing or orally, (3) a decision by a neutral decisionmaker, and (4)
a statement of reasons for the decision. 40 7 Although Title I of
Sarbanes-Oxley requires the PCAOB to provide each of these four
safeguards in its disciplinary proceedings, 40 8 any failure on the
PCAOB's part to do so in a particular case could constitute a constitu-
tional violation. 40 9 Where the PCAOB imposes civil monetary sanc-
tions on a firm or individual, there would be at least an argument that
by a grand jury, perhaps followed by an indictment and prosecution on crim-
inal charges, Csapo's choice of counsel to accompany and advise him during
his SEC interview is obviously a crucial one.
Id.; SEC v. Whitman, 613 F. Supp. 48, 49 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that "[u]nless the
lawyer can receive substantive guidance from an expert technician-in this case, an
accountant-when he determines in his professional judgment that such assistance is
essential, his client's absolute right to counsel during the proceedings would become
substantially qualified"). Although the "right to counsel" referenced in these cases is
a right provided under the APA, there is some authority for the proposition that the
respondents in SEC proceedings have a constitutional due process interest in their
choice of counsel. See In re Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,608, at 83,633 (ALJ 1974) (refusing an SEC
request to bar a law firm's simultaneous representation of a brokerage firm and forty-
seven registered representatives, and maintaining that "a respondent in administra-
tive proceedings normally has the right to be represented by counsel of his choice,
and that an unfair denial of that right might constitute a denial of due process under
the Constitution").
406 SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause... is [not] offended when a federal administrative agency, without notifying a
person under investigation, uses its subpoena power to gather evidence adverse to
him. The Due Process Clause is not implicated under such circumstances because an
administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights.").
407 RIcHtRD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 561 (4th ed. 2002).
408 See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
409 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985)
(noting that the denial of a hearing prior to dismissal deprived an employee of his
due process right to present his account of the facts); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 578 (1973) (stating that board actions that served the personal interests of pri-
vate practitioners serving on an optometry board violated the due process rights of a
business employing optometrists).
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subsequent sanctions by the SEC or DOJ could constitute a violation
of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.410
Finally, the PCAOB's rulemaking may be subject to constitutional
challenge, both in terms of its procedural compliance as well as its
substantive content. Once again, for procedural challenges, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the hallmark, preventing,
for example, retroactive application of announced rules.411 The sub-
stance of a PCAOB auditing standard could also be challenged, for
example, under the First Amendment if it restricted an accounting
firm's or an accountant's right to free speech or association.412
The above roadmap merely sketches a trail of the possible types
of litigation that the PCAOB may encounter because of the public
nature of this otherwise private corporation. But the rulemaking, en-
forcement, and adjudicative experiences of the SEC and other federal
agencies will undoubtedly serve as a good predictor as to what lies
ahead.
2. Specific Constitutional Restraints
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's disclaimer that "[n]o member or per-
son employed by ... the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or
employee of... the Federal Government"413 may well have convinced
Congress that the structural restraints imposed by the Constitution,
including the Appointments Clause and the general doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers, would not apply to the PCAOB. But the Court's
410 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects defendants
against multiple criminal prosecutions and multiple criminal punishments for the
same offense. Although statutory interpretation generally determines whether a par-
ticular punishment is criminal or civil, even when a statute specifically labels a sanc-
tion as civil, the sanction may be "'so punitive either in purpose or effect,' as to
'transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."'
SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). The Hudson test is difficult to meet and the plaintiff was not
able to do so in Palmisano. See id. at 866 (holding that the SEC's civil penalty was not
excessive in relation to its nonpunitive goals, "such as encouraging investor confi-
dence, increasing the efficiency of financial markets, and promoting the stability of
the securities industry").
411 Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per
curiam) (holding that the due process guarantee of the Constitution was violated
because the rulemaking procedure was inadequate).
412 See Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944-48 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying the so-called
"strict scrutiny" test under the First Amendment and upholding a regulation by the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board that restricted the ability of municipal securi-
ties professionals to contribute to and solicit contributions for political campaigns of
state officials from whom they solicit or obtain business).
413 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (quoting the statute).
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decision in Lebron commands an opposite conclusion: as the "govern-
ment itself," the PCAOB's composition and powers are subject to the
same constitutional checks and balances that apply to any entity or
official of the federal government. Thus, the PCAOB's consistency
with the Appointments Clause and the general doctrine of separation
of powers are threshold issues that will affect the legality of its
actions.
4 14
a. The Appointments Clause
By limiting the nature of persons eligible to appoint federal of-
ficers, the Appointments Clause functions as a structural restraint on
Congress's ability to widely disburse political power.41 5 Its text pro-
vides that:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for; and which shall be established by Law; but
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Of-
ficers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
law, or in Heads of Departments.
4 16
As the Court stated in Buckley v. Valeo,4 1 7 the Clause requires "any ap-
pointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States" to be appointed in the prescribed manner.418 Because
414 See Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991) (concluding that a statutory condition requiring
a "Board of Review" comprised of members of Congress and having veto power over
decisions of a regional airport authority violated the separation of powers doctrine);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988) (concluding that subpoenas issued by an
Independent Counsel to three former government officials were enforceable because
the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act violated neither
the Appointments Clause nor the limitations of Article III, "nor do they impermissibly
interfere with the President's authority under Article II in violation of the constitu-
tional principle of separation of powers"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976)
(invalidating certain powers of the Federal Election Commission because Congress
cannot provide for the appointment of officers of the United States except through a
procedure that "comports with" the Appointments Clause).
415 Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991).
416 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. As the Court recognized in Edmond v. United
States, "the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of 'etiquette or
protocol'; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional
scheme." 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125).
417 424 U.S. 1.
418 Id. at 126. Although it is not relevant here because the PCAOB is part of the
government for purposes of the Constitution, opinions differ as to whether the Ap-
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there seems little doubt that the five members of the PCAOB are exer-
cising "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States,"4 19 and because Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act vested
their appointment with the SEC,4 20 the primary questions in contro-
versy will be: (1) whether the PCAOB's board members qualify as "in-
ferior" or "principal" officers and (2) whether SEC commissioners,
acting together, qualify as "Heads of Departments."
Let us assume for a moment that the PCAOB's five board mem-
bers are "inferior officers" such that Congress may authorize their ap-
pointment by "Heads of Departments." One preliminary question is
whether the SEC qualifies as a "Department" within the meaning of
the Appointments Clause. Remarkably, the Supreme Court has never
decided, and on one occasion has reserved, the question of whether
an independent regulatory agency such as the SEC is a "Depart-
ment."42 1 Assuming the SEC qualifies as a "Department,'" 422 there is a
pointments Clause operates as a structural restraint on only federal entities. Compare
Walter Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Con-
gress, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513, 535 (2000) (stating that "[t]he Appointments
Clause simply is not implicated when significant authority is devolved upon non-fed-
eral actors"), with Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1511 (2001) (observing that the Appointments Clause may be the
best constitutional "candidate" for restraining the expanded privatization of federal
functions and programs).
419 See supra Part II.A.3-5 (describing the rulemaking, investigatory, and adjudica-
tive functions of the PCAOB). In United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va.
1823) (No. 15,747), Chief Justice Marshall viewed the term "officer" in the Appoint-
ments Clause to connote a person who performs duties that are continuing and that
are "defined by rules prescribed by the government, and not by contract." Id. at 1214.
420 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (describing the process of ap-
pointing the PCAOB's five board members).
421 Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 887 n.4 (1991).
We do not address here any question involving an appointment of an infer-
ior officer by the head of one of the principal agencies, such as the Federal
Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Id. Freytag concerned the validity of a statute that authorized the Chief Judge of the
U.S. Tax Court to appoint special taxjudges. The majority concluded that special tax
judges were "'inferior office [rs]' whose appointment must conform to the Appoint-
ments Clause," id. at 881, and the Tax Court was a "'Cour[t] of Law' within the mean-
ing of the Appointments Clause," id. at 890.
422 The validity of this assumption is very open to question. Although the Court in
Freytag expressed doubt at the petitioner's argument that the term "Department" in
the Appointments Clause was confined to Cabinet-level departments, id. at 886, it
agreed with the general proposition that the term must be construed narrowly to
"reflec[t] our Framers' conclusion that widely distributed appointment power sub-
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substantial question as to who is its "Head." One possibility is that the
SEC is "headed" by its five Commissioners as a collegial body. 423 But
another possibility is that the SEC is headed by its Chairman, who is
"the SEC's top executive. '424 A judicial finding that the Chairman
verts democratic government," id. at 885, and warned that "[g]iven the inexorable
presence of the administrative state, a holding that every organ in the Executive
Branch is a department would multiply indefinitely the number of actors eligible to
appoint," id.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion also sends a mixed message. He expresses
support on the one hand for the "proposition that 'Heads of Departments' includes
the heads of all agencies immediately below the President in the organizational struc-
ture of the Executive Branch" and identifies several inferior officers (including vari-
ous officers of the SEC) whose appointments would be rendered constitutionally
suspect by the majority's interpretation of the phrase. Id. at 918 (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). On the other hand, he specifically acknowl-
edges that "permitting appointment of inferior officers by the [independent regula-
tory] agency head may not ensure the high degree of insulation from congressional
control that was the purpose of the appointments scheme elaborated in the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 920-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
For an analysis of Freytag that would support the view that the SEC qualifies as a
"Department," see Dellinger, supra note 418, at 543 (offering the conclusion of a
then-Assistant Attorney General that "[w]e see no reason to exclude the independent
regulatory agencies from the class of entities that are 'Departments' for Appointments
Clause purposes").
423 Section 4 of the Exchange Act creates an SEC with five Commissioners, no
more than three of whom may be from one political party. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000).
The President appoints each commissioner, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, and commissioners serve for five-year terms, or until their successors are nomi-
nated, confirmed, and sworn in. Id. There is certainly authority for the proposition
that a collective body can constitute the "Head" of a department. See Silver v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the Governors of
the Postal Service could be deemed a "collective" head of a department, such that the
Governors could appoint the Postmaster General and the Deputy Postmaster General
as inferior officers pursuant to the Appointments Clause); see also Dellinger, supra
note 418, at 542 (citing a 1933 opinion by Acting Attorney General Biggs, 37 Op. Att'y
Gen. 227 (1933), that Congress could authorize the three-member Civil Service Com-
mission to appoint an inferior officer).
424 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Current SEC Commissioners, at http://www.sec.gov/
about/commissioner.shtml (last modified Apr. 9, 2003) (stating that the President
"designates one of the Commissioners as Chairman, the SEC's top executive"); see also
BIRG, supra note 24, at 6-7 (emphasizing the statement from website and concluding
that the SEC "is governed by the Chairman").
The development of the role of SEC Chairman is itself an interesting story that
bolsters the conclusion that the SEC has a unitary "head." Although section 4 of the
Exchange Act contains no reference to a "Chairman," until 1950 the full Commission
elected a Chairman annually. See SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681
(10th Cir. 1988). In section 3 of the Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, Congress
transferred this function from the Commission to the President, who now has exclu-
sive authority to designate a "Chairman" from among the five Commissioners. Reorg.
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"heads" the SEC within the meaning of the Appointments Clause
would likely mean that the appointment power for the PCAOB could
not be vested with the full Commission.
Because the Appointments Clause requires all officers other than
"inferior officers" to be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, Congress's decision to vest the power to
appoint PCAOB members in the full Commission would also be un-
constitutional if the PCAOB's five members are found to be "princi-
pal" rather than "inferior" officers. As the Court acknowledged in
Morrison v. Olson,4 2 5 "[t]he line between 'inferior' and 'principal' of-
ficers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little
guidance into where it should be drawn."4 26 The Court provided ad-
ditional guidance in Edmond v. United States,4 2 7 when it said:
Generally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relation-
ship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the Presi-
dent: Whether one is an "inferior" officer depends on whether he
has a superior. It is not enough that other officers may be identi-
fied who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities
of a greater magnitude .... Rather, in the context of a Clause de-
signed to preserve political accountability relative to important Gov-
ernment assignments, we think it evident that "inferior officers" are
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who
were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate.
428
But with respect to the PCAOB, Edmond leaves much open to
question. To some, the SEC's oversight responsibilities for the
PCAOB might suggest that the SEC's Commissioners are "superior" to
Plan No. 10 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1951), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 107-08 (2000),
and in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950). The Reorganization Plan also transferred from the full
Commission to the Chairman the "executive and administrative functions of the Com-
mission, including functions of the Commission with respect to (1) the appointment
and supervision of personnel employed under the Commission, (2) the distribution
of business among such personnel and among administrative units of the Commis-
sion, and (3) the use and expenditure of funds." Id. It also specified that "[t]he
appointment by the Chairman of the heads of major administrative units under the
Commission shall be subject to the approval of the Commission." Id. The Reorgani-
zation Plan therefore provides solid support for the proposition that the Chairman is
the SEC's unitary head.
425 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
426 Id. at 671-72 (finding that the Independent Prosecutor was an "inferior of-
ficer" because she is subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official, namely,
the Attomey General; she is "empowered by the Act to perform only certain, limited
duties;" and her office is "limited in jurisdiction" and "limited in tenure").
427 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
428 Id. at 662-63 (emphasis added).
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PCAOB members. Yet a strong argument can be made that federal
officers with fixed terms, who can be removed only when "good cause"
is shown, have no superiors to whom they are answerable. 429 It is also
unclear whether the PCAOB's work is "directed and supervised at
some level" by the SEC. In some areas, such as rulemaking and adju-
dications, the PCAOB could properly be said to be "supervised" by the
SEC, though not necessarily directed by it.430 Yet in other areas, such
as with respect to its investigative and prosecutorial functions, the
PCAOB's discretion is substantial and the potential for SEC "supervi-
sion" comes only at the very late stage of adjudicatory review. Indeed,
in the words of one influential Senator, Congress gave the PCAOB
"massive power, unchecked power, by design."431 The PCAOB's con-
gressionally designed independence could bolster a conclusion that
PCAOB members are "principal officers" such that the Appointments
Clause requires PCAOB members to be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
b. Separation of Powers
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is a self-exe-
cuting, structural safeguard that enforces the Framers' decision to
"dispers [e] the federal power among three branches-the Legislative,
429 See infra Part III.B.2.b (discussing whether limitations on presidential removal
violate separation of powers). Of course, a similar argument was rejected by a major-
ity of the Court in Morrison. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the majority's holding). But the majority's conclusion that the indepen-
dent counsel was an "inferior officer" was based in part on the very limited duties of
the special prosecutor and the fact that her tenure was of limited duration to accom-
plish only a single task. Id. at 655.
430 See supra Part II.A.7 (discussing SEC oversight of PCAOB rulemaking and adju-
dication). Although all rules promulgated by the PCAOB must be approved by the
SEC before they become final, the PCAOB retains substantial discretion with respect
to its rulemaking agenda and priorities. Other than its ultimate approval of the
PCAOB's budget (a power that Congress itself has over the SEC), it is difficult to see
how the SEC "directs" that agenda.
431 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (quoting the full statement by Sena-
tor Phil Gramm). As the Court noted in Edmond, "[b]y requiring the joint participa-
tion of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to
ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejec-
tion of a good one." Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660. It is certainly possible that Congress
was intentionally dodging responsibility when it rejected the Comptroller General's
recommendation to create a public oversight board with its members appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See supra notes 114, 117 and
accompanying text (quoting statements by Comptroller General David Walker). This
possibility is explored infra Part IV.A.2.
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the Executive, and the Judicial."432 Embodied in constitutional provi-
sions such as the Appointments Clause, the doctrine operates to en-
sure that one branch of government does not encroach on the duties
and responsibilities of another branch, and that power is not aggran-
dized by one branch at the expense of another. 433 As the Court has
recognized: "The ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to
protect the liberty and security of the governed." 434 Thus, actions that
violate the separation of powers doctrine must be declared unconsti-
tutional, even if Congress and the President are comfortable with the
manner in which the responsibility or power was redistributed.
435
The primary separation of powers question raised by the PCAOB
is whether Congress can shield that entity's enforcement function
from presidential control by placing the responsibility for oversight-
including the power to remove the PCAOB's five members-in a
source other than the President. To be sure, the Supreme Court has
already opined on the constitutionality of so-called independent regu-
latory agencies that combine rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudica-
tive functions with members who serve for fixed terms and are not
removable by the President in the absence of cause. 436 These deci-
sions are criticized sharply by constitutional formalists who advocate a
"unitary executive" model of the presidency, 43 7 but embraced by "con-
432 Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991).
433 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
434 Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 272.
435 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983) (stating that "[t]he assent of the
Executive to a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not
shield it from judicial review").
436 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the estab-
lishment of the Federal Sentencing Commission as an independent agency situated in
the judicial branch did not violate separation of powers doctrine); Wiener v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958) (upholding implied congressional limitations on
the President's power to remove members of the War Claims Commission);
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (upholding a statutory
provision that limited the President's power to remove members of the Federal Trade
Commission to a showing of cause); cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-97
(1988) (upholding the constitutionality of an independent prosecutorial agency).
But see Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (maintaining, for himself and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
that the decision in Humphrey's Executor helped to create a "headless Fourth Branch"
of government, and expressing the view that "adjusting the remainder of the Constitu-
tion to compensate for Humphrey's Executor is a fruitless endeavor").
437 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165-68 (1992); see also Stephen L.
Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative
Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 404-06 (1990) (questioning the constitutional
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stitutional functionalists" who are more concerned with the ultimate
balance of power than its strict separation. 438 The PCAOB's structure,
however, is a substantial step removed from the type of independence
from the executive garnering tacit approval in prior Court decisions:
the PCAOB is itself an entity with rulemaking, enforcement, and adju-
dicative functions whose members serve for fixed terms and are re-
movable only for cause by the SEC. A public/private entity overseen by
an independent regulatory agency elevates to a whole new level con-
ventional concerns about how the Framers' three-branch system can
be reconciled with a "headless fourth branch" of government.
439
There are at least two reasons why the PCAOB's structure may
not pass constitutional muster under either formalist or functionalist
approaches to separation of powers. First, because the President's
connection to the PCAOB is even more attenuated than his connec-
tions to independent agencies, Congress may have crossed the consti-
tutional line by impermissibly interfering with the President's
constitutional responsibility to "take care that the laws be faithfully
status of independent agencies); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 I-Lv. L. REv. 1231, 1242 (1994) (stating that "if a statute vests discretionary
authority directly in an agency official (as do most regulatory statutes) rather than in
the President, the Article II Vesting Clause seems to require that such discretionary
authority be subject to the President's control") (footnote omitted); Martin H. Red-
ish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 197, 228 (acknowledging the practical problems that would ensue from a
Supreme Court holding that independent agencies are unconstitutional, but con-
tending that the language of the Constitution simply does not allow such agencies).
438 See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 526 (1987) (stating that
"[a]lthough formalism has its advantages and functionalism its dangers, the former is
simply incapable of describing the government we have"); see also Cynthia R. Farina,
The "Chief Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 179, 179
(1997) (discussing the development and the dangers of the "cult of the Chief Execu-
tive"); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REv.
1346 passim (1994) (emphasizing role of Congress in structuring the executive branch
and criticizing arguments for absolute presidential control). Professor Stephen
Carter has speculated that without a functionalist doctrine, "there would be no inde-
pendent regulatory agencies in the federal government." Stephen L. Carter, From Sick
Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers,
1987 BYU L. REv. 719, 727.
439 See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 667-69 (1984) (arguing that the
Constitution does not really separate the federal government into three distinct
branches); Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DuKE L.J. 215
(discussing how the administrative state fits into the Constitution).
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executed."440 Indeed, with federal independent regulatory agencies,
the President's "take care" responsibilities are arguably fulfilled (at
least in the minds of functionalists) because the President generally
appoints members when there are vacancies, chooses the Chair, and
can remove members for cause. But the President possesses none of
these powers with respect to the PCAOB, and the oversight provided
by the formally independent SEC cannot plausibly be expected to
function as a presidential surrogate.441 Accordingly, defenders of the
PCAOB's structure will have their work cut out for them in arguing
that the Constitution allows the PCAOB's five members to be even
more independent from the President than the members of federal
independent agencies.
The PCAOB presents a second separation of powers argument
that both formalists and functionalists may find compelling. Unlike
the congressional limitations on the President's removal power that
passed constitutional muster in Humphrey's Executor,4 42 and the more
recent cases of Morrison v. Olson443 and Mistretta v. United States,4 44 with
the PCAOB it could be argued that Congress has acted to "increase its
own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch. '445 After all, the
PCAOB owes its life to Congress and by declaring the PCAOB a failed
experiment, Congress could abolish the PCAOB far more easily than
it could a longstanding federal independent regulatory agency.
446
Whether Congress aggrandized its power enough to trigger a constitu-
440 See Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and
Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 180-83 (1989) (emphasizing that
private delegates may elude executive oversight and control); Froomkin, supra note
30, at 548 (stating that some federal government corporations may raise separation of
powers concerns because they "weaken[ I presidential . . .control over the federal
administrative machinery"); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congres-
sional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L.
REv. 62, 72-80 (1990) (contending that congressional delegations to entities outside
of the President's control may prevent the President from fulfilling his constitutional
responsibility for implementing policy).
441 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 (holding that the Ethics in Government Act does
not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the Attorney General, a
subordinate of the President, has the statutory right to remove an independent prose-
cutor for cause).
442 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
443 487 U.S. at 670-97.
444 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
445 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694; see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (hold-
ing that Congress could not vest executive functions in the Comptroller General, an
agent subject to its control).
446 See Krent, supra note 440, at 67 (noting that when a recipient of delegated
power is accountable to Congress rather than the President, "Congress may be able to
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tional violation is an essential question that may challenge courts and
scholars for years to come.
C. The Nondelegation Doctrine and the PCAOB
A constitutional analysis of the PCAOB is incomplete without an
examination-even a brief one-of the Supreme Court's nondelega-
tion doctrine. In its broadest iteration, the doctrine prohibits Con-
gress from delegating its legislative power to other institutions,
whether public or private. 447 Rooted in constitutional principles of
separation of powers and due process, nondelegation ensures that
fundamental policy choices are made by Congress, the governmental
unit elected directly by, and most accountable to, the public. 44s Al-
though as currently interpreted it does not raise much constitutional
doubt as to the validity of Congress's delegation to the PCAOB, the
nondelegation doctrine does provide valuable insight into congres-
sional decisions regarding the PCAOB's design and structure.
When applied to administrative agencies or the executive branch
itself, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits only those delegations
that fail to lay "down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [take action] is directed to
conform."449 Accordingly, under the so-called "public" nondelegation
doctrine, Congress may vest agencies with vast policymaking power,
keep the reigns of power without facing direct electoral accountability for the subse-
quent formulation of policy").
447 STONE ET AL., supra note 375, at 365.
448 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3 (1993) (bemoaning that "[w]hen the
lawmakers we elect have others make the law, the people lose"). Recently, scholars
have debated whether the Constitution's text and history supports such a doctrine.
See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327, 330 (2002) ("The
nondelegation doctrine... is the Energizer Bunny of constitutional law: No matter
how many times it gets broken, beaten, or buried, it just keeps on going and going.");
Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from Constitutional and
Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDozo L. REv. 731 (1999). Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1722 (2002)
(arguing that "there just is no constitutional nondelegation rule, nor has there ever
been"), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1297 (2003) (advancing textual
and historical arguments for the nondelegation doctrine).
449 Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (emphasizing that Congress must articulate
an "intelligible principle" to guide an agency's discretion when it delegates rulemak-
ing authority to an administrative agency, but finding that the Clean Air Act did con-
tain an "intelligible principle").
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provided it is not "standardless. ' '45 0 However, since even nebulous
phrases such as "in the public interest" and 'just and reasonable"
qualify as standards that are "intelligible,"' 451 it is hardly surprising
that the last delegations to administrative agencies invalidated by the
Supreme Court were the ones at issue in the New Deal cases of A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States452 and Panama Refinery Co. v.
Ryan.453 Indeed, constitutional scholars rather routinely claim that
"the nondelegation doctrine has all but disappeared as a constraint on
the delegation of authority to administrative agencies." 454 Many find
this lack of constraint troubling because administrative agencies are
less accountable to the public than Congress or the President, though
their discretionary power is considerable. 4 55
Congressional delegations to private entities raise issues that are
even more troubling than those stemming from congressional delega-
tions to administrative agencies. When invalidating a New Deal statu-
tory scheme that allowed a majority of coal miners and producers to
establish standards for the entire industry, the Court had this to say
about private delegations:
This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or official body; presumptively disin-
terested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often
are adverse to the interests of others in the same business .... And
a statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an intol-
erable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and
private property.
45 6
Although Carter Coal highlights a concern with private parties'
self-interestedness, scholars observe the Court's wariness of an addi-
450 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473 (rejecting the D.C. Circuit Court's suggestion that an
"agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining
to exercise some of that power"); see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 144-45
(2000) (stating that the "public nondelegation doctrine... limits Congress's ability to
make standardless delegations to administrative agencies by imposing a limited partic-
ularity requirement on delegations of congressional authority to federal agencies").
451 See generally Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate
to Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 427-52 (2001) (discussing the history and
current implications of the nondelegation doctrine).
452 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
453 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
454 STONE ET AL., supra note 375, at 366.
455 See supra notes 437-38 and accompanying text.
456 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). The Court also criticized a
congressional delegation to private groups when it invalidated the National Recovery
Act in Schechter Poultry. 295 U.S. at 541-42.
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tional danger from private delegation: that "public sovereignty would
be gifted to private parties, perhaps for populist, redistributive, or sim-
ply commercial, rent-seeking ends. '457 The greater risks posed by
Congress ceding public power to private entities have prompted some
scholars to speculate that federal courts may be less reluctant to invali-
date private delegations, particularly if the congressional delegation
involved "core" governmental powers. 458 But court decisions, includ-
ing by the Supreme Court, demonstrate that governmental oversight
of private decisionmaking will generally insulate Congress's private
delegations from constitutional challenge.
459
Interpreted as such, neither the public nor the private nondele-
gation doctrine holds much hope for constitutional challenge to the
PCAOB. As the "government itself," the PCAOB's rulemaking is
guided by the "in the public interest" standard that appears through-
out Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.460 Thus, the PCAOB's actions
will likely pass constitutional muster under the public nondelegation
doctrine. And the result is the same even if the PCAOB were evalu-
ated under the doctrine of private nondelegation. The SEC's ultimate
authority with respect to PCAOB rulemaking and adjudication will
likely shield the rules of the PCAOB from constitutional attack.
All that said, the private nondelegation doctrine appears to have
functioned as a constitutional prophylactic during the critical period
when Congress was structuring the PCAOB. Indeed, while the legisla-
tive record reflects a strong consensus for decisionmaking by a private,
independent regulator, it also reflects a sensitivity to the importance
457 James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 DuKE LJ. 5, 14
(2000).
458 Freeman, supra note 30, at 584; see also Froomkin, supra note 450, at 155 (stat-
ing that "even though the Supreme Court has not decided a case turning on the
private nondelegation doctrine in sixty years, there is reason to believe that Carter
Coal's fundamental limit on delegations of public power to private groups retains its
validity") (footnote omitted).
459 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398-400 (1940) (up-
holding a post-Carter Coal version of the Bituminous Coal Act that allowed private coal
boards to set rules governing the sale of coal, with the board's rulemaking subject to
approval, disapproval, or modification by the government's Bituminous Coal Commis-
sion). For cases upholding SEC delegations to private entities, see Todd & Co. v. SEC,
557 F.2d 1008, 1012-14 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding the SEC's delegation of registration of
broker-dealers to the NASD was a valid exercise of legislative authority given that the
NASD's rules and disciplinary actions "were subject to full review by the S.E.C., a
wholly public body, which must base its decision on its own findings"); R.H. Johnson
& Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965) (same analysis); Arthur Andersen &
Co. v. SEC, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,374 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (dicta), available at 1978 WL 1073.
460 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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of SEC oversight, particularly with respect to the PCAOB's rulemaking
and adjudication. 461 This balance between independence and over-
sight was candidly acknowledged by Senator Phil Gramm in compar-
ing his and Senator Enzi's proposal with the PCAOB: "Ours is a little
more independent of the SEC; though, in the end, to meet the constitu-
tional test, the SEC has to have authority over it."462 The private
nondelegation doctrine is very likely the "test" to which Senator
Gramm was referring.
The SEC's authority over the PCAOB may have prevented a con-
stitutional infirmity under the private nondelegation doctrine, but it
helped to trigger another one: the SEC's formal control over the con-
gressionally created PCAOB renders the PCAOB a public entity for
purposes of the Constitution.463 In point of fact, Congress probably
could have navigated around both doctrines. That is, an oversight
board that was created by the accounting industry itself, "recognized"
by the SEC, and subject to SEC oversight potentially could have
steered clear of both a finding of state action and an impermissible
private delegation. 464 This possibility evidences a constitutional co-
nundrum: the more policymaking authority delegated by Congress to
private actors, the less likely it is that the Constitution constrains their
actions. 465 Scholarly criticism of the Court's state action and nondele-
gation jurisprudence therefore seems very well founded.
461 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
462 147 CONG. REc. S6335 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (em-
phasis added); see also supra note 138 and accompanying text (quoting Senator
Gramm's statement that we "want it to be private, but we want it to have governmental
powers").
463 See supra Part III.A.2.b.
464 See supra note 344 (postulating that had CAARTA been enacted in place of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the "public regulatory organization" recognized by the SEC
would have likely been viewed much like the NYSE and the NASD).
465 See Metzger, supra note 30, at 1425. As Professor Metzger sees it,
[t]he inverse relationship between the extent of government involvement
and private authority means that current doctrine has it nearly exactly back-
wards. Private actors given broader discretion in their exercise of govern-
ment power are less likely to be subject to constitutional constraints than
those who operate under close government supervision and whose potential
for abusive action is thus more curtailed .... [T]he Court uses state action
doctrine to police against intentional evasion and bad faith by those who are
indisputably government actors, but it does not view the doctrine as a safe-
guard against private actors wielding government power outside of constitu-
tional constraints.
Id. Professor Metzer develops and advocates a new constitutional analysis that focuses
on whether a private entity has been structured so that it may provide persons with
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IV. A POLICY CRITIQUE OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE REGULATORS
The foregoing part demonstrated the doctrinal flaw in Congress's
decision to establish the PCAOB as a nonprofit corporation in the
private sector: an entity that is created by the federal government,
with board members appointed by the government, and accorded
governmental powers and privileges to fulfill governmental objectives
can only be characterized as the government for purposes of constitu-
tional law. Thus, when it established the PCAOB, Congress created
what may be more appropriately termed a "public/private regula-
tor"-public for purposes of the rights, liberties, and structures pro-
tected by the Constitution, and private for other purposes.
This final Part shifts from doctrine to policy and contends that
entities established by federal law with a combination of rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudicative power should be part of the federal
government for all purposes, not merely for those purposes which the
Constitution places beyond Congress's purview. It advances three ar-
guments against the creation of such public/private regulators. First,
Congress's ability to designate an entity as private circumvents the stat-
utory obligations and protections that apply only to federal agencies.
Public/private regulators are therefore less accountable to the public,
their actions are less transparent, and their policymaking is less legiti-
mate than their purely public counterparts. Circumvention of statu-
tory obligations and protections is particularly troubling when the
powers possessed by the public/private regulator mirror those of fed-
eral independent regulatory agencies. Second, the pursuit of policy
through a public/private regulator significantly lessens Congress's
and the President's accountability to the public because it obscures
responsibility for unpopular decisions or unwise policies. Third, con-
gressional creation of a public/private regulator produces inefficien-
cies that could be avoided were the regulator officially part of the
federal government.
This Part concludes with a discussion of pending legislation that
would create an ostensibly private "Mutual Fund Oversight Board" in
response to the current industry crisis. Even if Congress opts to retain
the PCAOB's status as a private, nonprofit corporation, it should
break the mold from which it was cast and resist the temptation to
create other public/private regulators.
adequate means of enforcing constitutional limits even though it is exempt from di-
rect constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 1461-85.
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A. Arguments Against Public/Private Regulators
1. Circumvented Procedures and Protections
Although a public/private regulator can have the look and feel of
a federal independent regulatory agency, Congress's declaration that
it is "not an agency" allows that regulator to exercise rulemaking, en-
forcement, and adjudicative power unfettered by administrative stat-
utes designed to curb the discretion of unelected officials and ensure
that policymaking is rational, transparent, and accountable. This cir-
cumvention of administrative procedures and protections is troubling
because for most members of the regulated and protected public, the
statutory checks that Congress has placed on agency power may be
even more important than the constitutional checks imposed by the
framers.
466
Statutory checks on agency power include the judicial review, no-
tice, and comment provisions in the APA 4 6 7 the access to records
mandated by the FOIA; 4 6 8 and the open-meeting requirements of the
Government in the Sunshine Act. 469 Each of these statutes operates
to curb agency discretion by opening government "to the light of pub-
466 See id. at 1452 (recognizing that while constitutional rights "may assure baseline
protection," the substance of those rights often "may be so thin that they offer little
defense against abuse of power").
467 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000), affords
interested parties the right to participate in an agency's rulemaking process. For
rulemaking to be valid, the agency must (1) publish general notice of the proposed
rule in the Federal Register, id. § 553(b), and (2) give interested persons "an opportu-
nity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments," id. § 553(c). The APA also specifies that agencies must "incorporate in
the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose" and must
publish a final rule in the Federal Register at least thirty days before it becomes effec-
tive. Id. Its judicial review provisions include § 702, which provides that "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action ...is entitled to judicial review
thereof," and § 704, which permits a federal district court to reverse final agency ac-
tion that is, among other things, "arbitrary" or "capricious."
468 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004), per-
mits "any person" to request and obtain access to all federal agency records, subject
only to nine enumerated exemptions. Id. § 552a. The nine exemptions permit an
agency to shield from disclosure information including records pertaining to national
security, internal personnel rules, matters specifically exempted from disclosure by
other federal acts, trade secrets, inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda, personnel
and medical files, records or information compiled for pending investigatory or en-
forcement purposes, matters concerning the operation of financial institutions, and
geological information. Id. § 552b(c)(1)-(9).
469 The Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (West Supp. 2004),
requires open meetings for agencies headed by multi-member commissions or
boards.
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lic scrutiny. '4 70 The APA also curbs discretion by encouraging wide-
spread public participation in the early stages of rulemaking, before
policy decisions get "chiseled into bureaucratic stone."'4 71 An agency
that seeks widespread input and operates in full public view is more
likely to produce policy that is legitimate, 472 accountable, 4 73 and ra-
tional, 474  and is less likely to be captured by powerful
constituencies.4
75
To be sure, the absence of general statutory checks on adminis-
trative action does not preclude a private regulator from voluntarily
adopting rules and procedures that embody the same democratic val-
ues,4 7 6 nor does it prevent Congress from conditioning its delegation
of power on the regulator's adoption of specific procedures. 477 But
the public's "right to know what their government is up to"4 78 and the
public's right to participate in policymaking should not be dependent
on a private regulator's good will or perceived self-interest. And Con-
470 Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) (referring to the
FOIA).
471 Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 610 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
472 Because it affects compliance with the law, legitimacy is a particularly impor-
tant democratic value. See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57 (1990) (em-
phasizing that legitimacy is often "believed to be the key to the success of legal
authorities" and that "[i]f authorities have legitimacy they can function effectively; if
they lack it it is difficult and perhaps impossible for them to regulate public
behavior").
473 See Beermann, supra note 418, at 1553-56 (discussing how the FOIA, the APA,
and the Sunshine Act enhance agency accountability).
474 See Freeman, supra note 30, at 1303 (noting that "[p]rocedural regularity is also
instrumental . .. [because] procedures designed to ensure public participation and
individual fairness might improve the rationality of decisionmaking").
475 See infra note 479 (discussing the PCAOB and the risk of capture). See generally
IAN AYREs &JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGU-
LATION DEBATE 54-73 (1992) (providing an overview of capture theory and the de-
bates surrounding it).
476 See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing notice and comment
procedures and open-meeting provisions adopted voluntarily by the PCAOB). But see
supra notes 215-16 (discussing Title I's mandate of confidentiality which prohibits the
PCAOB from sharing most investigative and disciplinary records with the public).
477 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing Title I's requirement
that the PCAOB establish ethical rules and standards of conduct for its members and
staff, including a one-year bar on practice before the PCAOB for former members
and appropriate periods, not to exceed a year, for former staff); see also supra note 211
and accompanying text (discussing Title I's requirement that the PCAOB adopt "fair
procedures" for investigations and disciplinary proceedings).
478 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas,J., dissenting) (quoting Henry
Steele Cornmeger, The Defeat of America, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Oct. 5, 1972, at 7).
2005] 106 3
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
gress cannot be counted on to secure those rights in the legislation
that creates a public/private regulator because political compromises
often eliminate democratic checks that seem too bureaucratic for an
ostensibly private entity.
4 79
Circumventing administrative procedures through a congres-
sional declaration that a private regulator is not an entity of the fed-
eral government, and that its employees are not federal employees,
has an additional downside: it generally exempts the public/private
regulator from coverage under federal statutes and regulations de-
signed to further the integrity of an agency's process and to protect
agency activities from fraud, corruption, and other illegality. Exam-
ples include the prohibition on lying to a federal official, 480 the re-
quirement that certain administrative officials file detailed financial
reports, 48 1 the criminalization of offers or receipts of bribes or illegal
gratuities to or by public officials,482 and the prohibition on false
claims against the government. 483 A fledgling public/private regula-
479 Consider, for example, the statutory checks that were proposed, but ultimately
rejected, in the congressional design of the PCAOB: both the CAARTA and the bill
sponsored by Representative LaFalce would have required an oversight board to com-
ply with the FOIA, see supra note 133 and accompanying text, the LaFalce bill also
would have required the board to comply with the APA, see supra note 134, and the
Enzi-Gramm draft bill would have provided for direct federal district court review of
oversight board decisions in final disciplinary proceedings, see supra note 132. It is
ironic that the same Congress that specifically exempted the PCAOB from the FOIA,
15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(b) (5) (A) (West Supp. 2004), was concerned enough about the
risk of capture to flatly prohibit the service of more than two CPAs on the Board at
one time. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
Securities law scholars have emphasized that a key to the PCAOB's success lies
with its ability to "successfully resist[ ] capture by the interests of the actors it regu-
lates." Bratton, supra note 2, at 1032. Professor Bratton highlights the powerful force
of the accounting industry lobby and the "[e]normous rents [that] remain at stake, in
respect of both auditing services and outside consulting." Id. at 1033. He warns that
"[t]he political climate remains volatile, creating openings in which the voice of influ-
ence can effectively be raised." Id. If applied to the PCAOB, administrative statutes
like the FOIA would go a long way toward exposing those openings and lessening the
risk of capture.
480 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
481 Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Requirements, 5 U.S.C. app.
§§ 201-211 (2000).
482 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (b)-(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
483 The False Claim Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000). The federal statute that
criminalizes the obstruction, or attempted obstruction, of a "Federal auditor in the
performance of official duties," 18 U.S.C.A. § 1516, presents another example. In
United States v. Plasser American Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 140 (E.D. Pa. 1999), the defend-
ants conceded having attempted to obstruct an audit conducted by Amtrak, but con-
tended that it was not a federal audit within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 140.
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tor without the might of a longstanding federal agency may be partic-
ularly vulnerable to abuses by third parties and rogue employees.
Thus, the policy reasons for applying administrative procedures
and protections to public/private regulators are as strong-or per-
haps even stronger-than the reasons for applying them to their
purely public counterparts. And, as we shall see, the economic effects
of circumvention will often be negative ones.
48 4
2. Diminished Electoral Accountability
The pursuit of policy through a public/private regulator allows
elected officials to create for themselves a troubling "win-win" scena-
rio: Congress and the President can claim credit for the ingenuity that
resulted in regulatory successes and they can avoid blame for the pri-
vate regulator's unpopular decisions or unwise policies. But that sce-
nario is obviously a losing one for the general public-blurring the
lines of responsibility reduces the effective functioning of a represen-
tative democracy. The more confusion that is created, the lesser the
likelihood that voters can express accurate preferences for retaining
or removing elected officials.
485
The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that while the
Court's decision in Lebron held that Amtrak was a federal actor for purposes of the
Constitution, Congress's determination in the enabling statute that Amtrak "is not a
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government" was con-
trolling for purposes of the obstructions statute. Id. at 140-41.
484 See infra Part IV.A.3. Although some might argue that statutory checks on
agency power (e.g., the APA and FOIA) should apply to any entity that is created by
the federal government to serve a governmental purpose, there is a strong counter-
argument that these statutory checks may be too restraining for a congressionally cre-
ated commercial entity that is subject to private sector competition and that does not
function primarily as a regulator. See Froomkin, supra note 30, at 557-58 (discussing
the economic rationales for creating federal government corporations). Congres-
sional decisionmaking, however, is often laden with irony: while both Amtrak and the
PCAOB were designated by Congress as "not an agency or instrumentality" of the
federal government, Amtrak was required to comply with the FOIA, 45 U.S.C.
§ 546(g) (repealed 1994), whereas PCAOB records are specifically exempt, 15
U.S.C.A. § 7215. Precisely the opposite conclusion would be assumed from the rela-
tive balance of their commercial functions and policymaking responsibilities.
485 See Beermann, supra note 418, at 1509 (stating that "the clarity of responsibility
for an action or policy involves the degree to which the body politic can discern who
in the political system is responsible for a decision, policy, or activity, so that efforts to
exert political influence can be directed to the proper authorities"); see also Froomkin,
supra note 30, at 548 (stating that "[p]lacing public funds, public monopolies, or pub-
lic power, in the hands of unelected, unappointed, almost certainly unimpeachable,
and largely unaccountable private parties poses a serious and largely unexplored chal-
lenge to accountable, efficient, democratic national government").
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In this regard, the PCAOB's structure raises even more concern
than other congressionally created public/private regulators. As dis-
cussed previously, the three closest analogues to the PCAOB-the Le-
gal Services Corporation (LSC), the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (CPB), and Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC)-each have their members appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. 48 6 Such joint participation holds both
branches accountable for the "making of a bad appointment and the
rejection of a good one."48 7 But even this minimal accountability is
not present with the PCAOB because the power to appoint its mem-
bers lies with the full Commission. The SEC's role as buffer, both in
the appointments process and as the PCAOB's overseer, diminishes
electoral accountability.
3. Inefficiencies
Although Congress is often drawn to the private sector to reduce
the costs of regulation,4 8 8 policymaking through a public/private reg-
ulator may actually serve to increase the total costs of a regulatory pro-
gram. At least three factors account for why a public/private
regulator may operate less efficiently than one that is purely public.
First, public/private regulators may expend valuable resources in pro-
posing and adopting customized rules and procedures where existing
requirements for federal agencies would have functioned as well or
better. 48 9 Second, the workload of a purely public regulator may have
to be increased substantially to allow for effective oversight of a pub-
lic/private regulator. Such inefficiencies are compounded when the
principal impetus for oversight is the avoidance of constitutional
problems under the private nondelegation doctrine.4 90 Finally, sub-
stantial costs may be generated by the uncertainty surrounding the
486 See supra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
487 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
488 See Freeman, supra note 311, at 1296 (noting that, from a pragmatic perspec-
ive, "privatization is a means of improving productive efficiency: obtaining high-qual-
ity services at the lowest possible cost, thereby freeing up resources that might
otherwise go to waste and allocating them elsewhere to maximize welfare"); Schwarz,
supra note 311, at 321-22 (stating that "[i]f the goal of commercial regulation is eco-
nomic efficiency, private institutions can achieve that goal more easily than public
actors").
489 See supra notes 168, 236 and accompanying text (discussing the PCAOB's devel-
opment of rules for ethical conduct for members and staff and rules for investigation
and disciplinary proceedings).
490 See supra note 462 and accompanying text (quoting a statement by Senator Phil
Gramm suggesting that constitutional requirements may have dictated the scheme of
SEC oversight for the ostensibly private PCAOB).
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regulator's legal status as a public/private regulator. 491 Weighed
against these costs are the possible gains in flexibility from the public/
private regulator's ability to avoid time consuming administrative pro-
cedures like notice and comment.492 But to increase the quality and
legitimacy of its policymaking, a public/private regulator may be
tempted to forgo those gains and employ such procedures
voluntarily.
493
In light of these factors, a strong case can be made that Congress
could have structured the PCAOB to operate more efficiently as an
official part of the federal government. One possibility, as former
SEC Chairman David Breeden and other congressional witnesses rec-
ommended, would have been to infuse the SEC with additional re-
sources to enable it to play the primary role in auditor oversight.
These witnesses emphasized that the SEC's long and impressive gen-
eral enforcement record rendered it unnecessary to "reinvent the
wheel." 494 Another possibility, in accordance with Comptroller Gen-
eral David Walker's favored recommendation, would have been to
structure the PCAOB as an independent governmental entity housed
within the SEC. As the Comptroller General emphasized, the new en-
tity could have received "administrative support from the SEC includ-
ing human resources [and] payroll," and its venue would have
"facilitate [d] communication and provide [d] for maximum coordina-
tion with the SEC."'495 A third possibility, also endorsed by the Comp-
troller General, would have been to organize the PCAOB as an
independent stand-alone government agency.
496
491 See Froomkin, supra note 30, at 548 (noting that with some government corpo-
rations, "otherwise simple civil cases become complicated, as courts struggle to deter-
mine whether an entity is a private party, a state actor, or part of the state itself"). In
light of the PCAOB's rulemaking, enforcement, and disciplinary functions, an expec-
tation of substantial litigation would certainly seem reasonable.
492 See supra note 484.
493 Ironically, a private entity's decision to forgo its blanket "exemption" and vol-
untarily adopt APA-like procedures negates the very rationale that most often justifies
its creation as a private entity in the first place. Another irony is that when voluntary
notice and comment procedures are adopted by a private entity, there is often a
double opportunity for notice and comment because the APA may require the private
entity's public overseer to provide notice and comment before approving a final rule.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (describing the process by which the
PCAOB first proposes a rule, provides a period of notice and comment, finalizes that
rule, and transmits the rule to the SEC, which provides for notice and comment
before SEC approval of final rule).
494 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
495 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (quoting a letter from Comptroller
General Walker to Senator Paul Sarbanes).
496 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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In connection with any of these alternatives, Congress could have
imbued the new SEC division or independent governmental body
with attributes from the private sector. For instance, Congress could
have provided for funding of the new SEC division or independent
public body by authorizing it to collect accounting support fees from
public companies. 497 As governmental bodies like the FDIC and the
Federal Reserve evidence, Congress certainly does not need to create
a private entity to provide for private funding.498 Moreover, as it has
done with the FDIC and the Federal Reserve (and more recently with
the SEC itself), Congress could have exempted the independent gov-
ernment body from the federal civil service pay scales that could inter-
fere with its ability to attract highly competent board members and
support staff.4 9 9 Indeed, Congress could have authorized an indepen-
dent government body to compensate its staff at levels even higher
than the SEC and the federal bank regulators. 50 0 Thus, if Congress
497 See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (discussing the PCAOB's power
to allocate and collect accounting support fees from public companies).
498 See supra notes 295, 303 and accompanying text (noting that both the FDIC
and the Federal Reserve were established as entities of the federal government,
though both are funded through fees paid by banks and other financial institutions
rather than through general appropriations); see alsoJoel Seligman, Self-Funding for the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NoVA L. REv. 233, 238-39 (2004) (noting that
the registration and other fees collected by the SEC far exceed its annual
appropriations).
499 For decades, pay parity between the SEC staff (who were compensated at stan-
dard civil service pay levels) and the more well-compensated staff of the federal finan-
cial institution regulators (the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision) had been the subject of impassioned requests by SEC Chairmen
in reports and testimony to Congress. See, e.g., supra note 97 (quoting statement by
former SEC Chairman Breeden); see also 148 CONG. REc. S7352 (daily ed. July 25,
2002) (statement by Senator Paul Sarbanes) (characterizing the salary discrepancies
between the SEC and the five federal bank regulatory agencies as an "intolerable situ-
ation"). Although Congress acceded to the SEC's request in January 2002, the money
to fund it did not come until seven months later as part of the appropriations in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See id. (stating that "[p]ay parity has been authorized and now
must be funded; this legislation specifically provides the necessary funding").
500 A separate question entirely is whether it would have been efficient for Con-
gress to have used that power. Indeed, even with the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act changes
to their compensation structure, staff at the SEC are paid significandy less than their
counterparts at the PCAOB. The large discrepancy in salary structure creates a rea-
sonable fear that the PCAOB can drain the SEC of its staff most skilled in accounting
matters. Of course, the SEC is used to dealing with the possibility that key staff can be
lured away by the higher salaries offered by SROs like the NYSE and the NASD. But
there the competition is not from a congressionally created entity.
A large disparity between SEC and PCAOB salaries also creates the possibility that
the judgment of SEC staff could be influenced subconsciously by the hoped for op-
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chose to situate the PCAOB in the private sector to provide its mem-
bers and staff with more competitive compensation, 50 1 it did so for
reasons of politics rather than law.
B. Breaking the Mold
Even if the PCAOB remains a private nonprofit corporation with
public status only for purposes of constitutional law, Congress should
break the mold from which it was cast and resist the temptation to
create other public/private regulators. As the foregoing section dem-
onstrates, not only are centaur-like creatures less accountable, legiti-
mate, and transparent than "official" federal regulators, but the total
costs of the regulatory programs they administer may actually be
higher.
The concern that Congress may be tempted to employ the
PCAOB as a regulatory model is not at all a hypothetical one. In re-
sponse to a perceived crisis in the mutual fund industry, Senator
Thomas Daschle (D-N.D.),joined by Senators Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.)
portunity of PCAOB employment later down the road. Cf Mundstock, supra note 45,
at 834-85 (noting that "accountants at the SEC leave to go to the FASB for higher-
paying (non civil service) staff jobs, a possibility which must unconsciously color the
Agency's (or, at least the Office of the Chief Accountant's) view of the Board").
501 When the PCAOB's Chairman was asked at a recent lecture to comment on the
reasons behind Congress's choice to organize the PCAOB as a nonprofit corporation,
he offered the following explanation:
We were created as a not-for profit corporation largely so the PCAOB could
pay better than the government .... [Members of Congress] realized that
they were piling an immense responsibility on a startup, and so one of the
things they figured out is you're going to have to pay people better than the
government can pay.
So we are competitive with a big accounting firm, and we pay about twice as
much as the U.S. Government can pay for a similar position. That is why we
are a not-for-profit.
William J. McDonough, The Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securi-
ties & Financial Law, 9 FoRDHAm J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583, 599-600 (2004). Chairman
McDonough's explanation for the PCAOB's private status is consistent with a state-
ment made several months before by Charles Niemeier, who was the Chief Account-
ant for the SEC's Division of Enforcement immediately before his appointment as a
member of the PCAOB:
Congress had a stroke of genius when it chose to organize the board as an
independent not-for-profit organization rather than as a unit of government.
The board will be able to offer a compensation structure that will attract
highly qualified individuals and offer them a career path that simply is not
possible for people in the government.
Robert H. Colson, Maintaining Public Credibility: An Interview with Charles D. Niemeier,
CPAJouRN1AL, Apr. 1, 2003, at 18, 19-20 (quoting statement).
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and John Kerry (D-Mass.), introduced a bill that, among other things,
would create an ostensibly private "Mutual Fund Oversight Board."
50 2
The proposed board would possess registration, investigation, discipli-
nary, and rulemaking authority over mutual fund directors.50 3 Its
members would be selected by the SEC 50 4 and it would be funded by
assessments against mutual fund assets or management fees. 50 5 Sena-
tor Kerry provided the following rationale for its creation, one far
more candid than any offered in Congress for the PCAOB:
The actions by the SEC show that it is incapable of protecting inves-
tors from securities fraud by mutual fund companies and will not
prosecute this type of fraud to the full extent of the law. Therefore,
we must take the day-to-day oversight of mutual funds away from the
SEC and develop a new Mutual Fund Oversight Board to provide
oversight, examination and enforcement of mutual funds. This new
board will be similar to the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board developed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
50 6
Whether or not the SEC's record of mutual fund regulation de-
serves such staunch criticism, the proposed cure-the creation of yet
another private board to regulate yet another securities-related area-
502 The Mutual Fund Protection Act of 2003, S. 1958, 108th Congress § 201 (a)
(2003). In wording drawn verbatim from Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see supra
notes 157-58 and accompanying text, the Mutual Fund Oversight Board shall be "a
body corporate, operate as a nonprofit corporation, and have succession until dis-
solved by an Act of Congress" and "shall not be an agency or establishment of the
United States Government, and, except as otherwise provided in this Act, shall be
subject to, and have all the powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by, the
District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act." S. 1958 § 201(b). Moreover, "[n]o
member or person employed by, or agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an
officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such ser-
vice." Id.
Following closely on the heels of the Daschle-Kennedy-Kerry bill was a bill intro-
duced by Senator Christopher Dodd and Senator Jon Corzine, joined this time by
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), that, among other things, would require the
General Accounting Office to "conduct a study to determine the feasibility of, and
assess what, if any, benefits to shareholders, mutual fund governance and mutual
fund supervision would result from establishing a 'Mutual Fund Oversight Board.'"
The Mutual Fund Investor Confidence Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1971, 108th Cong.
§ 104 (2003). Both bills, and a number of others, were referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which conducted a series of "mutual
fund" hearings in winter 2004. Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: Consumer, Investor
Groups Tell Senators of Need for Improved Fund Fee Disclosure, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 560, 560 (2004). The bills remain in that Committee.
503 S. 1958 §§ 202-205.
504 Id. § 207(d)(1).
505 Id. § 201(e)(3).
506 149 CONG. REc. S19,584 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
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is worse than the diagnosed problem. A public/private regulator to
oversee the mutual fund industry will trample once again on demo-
cratic values and will further fragment efficient securities regulation.
If further study and consideration of the mutual fund industry
demonstrates that regulatory change is warranted, then Congress has
at least two preferable alternatives: it can use its power of the purse to
encourage even more vigilant enforcement efforts by the SEC's Divi-
sion of Investment Management or it can remove mutual fund over-
sight from the SEC's jurisdiction and assign it to a newly created
governmental body. But for all of the reasons discussed in this Article,
Congress should not replicate the PCAOB's structural flaws in a pub-
lic/private regulator for the mutual fund industry.
CONCLUSION
Congress's decision to create the PCAOB as a new watchdog for
the accounting profession raises tremendously important issues, both
from a doctrinal perspective as well as a normative one. The principal
doctrinal question is whether the PCAOB's congressionally designated
status as a private corporation will insulate its actions from constitu-
tional challenge. Supreme Court precedent answers that question
with a resounding "no." The principal normative question is whether
a congressionally created "private" entity with a combination of
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative power stands in tension
with democratic values such as accountability, transparency, and legiti-
macy. Finding such public/private regulators in tension with those
values, and few actual benefits from their designation as private, this
Article urges Congress to cease playing peekaboo with public/private
regulators modeled after the PCAOB.
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